

LANGUAGE AND SELF:
THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

By

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A person's use of language as the basis for his representing and exploring the world around him channelizes his thinking processes. It affects the ways in which he abstracts from his experiences, the ways in which he establishes a sense of his relationship to others, the ways he generates and manipulates symbols and images about himself, and the ways in which he makes his experiences available to himself. Thus, language permeates the individual's experience at many levels, providing him with the means of freeing himself from superficial appearance on one hand, and of chaining himself to distortions and misperceptions on the other hand.

If we look at the speech process itself, we see the individual finding ways of bringing to public shape his personal thoughts, feelings, impressions, and ideas. In so doing, the individual discovers more about the experience he attempts to communicate to others; he has to reflect upon it, symbolize it, and transform it into some communicable state. The other side of the speech process, speech for oneself, highlights

the exploratory, bringing-to-an-understanding process even more, for through it the individual develops his characteristic modes of perceiving himself and of relating his experiences to each other. Operating at a lower level--in most cases, probably a prior level of functioning--a person's inner speech affects his overall psychological structure, particularly his ability to function fully throughout his life.

The fully functioning person has as one of his primary characteristics a firm sense of his own identity. That is, he is aware of himself as a responsive organism with continuing meanings and values. Being in touch, on the whole, with his experiencing and having the capacity to make his experiences available in other experiences, he has differentiated himself rather completely from his environment and from other people. This has occurred through his capacity to symbolize his experiences in a variety of ways and to use his symbolic functioning as an abstracting process. He is in command of his perceptual organization in that he does not mistake symbols for the things symbolized. He is reality-oriented in that he bases his conceptions of himself upon an accurate appraisal of situations and events without the distortion that comes from feeling threatened in some ways.

The inadequate or partially-functioning person has different perceptual and symbolizing characteristics. He is limited to two-valued terms in defining himself so he tends to be more rigid perceptually, operating in either/or terms. Thus, he is likely to define himself in negative terms, in respect to what he is not instead of what he is. He confuses symbols and the things they represent, which leads

him to reacting to the wrong elements frequently and distorting the situations he finds himself in, he acts with a great quantity of unchallenged assumptions about what is and what is not.

Furthermore, if he uses his language in ways that remove him from direct reference to his experience he becomes experientially empty, incapable of knowing what he feels and what he thinks. Thus, he has a limited amount of personal experience available to him in new situations, so he is limited in his being able to respond fully and well.

Finally, out of his lack of participation in experiential modes, his symbols and meanings are constantly being shuffled through into a mythological structure, representing not so much what really is but what he thinks is; this inadequate means of organizing his perceptions, having little or no means of sorting out levels of organization and meaning, severely limits his sense of identity.

INTRODUCTION

Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956) once said that language is the best show man puts on. It certainly is the most characteristic and pervasive means man has of understanding and representing his experience. Language cuts across man's every activity. It is not merely a behavior that he exhibits; it has impact upon man's perceptions, mental functions, relationships with other men, beliefs and meanings. Thus, the study of language in all its forms and functions is a study of man's capacities and predilections for experiencing. My purpose in this work is to explore the role of language in personality development, particularly in relation to development of the self.

One of the essential human experiences is the experience of one's self. An individual develops a sense of his own identity through his experiences. He forms perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and meanings about himself as he grows up; this constellation of meanings is organized, dynamic, and changeable. It is a self-system in that it is systematic, hierarchical, and understandable. Language capacity and language use provide the individual with the necessary conditions for perceiving himself in his environment and for organizing his perceptions into a holistic self-concept.

Developments in self theory in the last century have moved towards understanding the self from the individual's own perceptual field. Beginning with William James' description of the self as an object of

knowledge for each individual and extending through the phenomenological approach of Combs, Lecky, Rogers, Rainy, etc., self theory has attempted to account for the individual's experience of himself as the dominant organizing feature of his existence. These developments have produced a wide range of studies on the effects of self concept on performance (Purkey, 1970) and have generated countless discussions about the validity of the self concept as an explanatory device (Wylie, 1961).

Generally self-theorists have agreed to orient their explanations of self at the level of describing the dynamic and organizational features. Studies revolving around this level of understanding of the self have introduced sophisticated evidence for the centrality of self concept in a person's life. The effects of environment, history, and experience upon a person's self concept have been explored (Combs, 1959) and psychologists have found ample evidence for determination of a person's self concept by social interaction.

The phenomenological approach, which describes a person's self in terms of his perceptual field, places greatest importance upon the perceptual process in the forming of a self concept. The perceptual process is described in Gestalt field terms and thereby is able to account for the dynamic, holistic features of perception. Understanding of the perceptual process, however, has not sufficiently considered the role of language in the development of perception. Since language is man's most characteristic and influential form of knowing, it has great impact upon the individual's perceptions.

The study of language encompasses investigations from a broad spectrum of human knowledge: philosophy, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, semantics, speech, and psychology. In recent years linguistics as

a discipline within itself has emerged as a major theoretical area and investigations in the relation among language, thought, perception, and experiencing are generating fascinating new understandings of the role of language in human life. Out of this study in new frontiers of language and out of the investigations from the past comes important information for the psychologist, particularly for the self-theorist who wishes to account for all levels of human experience.

Two important results can be obtained from a study of language and of the self: we can increase our knowledge about the role of language in the individual's experience of himself and we can enlarge our own perspectives on human functioning by incorporating knowledge from other disciplines. The cross-fertilization of areas of knowledge leads to a more synthesized holistic conception of human nature. Just as the introduction of new experiences enlarges and alters an individual's perceptual field, the introduction of new approaches to understanding enlarges the professional's perceptual field.

The matter of relationships between language and perception has long intrigued me and it is for this reason that my investigations have proceeded in the direction they are now taking. In addition, I have been struck by the problems involved in describing a person's self-system, the total organized systems of perceptions he has, particularly in the area of describing the growth and development of the self-system in children. At present there exists much information regarding the organizational features of the adult and there are applications of this knowledge to the developing child and adolescent. However, essentially the descriptions

we obtain are based on either an assumption of the social origin of the self concept--in which significant people in a child's experience present him with attitudes about himself which he incorporates--or based on personality dynamics of adults.

While both of these approaches to the growth of the self-system are highly suggestive and valuable to self-theorists, another approach, one which considers the development of thinking processes in the individual, could extend our present knowledge and afford a more complete picture of the development of the self. My contribution to the field, then, would be to provide a rationale for considering the cognitive processes as they relate to the dynamics of personality and perception. The means for joining these aspects is, I believe, found in psycholinguistic research and theory.

Scope of this Work

Beginning with a discussion of the self in psychological terms and the problems attendant in trying to describe the self in terms other than the individual's own perceptions, I enter into a description of the phenomenal self and self concept as determiners of behavior. From this point I outline the socializing effects of language. Following chapters formulate the role of language in extending the individual's control and understanding of the environment and of himself--the ways in which he learns what to anticipate and how to construe the world. Then, the development of an inner language, an inner symbol system based upon the external symbol system, is presented, and its importance in the individual's total personality is elaborated upon in chapters five and six. The learned ways of symbolizing himself affects the degree of openness and complexity in his

self concept, and the degree to which he develops an adequate process of symbolizing and making available his experiences determines how fully he will be able to function in his daily life. An appendix, dealing with the search for linguistic universals and psychological processes rounds out the work.

I have investigated and am continuing to investigate the best evidence that exists in psychology, linguistics, etc. I draw upon the research and analysis of such figures as Benjamin Lee Whorf, Alfred Korzybski, S. I. Hawakawa, Noam Chomsky, David McNeill, Jean Piaget, Jerome Bruner, A. R. Luria, L. S. Vygotsky, George Herbert Mead, Ernst Cassirer, Charles Morris, Eugene Gendlin, and Gregory Bateson. My own position in regard to the development of language and emergence of the self-system owes a lot to the above men in addition to the work done by self-theorists in psychology, such as Combs & Snygg, Rogers, Maslow, etc.

Valid Theory Building

The validity of my position should be testable on both the theoretical and empirical levels. In this current study I intend to define the theoretical foundations of a psycholinguistic approach to the self-system. Therefore, the rigor of my investigation is directed by criteria for valid theory building. Gordon Allport (1947), reporting the results of the Social Science Research Council on the validation of social theory, lists six criteria: feelings of subjective certainty; conformity with known facts, mental experimentation, predictive power, social agreement, and internal consistency. I propose to follow the same criteria in the formulation of my theoretical position, using such criteria as touchstones to

insure that my theory is not only a sound presentation of present evidence but also a sound generation of explanatory constructs from the available evidence.

Allport's first criterion, feelings of subjective certainty in theory building, underscores the intuitive or organismic side of knowing. To someone who has wrestled regularly, extensively, and vigorously with a body of knowledge, a "feel" for the material develops. He maintains a subjective sense of the logicality, the relatedness, the impact, and the adequacy of the total sum of information he has encountered. Out of this "feel" for the material the individual is sometimes able to organize his subjective impressions into a logical framework that can be communicated to others, but the initial basis for forming the finished product may lie in the nomothetic or intuitive sphere. Allport points out the "subjective certainty is one sign that suggests a good fit for nomothetic knowledge with specific evidence, though it can never be taken alone" (p. 170). In my own investigations of psycholinguistic areas--taking me into philosophy of language, linguistics, anthropology, developmental psychology, psychotherapy, self theory, and social psychology--I have long believed that the symbolic functioning in man, in all of its diverse dimensions, related together at some level of analysis that could be ordered, organized, communicated, and tested. The result of this subjective impression is the following dissertation.

In attempting to pass from intuition to analysis, which is the process of justifying subjective feeling states or nomothetic knowledge, I have examined the range of existing evidence for all dimensions of language development. Moving into this sphere of investigation, actually

/

confronting the body of evidence, satisfies Allport's second criterion: conformity with known facts.

Although I am well aware that "known facts" are themselves subject to scrutiny and challenge, particularly in social science, and that there are apparent contradictions and inconsistencies in the available evidence, there is a far greater agreement than disagreement, and greater consistency than inconsistency. Allport says, "to include known facts and to exclude none is demanded as a test for the adequacy of theories in physical science. Important as this criterion may be it is not always easy to apply to social data (e.g. personal documents) where the facts are subjective and often ambiguous. But at the same time, salient events in the life cannot remain unaccounted for by an interpretation that pretends to be valid" (pp. 170-171)." My attempt to account for the characteristics of language development and emergence of the self-system will consider all the events that pertain.

While accounting for the existing evidence and organizing it into a coherent body, I will subject this evidence to mental experimentation-- Allport's third criterion. This means that alternative explanations are to be considered, levels of analysis are to be extended, and implications, both short term and long term, are to be examined.

The process of mental manipulation is admirably explained by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's (1967) fictional character, Sherlock Holmes:

"The ideal reasoner," he remarked, "would, when he has once been shown a single fact in all its bearings, deduce from it not only all the chain of events which led up to it, but also all the results which would follow from it. As Cuvier could correctly describe a whole animal by the contemplation of a single bone, so the observer who has thoroughly understood one link in a series of incidents, should be able accurately to

state all the other ones, both before and after. . . .
 To carry the art, however, to its highest pitch, it is
 necessary that the reasoner should be able to utilize
 all the facts which have come to his knowledge . . .
 (p. 160)."

The predictive power of any theory, alluded to in the quotation above, must be a major consideration. Allport suggests that this fourth criterion is not sufficient in itself for concluding that a conceptualization is adequate, but if a theory has predictive power or heuristic value, then it is greatly improved. In my theory I will seek to account for those predictions and further questioning that would be derived from the stated position. For example, if I show that the abstracting process is mediated on several levels by language, I would then predict that perceptions, as it is derived from abstracting processes, would be affected by changes in language. This would lead to further predictions of how a person's conception of his world and of himself would be altered through language.

While predictive power can be approached on levels ranging from simple historical/sequential predictions (as in predicting what behavior a person will next exhibit) to highly abstract predictions (as in predicting changes in personality structure or in mental functioning), a valid theory would maintain means for predicting on all levels of analysis. Refinement of my theory would increase the amount of specificity in predictions with the increase in empirical data. My expectations for the present, however, are to be predictive on more general and abstract levels.

There is a great deal of agreement among experts in the area of language that language itself affects perceptions, actions, thinking,

and feeling. Also among laymen we find a subjective realization of living in "semantic space" (Hayakawa, 1953), in contexts where the words used in communication have essential effects upon personal experience. This is one form of social agreement that encourages my investigation. Although Allport indicates the danger of "prestige-suggestibility, of scientific fad and fashion, and of common prejudice" (p. 171), "consensual agreement must be reckoned with. It is here that I expect to have to wait for validation of my theory.

Drawing upon a variety of agreed-upon conceptualizations as I will be doing, I can expect to find initial agreement on parts of my formulation, but I will have to wait for judgments on my interpretations until they have been thoroughly presented and their implications explored. Modifications of my theory might come out of the impact it has on other investigators in the field.

Finally, the validity of a theory rests on the internal consistency of the conceptualization. As Allport concludes,

Parts of an interpretation can be made to confront one another. Logical contradictions raise the suspicion of invalidity. True, the lives to which the interpretations apply are not themselves without contradictions and inconsistencies. And yet, just as a personality has an intricate integration wherein even the inconsistencies often find a deeper resolution, so too should an interpretive scheme applied to the personality have the same intricate properties of self-confrontation and congruence. No parts of it should fall out of character (p. 171).

My attempt to realize consistency in the theory comes in the form of a deeper resolution of seemingly disparate elements.

As a phenomenologist I am aware of the need for self-consistency within an individual's perceptual experience. As a psycholinguist I

see a similar need for self-consistency among the various parts of my formulations. This is provided for in each chapter as I relate a body of linguistic evidence to understanding about the self. Consistency is also provided in the total organization of the study around man's capacity to symbolize his experience in many ways.

CHAPTER I SELF AND SYMBOLIC SELF

Description of the Self

For centuries mankind has debated the existence and the properties of the self. In the second half of the seventeenth century Blaise Pascal, mathematician, scientist, philosopher and religious polemicist, wrote an impressive array of thoughts on human nature. In Pensees (1660-1662) he confronts the issue of what man really is, not only in relation to God but in relation to other men. Few people study man, he says, because it is a difficult project and they do not know how to go about it. The main problem is in locating the object under scrutiny. In daily life as well as in formal study we often confuse external attributes of someone for the person himself, which leads us away from our goals. Pascal says:

What is the self?

A man goes to the window to see the people passing by; if I pass by, can I say he went there to see me? No, for he is not thinking of me in particular. But what about a person who loves someone for the sake of her beauty; does he love her? No, for smallpox, which will destroy beauty without destroying the person, will put an end to his love for her.

And if someone loves me for my judgment or my memory, do they love me? Me, myself? No, for I could lose these qualities without losing my self. Where then is this self, if it is neither in the body nor the soul? And how can one love the body or the soul except for the sake of such qualities, which are not what makes up the self, since they are perishable? Would we love the substance of a person's soul, in the abstract, whatever qualities might be in it? This is not possible, and it would be wrong. Therefore, we never love anyone, but only qualities (p. 245).

I would rather say that we never observe anyone, but only qualities. In the position of an outside observer I can only see attributes which I have abstracted from behaviors of others. Thus, in looking at individuals and attempting to understand them, I am constrained by the impossibility of knowing another person fully. I may recognize patterns of behavior and even be able to infer consistent motives for his actions, but if I try to specify a self in these terms I can only, at best, relate attributes with each other, not with that person himself. Yet, in psychology the self is a valuable and widespread construct.

Self as Role Relations

George Herbert Mead (1934) distinguishes between two aspects of self, the "I" and the "me," both arising out of the social context. The "me" of personality is the organized set of attitudes and roles that an individual internalizes from his interactions with others. It is a composite self, an add-sum relation based upon his social experiences and expectancies. Roles are not necessarily conscious roles as in play-acting; they constitute any regular interaction between the individual and his environment.

The individual also reacts to the "me" of his identity. Since the "me" is formed through complex role relationships, it is observable by each person as a patterned identity. The "I" of the self is aware of his roles and his behavior. According to Mead the "I" is conscious of social expectancies and acts in some particular context. Once it has acted the "I" becomes a "me," a part of the individual's knowledge of himself. Mead says:

He has their attitudes, knows what they want and what the consequence of any act of his will be, and he has assumed responsibility for the situation. Now, it is presence of those organized set of attitudes that constitutes the "me" to which he has ~~fixed~~ an "I" is responding. . . .

The "I" is his action toward that social institution within his own conduct, and it gets into his experience only after he has carried out the act. Then he is aware of it (p. 230-231).

The self in Mead's conception is the product of social interaction, which is established through language. He does not consider a person to have an innate self or a particular set of innate characteristics that develop in his growing up. Representative of the pragmatic school of sociology, Mead's theory stands against biological explanations of identity and personality. Seeking a functional description of the relationship between the environment and the individual, he settles upon the self as that which is the most salient product of interaction. This is discussed more extensively in chapter two.

Self as Psychosocial Identity

Erik Erikson (1968) takes the position that psychosocial identity in each person is the anchoring point for his whole personality. The organism unfolds in a prescribed, biologically based sequence. The inherent biological mechanisms are the controlling elements of identity, but they come in contact with the social environment and have to adjust to it; thus, each person develops a psychosocial identity throughout life, one which is constantly becoming more elaborated and fixed. Erikson says:

in the sequence of his most personal experience the healthy child, given a reasonable amount of proper guidance, can be trusted to obey inner laws of development, laws which create a succession of potentialities for significant interaction with those persons who tend and respond to him and those institutions

which are ready for him. While such interaction varies from culture to culture, it must remain within "the proper rate and the proper sequence" which governs all epigenesis. Personality, therefore, can be said to develop according to steps predetermined in the human organism's readiness to be driven toward, to be aware of, and to interact with a widening radius of significant individuals and institutions (p. 93).

The self in Erikson's terms has an intrinsic existence apart from the culture that shapes it. In fact, one of the most telling pieces of evidence cited in this respect is what happens when the individual overcomes developmental crises. In Erikson's proposed stages of development there are crisis points where the individual must establish his identity anew in relation to others. If he overcomes the crisis point, which balances a sense of estrangement against a sense of fulfillment and participation, he becomes more fully functioning, and more capable of further identity formation. Erikson points out that resolution of a crisis produces a more integrated personality: "some new estrangement is resolved in such a way that the child suddenly seems to be 'more himself,' more loving, more relaxed, and brighter in his judgment--in other words, vital in a new way"(p. 115)."

This description of the resolution of crisis highlights an important dynamic in human functioning. The experience of being more oneself through the overcoming of crises is common to many, many people. Although it does not settle the problem of what the self is and how a person is to know when he is himself, this experience of identity is part of the individual's subjective experience of having a self that can be more fully elaborated. In fact, Erikson proposes that the identity-seeking pattern is maintained throughout all stages of development.

The notion that the self has its own existence within each person, apart from society and the physical environment, has many adherents, particularly those steeped in the psychoanalytical tradition (Rapaport, 1959). Essentially, the problem with proposing an innate self or dynamic force that has the motive of actualization or "becoming" is that we have not explained where the self comes from.

Self as a Dynamic Force

Jung (1945) suggests that the self is the mid-point of personality and also the goal of all activity in the organism. Throughout his life a person seeks to extend and realize all aspects of his potential. If he is successful at this he develops an organized, well-rounded, fully realized personality--a coherent self. The attributes of the self constellate around the center like planets.

The self in these terms is both a force for existence and a product of the "urge to become." How can it be both? Maslow (1954) answers the question by citing a hierarchy of needs common to all people. The needs for food, shelter, warmth, safety, belonging, love, respect, self-esteem, and so forth are universal needs, he says, and as people satisfy basic needs they are able to progress to "higher" needs. Thus, the process of self-actualization is a dynamic and constant reorganization of needs on increasingly complex levels.

The single holistic principle that binds together the multiplicity of human motives is the tendency for a new and higher need to emerge as the lower need fulfills itself by being sufficiently gratified (Maslow, 1962, p. 53).

Each person has an identity at any point of his life; in addition there is the possibility of becoming more and more of what one is capable.

Self-actualization, as a psychological concept, incorporates both aspects of self: it is both process and product. Whether couched in terms of tension-reduction principles, pleasure-pain balances, hierarchies of needs, or biological drives, the self has largely been seen as an elegant energy system, composed of personality dynamics which can be specified both in function and in form.

A description of the self in these terms often is based upon the Freudian model of psychological functioning, and accords greater knowledge of a person's personality structure to the expert external observer than to the person himself. For example, Otto Rank (1956) states, "The knowledge of the average man about his own psychic processes and motivation proves to be so false that it works really only in its complete spuriousness, in all illusion troubled by no kind of knowing"(p. 71).

If the individual is, himself, so imperfectly aware of his own motives, then it becomes the province of the psychoanalyst to describe or otherwise reveal it to him. But another consideration is that psychoanalysts may be wrong in their descriptions of personality and their formulations may not fit with individual experience. It has been pointed out (London, 1969) that psychoanalysis is essentially a means of training the individual to see and describe himself in the analyst's terms, not in his own terms. For the purpose of understanding the self, however, we have to confront the problem of tallying an abstract, conceptual system with private experience. They may not be the same at all. As Rollo May (1961) points out, "The more absolutely and completely we formulate the forces or drives, the more we are talking about abstractions and not the living human being"(p. 14).

Personality theories organize inferred attributes of man into coherent descriptions of the relationship between the indicated parts. While most theories focus upon one main attribute of personality and relate other attributes to it in lesser importance, the avowed purpose of personality theories is to present a picture of the whole person, one which will account for all personality dynamics. It is often assumed that the self in such descriptions is the sum total of personality structure. Psychologists are guilty of confusing the map of personality structure with the territory when they rely more upon their mappings than they do upon the person himself. The self can be abstracted from intricate theories of personality dynamics, but it is an abstraction from a host of abstractions, and therefore, often far removed from the real person.

Self as Traits

The concept of the self in personality theories in which the self is used to explain motives, intentions, and behaviors, risks becoming no explanation at all. Gordon Allport (1955) reflecting upon the problem of assigning functions to the self says that there is a danger "that a humunculus may creep into our discussions of personality, and be expected to solve all our problems without in reality solving any. Thus if we ask 'what determines our moral conduct?' the answer may be 'The self does it.' Or, if we pose the problem of choice, we say 'The self chooses.' Such question-begging would immeasurably weaken the scientific study of personality by providing an illegitimate regressus"(pp. 54-55)."

Allport's solution to the problem of defining the self, which he calls *proprium*, is to talk only of traits. He suggests that the *proprium*, which incorporates all traits and habits that are central to a person's existence and which make for inward unity, is a valid alternative to positing an inner self. From the point of view of an outsider traits are the building blocks of the individual. As with Pascal's lover, however, when the traits or qualities we observe in others disappear, so does our conception of that person.

Traits as the object of study may help the psychologist organize his conceptions of personality, but they are no better than well made maps. We could become cartographers of personality and refine our conceptualizations to pinpoint accuracy, but nowhere would we have the self. All we would have would be the map of our own devisement, and, although that is valuable to the social scientist, it is not all of the self. Furthermore, there is a danger in believing that someone can be understood completely on the basis of traits. While concentrating upon traits reduces the chance of proposing a model of personality too far removed from the individual in daily life, it still implies that we know someone when we know all his traits.

There are areas of each person's experience and personality that remain hidden from the probing of outside forces. Tolstoy (1950) says:

One of the most widespread superstitions is that every man has his own special, definite qualities; that a man is kind, cruel, wise, stupid, energetic, apathetic, etc. Men are not like that. . . . Men are like rivers: the water is the same in each, and alike in all; but every river is narrow here, is more rapid there, here slower, there broader, now clear, now cold, now dull, now warm. It is the same with men. Every man carries in himself

the germs of every human quality, and sometimes one manifests itself, sometimes another, and the man often becomes unlike himself, while still remaining the same man.

The Eastern Conception of Self

In Eastern philosophies the self is not an individualistic identity, but a transcendence of identity, a merging of the individual and the other into a cosmological whole. D. T. Suzuki (1970) describes it this way:

When we say 'self' we distinguish it from non-self, that is, others, but the self that Zen people strongly emphasize is not that kind of self, but Self that is Absolute, Absolute Self. Therefore, the absolute self might be termed absolute other, Absolutely Not-self (p. 14).

Self in these terms is beyond the daily experience of most people. I seriously question if a person's experience of himself in Eastern cultures is truly different from the Westerner's experience. A highly refined philosophic viewpoint, like Zen, actually may reflect very little of the individual's common experience.

In America Walt Whitman probably comes closest to expressing the transcendent aspects of self that are voiced in Eastern philosophy. He identifies broadly with all existence and defines himself in "Song of Myself" (1855) as an all-encompassing identity:

I pass death with the dying and birth with the
new washed babe, and am not contained between
my hats and boots,
I peruse manifold objects, no two alike and
everyone good,
The earth good and the stars good, and their
adjuncts all good.

I am not an earth nor an adjunct of an earth,
I am the mate and companion of people, all
just as immortal and fathomless as myself
(p. 29).

No matter if a person identifies himself with a cosmological force, with all of mankind, with a small group of people, or with no one at all, he still identifies himself as an existing organism. What he identifies with is less important here than the fact that he does identify himself in some way.

The Subjective Experience of Having a Self

All people have unique experiences of themselves and of their world. Each person has many characteristics that are common to other people also; these are the data of the behavioral scientist. But the individual's unique physical and mental experiences--that is, his total perceptual framework--contain elements that are not reproducible in others. No one else sees through his eyes or feels with his fingertips. His individual reality is his own datum from which he distinguishes his own identity.

Each person has a corporeal identity. He is a body, an organism that acts in the physical world. He also has a personality identity. Because he can think, he is more than a physical organism. He is capable of realizing a continuity in his experience from memories of the past and anticipations of the future, and because he has a continuity of experience he can depict patterns in his behavior that are organized into a coherent whole. Merleau-Ponty (1964) suggests that the body and the self are one process:

Our body is not in space like things; it inhabits or haunts space. It applies itself to space like a hand to an instrument, and when we wish to move about we do not move an object. We transport it without instruments as if by magic, since it is ours and because through it we have direct access to space. For us the body is much more than an instrument or a means, it is our expression in the world, the visible form of our intentions (p. 5).

Although the individual may experience himself as being more than or different from his physical being, he is inseparable from his body in applying himself to the world. That is, his personal experience is first grounded in his biological, physiological existence.

A Perceptual Approach to the Self

She was the single artificer of the world
 In which she sang. And when she sang, the sea,
 Whatever self it had, became the self
 That was her song, for she was the maker. Then we,
 As we beheld her striding there alone,
 Knew that there never was a world for her
 Except the one she sang and, singing, made (Stevens, 1954).

As distinct perceiving and behaving organisms we, each of us, are artificers of our world. What we believe about it, transforms it, for us, into our conceptions. In this sense each person creates his own reality. He interacts with the world, participates in full and ever-extended experiences, and establishes relationships with his surroundings. Out of his endless experience the individual formulates his own reality. As George Kelly (1963) points out, "events do not come around and tell us how to do the job--they just go about their business of being themselves. The structure we erect is what rules us"(p. 20).

Each person's behavior is absolutely determined by his total belief system at any one moment. What he believes to be real is the structure of his personal reality. He can act only in terms of this structure of beliefs. What he believes to be true is his total perceptual field. Thus, perception and belief are one and the same thing. The perceptual model of knowledge serves as an appropriate model for the structure of personality, for each person is capable of representing his environment like the visual image

represents the environment. A person does not collect willy-nilly the impressions that bombard him from the physical world. The perceiving organism selects from the available impressions, organizes perceptions, and creates meaning out of the stimuli that confront him.

A comprehensive theory of personality based upon the individual's phenomenological relationship to the world is proposed by Snygg and Combs (1949, 1959) in Individual Behavior. This approach to personality is called perceptual psychology, sometimes also called phenomenological psychology. Based in part on the Gestalt psychology of Kohler, Koffka, and Wertheimer, and on the field theory of Kurt Lewin, perceptual psychology affords a holistic look at the role of perception in the individual's development of personality.

It is the construction aspect of perception and knowledge that most concerns the phenomenological psychologist. How does one organize his experience? What principles are involved in the construction of personal reality? In the act of constructing his world, which is a complex activity and not immediately accessible to the observer, a person transforms his impressions of external reality in to what he experiences as being a true representation of the world. The constructive aspect of perception is not apparent to the perceiver unless he separates himself from his perceptual mode in some way and scrutinizes his activity.

The experience of having straightforward untransformed perceptions accounts for the fact that a person acts totally in regards to his perceptions of the moment. He cannot do otherwise. Yet we do know that the individual does affect what he perceives. It is not purely an intake process. If perception were merely imitation of external reality it would

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at best have a one-to-one correspondence with external impressions. However, in mental activity, which encompasses perception, people go beyond simple absorption of impressions. We draw inferences, conclusions, assumptions, generalities, abstractions; we imagine details, goals, motives, etc.

Perceptual Field

The field of impressions for an individual is composed of a background and a foreground (Combs, 1959). At any moment a person's perception is a result of a particular pattern of impressions that emerges for the perceiver from the total field. The intensity, clarity, stability and relatedness of particular impressions determine the degree of differentiation of the figure from the field. All phenomena that are available to the senses make up the field; those that have a certain meaning for the individual become the dominant figure or image that determine what actions, if any, the perceiver takes.

One of the goals of Gestalt learning theory has been to describe the holistic, momentary creation of meaning or understanding, what is sometimes called the "aha" experience. Wertheimer (1959) claims that true knowing involves knowledge of the structural characteristics of an event. In his classic discussion of teaching children to find the area of parallelogram (1959) he notes that what makes it possible for some children to draw the appropriate perpendicular and generate a productive answer is not adherence merely to simple rules or the blind following of a formula, but a recognition of the formal properties of the geometric figure. The children had to be able to perform some kind of mental operation on the figure that not only preserved their sensorial knowledge of it but that also enriched their total perception of the structural characteristics.

In a more personal vein each person determines the structural characteristics of his own experience. That is, he constructs his experience in a way similar to that described by Gestalt psychology. His understanding of the world and of himself is a product of the constructive process. The meaning of his knowledge is a function of figure/ground relations and of their relationship to himself.

There are limitations to what someone can see visually. For example, a person cannot perceive both a figure and a field equally at the same time. He establishes a context for his perception by relating the two, thereby providing cues to the identities involved, but he cannot scrutinize a small segment of the visual field and, at the same time, take in all of the impressions globally. We are selectively attentive to the visual environment.

All other things being equal, perceptions are differentiated in terms of their nearness, similarity, intensity, common fate, novelty, and movement or direction. For example, as I write this I have several stacks of books on my desk; I perceive each stack as a unit of books because they are nearer each other in their respective stacks than they are to books in different stacks. Within one stack all the books with pale bindings stand out because of that similarity. The sound level of traffic outside my window is sometimes altered by the sound of a motorcycle with a different intensity of noise. Likewise, bright colors, more pungent odors, objects making extreme movements attract my attention and, momentarily, stand out from the other impressions. The objects on my desk have a common fate. Notebook paper, pencils, ballpoint pens, eraser, scotch tape, scissors and

pencil sharpener make up the objects used in writing, so I perceive them as a unified whole. A new style ballpoint pen which I have just purchased stands out because of its novelty, but once the novelty has worn off the pen will recede into less prominence for me. Finally, all the trees and bushes outside my window are swaying in the same direction when the wind blows; I perceive their common movement as a unified impression.

From the patterns that a person reacts to in differentiating his perceptions come fairly simple conceptual schemes. For example, I take the swaying of trees in the same direction as evidence that the wind is blowing from the north. If they were swaying in many different directions at the same time, I would not know how to conceptualize the apparent chaos. My understanding of events comes from the ability to perceive patterns that aid in differentiating objects and events, and also from my past experience. My past experience presents me with the concept wind, to account for the visual pattern I perceive.

Two processes interplay to produce a person's perceptual field. One is the capacity for organizing perceptions, for seeing patterns, abstracting common features, etc. The other is the individual's capacity for building upon his past experiences in order to understand and interact with his current experiences. Actually, it is misleading to separate these two processes, for they are not separate but merely two aspects of the same perceptual process.

A person's perceptual field is his unique experience. Through his ability to perceive, in all the dimensions of the work, he develops

a means of exploring the world and of extending himself into the world.

As Henry James (1888) says:

The power to guess the unseen from the seen, to trace the implications of things, to judge the whole piece by the pattern, the condition of feeling life in general so completely that you are well on your way to knowing any particular corner of it--this cluster of gifts may almost be said to constitute experience (p. 107).

Organization of the Self

The organism grows and extends itself through increased ranges of perceptions. In fact, the human organism has as one of its most important features an internal organization that makes it whole. This has been pointed out in many places. Goldstein (1939), for example, cites the holistic nature of the organism. He says that organization is the natural state of the organism, that anything that affects part of the organism affects the whole, and that disorganization is the stuff of pathology. Thus, we can look at the self in terms of its organizational features.

If the degree of organization of the organism is a central factor in the maintenance of the self, we would expect the stable quality of the self to be disrupted whenever events occur that produce disorganization. This is exactly what happens. Leon Festinger's (1957) work on cognitive dissonance indicates that incompatible beliefs or cognitions (arising from logical inconsistency, conflict with cultural mores, contradictions between specific opinions and larger, more encompassing opinions, and past experience) produce an uncomfortable state, which the organism attempts to rectify.

A more embracing theory about the requisite organization of personality has been elaborated by Prescott Lecky (1945) and modified by others. The urge for self-consistency in each individual derives from his being a unique organism placed in the world and from his needing some systematic way of understanding his environment and his relation to it. Lecky says that:

The ability to foresee and predict environmental happenings, to understand the world one lives in and thus to be able to anticipate events and prevent the necessity for sudden readjustments, is an absolute prerequisite for the maintenance of unity

The interpretations which serve as the basis for prediction, however, rest upon no other ground than individual experience. Immersed in an environment which he does not and cannot understand, the individual is forced to create a substitute world which he can understand and in which he puts his faith. He acts in consistency with that conception, derives his standards of value from it, and undertakes to alter it only when convinced by further experience that it fails to serve the goal of unity. Since this self-made scheme of life is his only guarantee of security, its preservation soon becomes a goal in itself. He seeks the type of experience which confirms and supports the unified attitudes, and rejects experience which seem to promise a disturbance of this attitude (p. 50).

As a goal of his behavior, then, the maintenance of a unified, self-consistent organization of perceptions, beliefs, cognitions encompasses all of his experience. An individual constantly receives impressions from his environment, often on a very complex scale, and sorts out these impressions in terms of their fitting with his existing conceptions. His perceptual field, then, is affected by the need to maintain a particular organization, not just any organization. This is where the ability to perceive patterns and to incorporate past experience become most important.

The Phenomenal Self

Since everything a person perceives is seen in relation to himself, the maintenance of an organized system of perceptions is essential to the maintenance of himself as the perceiver. The phenomenal self consists of all aspects of himself and his relations to others that a person experiences at any one time. His phenomenal self is constantly changing with his circumstances. It lies between his perceptions of his environment and his concepts about himself as a whole. Thus, the phenomenal self is his organized perceptions of himself in a particular situation. Combs (1959) describes the phenomenal self as:

the individual's own unique organization of ways of regarding self; it is the Gestalt of his concepts of self. Whereas the concepts of self . . . describe isolated aspects of the person, the phenomenal self is the organization or pattern of all those which the individual refers to as "I" or "me." It is himself from his own point of view. The phenomenal self is not a mere conglomeration or addition of isolated concepts of self, but a patterned interrelationship or Gestalt of all these (p. 126).

The phenomenal self is most real to the individual himself. The outsider cannot see it or touch it; he may be able to infer an approximate version of the individual's phenomenal self from observed behavior. However, since each person can experience only his own phenomenal self, it is not something that can be maintained from the outside. We seek to maintain our phenomenal selves, not that of someone else.

In maintaining the phenomenal self the individual needs to be able to anticipate events and alter himself in ways that will best preserve himself in the future. Combs (1959) points out:

man seeks not merely the maintenance of self but the development of an adequate self--a self capable of dealing effectively and efficiently with the exigencies of life, both now and in the future. To achieve this self-adequacy requires of man that he seek, not only to maintain his existing organization, but also that he build up and make more adequate the self of which he is aware. Man seeks both to maintain and enhance his perceived self (p. 45).

The individual's self perceptions, how he sees himself in relation to the rest of the world and in relation to himself at other times, maintain the organization of the phenomenal self.

Self Concept

While the phenomenal self is the total perceptions a person has of himself at any one time, the self concept is a more stable, abstract perception of himself. There are many activities, for example, that I engage in during any one day. Some are fleeting and even uncomtemplated activities; others are part of enduring patterns and goals; still others are one-of-a-kind events. My perception of myself at any one moment will take in all of the activities and relationships I am engaged in; my perception of myself as a constant entity, that is, my self concept, is abstracted from my continuing activities and experiences. Hence, it is largely composed of the more stable and generalized conceptions I may have of myself. It is more resistant to change because it has accrued from my total past experiences.

Combs (1959) points out the necessity for recognizing that the self concept is an abstraction from each individual's continuing experiences. It is not all of his experience, nor is it all of his phenomenal self. He says:

Though we may sometimes use the self concept as a convenient device for understanding the individual, it should never be forgotten that people always behave in terms of the total phenomenal

field, never in terms of an isolated part. The self concept is a useful approximation of a larger organization; it is not synonymous with it. The self concept is never a sufficient explanation of behavior by itself (p. 128).

A person's self concept, being an abstraction that he has formed on the basis of his personal experiences, is changeable through experience. As a child grows up he differentiates aspects of himself in light of his experience. What begins as a global distinction between himself and others progresses to more elaborated conceptions of his abilities, identity and relationships with others.

The sharpness and clarity of a person's self concept may vary from time to time and situation to situation. Some self perceptions become crystalized and remain clear throughout otherwise rapidly changing circumstances; a person's identification of himself with his family often is a central and stable concept. His concept of himself as a student, for example, would be replaced by concepts of himself in career situations once he has finished with formal education.

Overriding beliefs in one's adequacy or worthiness may cut across specific role-related perceptions of oneself. These perceptions tend to be even more stable and resistant to change because the individual does not depend upon only one kind of relationship (e.g., student, mother, athlete) to perceive himself in a particular way. To change such persistent beliefs about himself an individual would have to build up a new body of experiences that supplant his earlier formed conceptions. For this reason the self concept is marvelously consistent.

Victor C. Raimy, who first defined and described the self concept in 1943, believes that the self concept is a "learned perceptual system which functions as an object in the perceptual field (1943, p. 97)," and that its organized, systematic structure makes it an important determinant of behavior. He says:

If such structure exists as assumed in the above discussion, the Self-concept assumes more behavioral significance than if only a multitude of relatively independent "Self-observations" are present in the perceptual field. Without such a structuring or unifying process, the self-observations take on the appearance of scattered objects which have little effect on more than isolated segments of behavior. With structuring, the Self-concept has importance for behavior as a differentiated but organized system with qualities of dominance and subordination (p. 103).

Not only is the self concept a product of the individual's total experiences, it also is a template against which all further experiences are matched. A person who believes that he is fundamentally an uninteresting person, for instance, will find in his contacts with others evidence abounding to attest to his uninteresting personality.

Once the phenomenal self has become established, experience thereafter can only be interpreted in terms of the self. Thus all perceptions which are meaningful to the individual derive their meaning from their relation to the phenomenal self already in existence (Combs, 1959, p. 131).

This dual functioning of the phenomenal self--as a product of experience as a template against which new experiences are evaluated--is an important region of human experience. The capacity for the individual to abstract from his experience in the formation and transformation of his phenomenal self is part of his symbolization processes. I will elaborate on this in the next chapter.

The Symbolic Self

Each person has as his most characteristic endowment the ability to symbolize all aspects of his experience. In understanding even very simple phenomena the individual draws upon his capacity for symbolization in diverse ways. He may symbolize an event in order to communicate it to another, or in order to remember it for himself, or so that he may explore its characteristics more fully. Mental activity in itself, whether it is engaged in abstruse theoretics or in every day manipulation of objects, represents phenomena. Not only does it mediate experience, it re-presents them to each person.

In psychological thought it is recognized that some phenomena may be both process and product (Combs, 1959; Allport, 1955; Raimy, 1943; Lecky, 1945). In interpersonal relationships, for example, a person's conception of another is progressively differentiated and altered through his contacts with the other. Likewise, one person's concept of the other influences the kinds of contact that he establishes. On one hand, a concept is the product of interaction and on the other hand it is part of the process of interacting. The self concept functions similarly. Raimy (1943) points out that "the Self-Concept not only influences behavior but is itself altered and restructured by behavior"(p. 98).

Both in the developing and in the elaborating of self concepts we find a product and a process. The nature of symbolizing activity affects these concepts, for the human symbolizing act is itself both product and process. Symbols that are formed become the means of shaping further symbols. Symbolizing events opens the way to further symbolization.

The universality of symbolization is so basic to human life that some scholars suggest that it is the distinguishing characteristic of man. Susanne K. Langer (1951), for example, has this to say:

I believe there is a primary need in man, which other creatures probably do not have, and which activates all his apparently unzoological aims, his wistful fancies, his consciousness of value, his utterly impractical enthusiasms, and his awareness of a "Beyond" filled with holiness. Despite the fact that this need gives rise to almost everything that we commonly assign to the "higher" life, it is not itself a "higher" form of some "lower" need; it is quite essential, imperious, and general, and may be called "high" only in the sense that it belongs exclusively (I think) to a very complex and perhaps recent genus. . . .

This basic need, which certainly is obvious only in man, is the need of symbolization. The symbol-making function is one of man's primary activities, like eating, looking, or moving about. It is the fundamental process of the mind, and goes on all the time. Sometimes we are aware of it, sometimes we merely find its results, and realize that certain experiences have passed through our brains and have been digested there (p. 45).

There may be some confusion over Langer's citing of symbolization as a need. Symbolization is not a need in the sense that it is a basic biologic or human need. As elaborated in perceptual psychology (Snygg & Combs, 1949), the basic human need is the maintenance and enhancement of the phenomenal self. In those terms, then, the only need is the need for adequacy. Other areas of human functioning are means toward fulfilling the basic need for adequacy, or they are merely expressions of that need.

Certainly, symbolization is one of man's most distinguishing activities, and it operates as the best way he has of fulfilling the basic need. Through the symbol-making function man is able to extend and transcend raw perceptual events in pursuit of personal and cultural adequacy.

In the symbolizing process mental activity transforms undifferentiated impressions into recognizable patterns, such as figure-field arrangements, which are related by the individual to the whole of his synthesized experience. Thus symbolization is the essence of mental life, giving the individual the ability to go beyond mere absorption of incoming impressions. The ability to symbolize allows the individual to remember past experiences, anticipate future events, establish interchanges in the present, and determine the personal meaning of them all.

In terms of the phenomenal self symbolic functions enable the individual to experience his existence in a self-reflexive manner. That is, on one hand the individual is immersed in his perceptions and completely controlled by them; if this were his only means of behaving he would not be able to reflect upon his actions; he would merely be doing and reacting in the way that the autonomic nervous system reacts to stimuli. On the other hand, he is capable of construing his experience in daily life and is, thus, ruled more by his constructions.

Man to the extent that he is able to construe his circumstances can find for himself freedom from their domination . . . man can enslave himself with his own ideas and then win his freedom again by reconstruing his life (Kelly, 1963, p. 21).

Thus it is that most of our lives are lived on a symbolic level. Not that the physical events and activities are secondary to the symbolic--we do need basic physically satisfying circumstances to maintain our bodily selves, but that the symbolic realm contains the meaning that circumstances have for us. This is another way of saying that the phenomenal self, however it is construed by the individual transcends the physical self.

S. I. Hayakawa (1958) links symbolic function in man with the phenomenal self by calling it the symbolic self:

Once it is understood that human beings are a symbolic class of life--once it is grasped that all human behavior is conditioned, shaped, and mediated by symbols--then the idea of self-preservation as the first law of life can be modified to include almost all of the complexities of human behavior: the fundamental motive of human behavior. . . . the preservation of the symbolic self (p. 37).

As he forms meanings about himself, the individual is constantly discovering ways of symbolizing his existence. It is this symbolizing process--one which we only partially understand--that distinguishes mankind. Thus in perception of himself the individual takes the externally generated symbols--good, bad, big, pretty, energetic, intelligent--and combines them into a symbolic representation of himself, and of his world.

Language and the Symbolic Self

As a person grows from infancy to adulthood, he develops patterns of behavior, styles of expression, skills in manipulating objects, knowledge about the world, ways of perceiving, attitudes about himself and others. His progression from a state of almost absolute dependency to a state of high independency occurs in a variety of ways. By learning about the construction of the environment, that is, by learning gradually what the properties of physical objects are and how they may be manipulated, the child extends his ability to control his environment. By learning about the nature of human contact, through his mother, his father, his siblings, and significant others, he acquires social skills that enable

him to communicate, negotiate, and relate with people. By learning about his own specific abilities, his strengths and weaknesses, his desires, and needs, the child learns ways to satisfy his needs and extend his abilities. Through a rich influx of sensations, experiences, perceptions, and opportunities the child learns to conduct himself in diverse manners through old, continuing, and new experiences.

The symbolic function in the child cuts across and influences all of these activities of exploration, manipulation, understanding, communication, and conceptualizing. It influences the character of his experience and the direction of the growth of his self-system. In this respect the symbolic function is permanently linked with mental activity of all types. The most pervasive form that the symbolic function takes is language. As he learns a system of representation in language acquisition the child is learning dominant modes of directing his current and future experience. The early stages of symbolization order his progress in understanding and manipulating his environment and in differentiating aspects of himself.

The phenomenon of language is interesting because it has both representational functions and explorational functions. Language is used to communicate perceptions of physical reality, private experiences, and communal experiences; in that sense it is representational. Language is also used to investigate the quality of human experience, to extend knowledge about objects, and to create new experiences (e.g., novels, poetry); in this sense language is exploratory. An individual's use of either mode may be appraised by the individual or others in order to further their knowledge about existence.

At least one researcher (McElroy, 1972) has proposed that language is a search for self. I take this to mean that the self is discoverable through linguistic processes, and what is "discovered" is contingent upon a person's use of language. In fact, that is a major theme of this work, one which will be elaborated more fully in the following chapters.

Language plays a major role in the development of the total personality and in the development of the self concept. The representational aspects of language inform the individual of the essential features of the world and of himself. The exploratory functions of language enable him to extend his perceptions and to build up comprehensive perceptual processes. The kind of symbols, linguistic and non-linguistic, that a person has available to him determine the openness and flexibility of his self concept, and the modes of language use that he establishes determine the degree to which he is able to make his experiences available to himself. These dimensions of language, as I indicate in the rest of this work, are integral to the individual's personality structure. As such, they are important areas of investigation for psychologists interested in the factors contributing to personality development.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIALIZATION OF SELF THROUGH LANGUAGE

Each individual is at one time a private entity in his own right and also a member of a larger social identity. Kelly (1962) points out that we do not need to talk about the individual or society, because the individual is formed in social contexts. Adler (1929) cites social interest as the most important factor in an individual's development of a healthy personality. Goffman (1959) suggests that a person's "performance" in the social sphere "will tend to incorporate and exemplify the officially accredited values of the society"(p. 35), and therefore he affirms the moral values of the community through his presentation of himself to it. Cooley (1909) sees "human nature" as being produced and developed through the cooperative associations established in group membership. The phenomenal self is so linked with the environment, both physical and social, that its formation cannot be considered as going on outside the social process.

Although each person is the architect of his experiences, socialization influences the tenor of his subjective experience and, through the symbolic representations that are made available to him, influences his sense of the rightness of his self. That is, the social context so informs him of his identity that, if he is faced with a duality between the social representation of experience and his private representations, he is inclined to choose the socially agreed upon representation. About

this Berger and Luckmann (1967) say:

By the very nature of socialization, subjective identity is a precarious entity. It is dependent upon the individual's relations with significant others, who may change or disappear. The precariousness is further increased by self-experiences . . . the "sane" apprehension of oneself as possessor of a definite, stable, and socially recognized identity is continually threatened by the "surrealistic" metamorphoses of dreams and fantasies, even if it remains relatively consistent in everyday social interaction (p. 100).

As the symbolic self is developed through representation of private and social experiences the individual generates a sense of his relationships with others. It is through the communication experience, through the development of a language, that he is able to increase his contacts with the world at large. Roger Brown (1956) calls this process of first-language learning the "Original Word Game," or "cognitive socialization." Through awareness of his relationships to others, as established in early language learning, the individual learns to look at himself as a separate, yet related being.

In the social realm language affects the emergence and development of the self through: 1) the individual's development of a capacity for self-reflection; 2) the cultural assumptions embedded in it; 3) the establishment of overlapping perceptions for members of society; 4) the channeling of information for individuals; 5) the elaboration of self-through role relationships; and, 6) the creation of common meanings and a sense of cooperation. These dimensions of socialization through language overlap, as we shall see, forming a complex interactive relationship among the individual, society, and language.

The Capacity for Self-reflection

Early in life the child develops a consciousness of his own body, the fact of its existence in space and time. Merleau-Ponty (1964), drawing upon the investigations of child psychologists, proposes that at the point where the child recognizes himself in a mirror he develops a new sense of himself. This occurs in the latter months of the first year, and perceptual change that accompanies the recognition of oneself in the mirror--what Merleau-Ponty calls the specular image-- parallels the development of a sense of self through language and social interaction. Merleau-Ponty says:

At the same time that the image of oneself makes possible the knowledge of oneself, it makes possible a sort of alienation. I am no longer what I felt myself, immediately, to be; I am that image of myself that is offered by the mirror. To use Dr. Lacan's terms, I am "captured, caught up" by my spatial image. Thereupon I leave the reality of my lived me in order to refer myself constantly to the ideal, fictitious, or imaginary me, of which the specular image is the first outline. In this sense I am torn from myself, and the image on the mirror prepares me for another still more serious alienation, which will be the alienation by others. For others have only an exterior image of me, which is analogous to the one seen in the mirror. Consequently others will tear me away from my immediate inwardness much more surely than will the mirror. The specular image is the "symbolic matrix," says Lacan, "where the I springs up in primordial form before objectifying itself in the dialectic of identification with the other. (pp. 136-137).

This phenomenon of seeing oneself from an external point of view enlarges and changes the individual's perceptions of himself. He is not merely behaving directly in his environment; he is also part of the environment for others, and he is capable of seeing himself in the

context of others. His private experience and his public experience, however, become separated. In language these two identities mingle and merge. They offset each other by producing a synthesized experience. He experiences himself as object.

Consciousness of oneself and consciousness of language appear at about the same time. It is through the taking on of external perspectives that the child becomes capable of self-observation, for external perspectives offer the possibility of defining boundaries. The "me"/"not me" differentiation of the infant evolves into a "me" and "I" differentiation that encapsulates the child's internally generated perceptions and his externally generated ones. Relatively late in his acquisition of language the child adopts the use of the pronoun I, after he has developed the use of his proper name (Guillaume, 1925). When he does this he becomes fully aware of his own perspective in opposition to those of others, and he stabilizes his perceptual modes into fairly well defined inner and outer forms. Merleau-Ponty says:

The pronoun I has its full meaning only when the child uses it not as an individual sign to designate his own person--a sign that would be assigned once for all to himself and to nobody else--but when he understands that each person he sees can in turn say I and that each person is an I for himself and a you for others (p. 151).

The incidence of perceptual relativity, occasioned by the development of a full awareness of the I, extricates the child from perceptual monism. He develops a conception, however hazy, of the perceptions of others and of himself as someone with personal perceptions.

The development of personal perspective in social situations is often exhibited in the young child's declaration of "no" to his parents. To say "no" is to experience oneself as an agent apart from the immediate

context and to seek to affect the course of this situation in direct, verbal ways. As he comes to see himself as maintaining a particular perspective and not merely living in the things around him, the child solidifies his own self identity. Merleau-Ponty (1964) says:

At around three years the child stops lending his body and even his thoughts to others. . . He stops confusing himself with the situation or the role in which he may find himself engaged. He adopts a proper perspective or viewpoint of his own--or rather he understands that, whatever the diversity of situations or roles, he is someone above and beyond these different situations and roles. (pp. 151-152).

It may be too much to say that the child develops an ability for self-reflection from the linguistic evidence cited above. However, reflection has two components that are available to the child at this point. First, reflection--as in a mirror or as in mental operations--distinguishes an outline in the here and now situation. The individual sees himself from the outside in and thereby possesses himself in the same way he "possesses" physical reality. Second, reflection is historical; to reflect is to place oneself in a historical context, to see one's actions, thoughts, perceptions in time. At least this is the phenomenological position enunciated by Husserl (1931) and Merleau-Ponty (1964).

If the child is capable of establishing a sense of perceptual relativity through the differentiation of himself and others in context, he is capable of reflecting upon himself. In short, he is capable of creating a self-concept through the patterned perceptions afforded him in his language and action. He is symbolizing his experiences of the world, of others, and of himself in the language he develops. Combs (1959)

points out that differentiation of the self is accelerated through the development of language; "language provides a 'shorthand' by which experience can be symbolized, manipulated, and understood with tremendous efficiency. Above all, the possession of language vastly facilitates the differentiation of self and the world about"(p.134). But not only is language an efficient means of differentiation, it also affects the direction the differentiation will take. This will be explored more fully in the following sections of this chapter.

Cultural Assumptions

When we look at society as an organism we observe that one of its organizing modes is communication among all its diverse parts. The cooperation necessary to maintain an organismic balance is established and maintained through the language of the society. This occurs on two basic levels. First, the fact of having a common language and a common set of assumptions expressed in the language provides some of the unity among the parts. Second, the act of communication itself establishes agreements and cooperation among the people in both private and public sectors. The first is an interesting yet limited means of maintaining cooperation; the second, an expansive and powerful one.

Whorf (1956), an anthropologist studying the languages of several southwest American Indian tribes, proposes that "the forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious"(p. 252). These laws of pattern are embedded in the individual's language, said Benjamin Lee Whorf. Particularly when we compare languages from different linguistic families, such as English, Sanskrit, or Hopi, we see the vast differences in the ways an individual cuts up, labels, and organizes perceptions. Whorf says:

And every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others, in which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates, but also analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationships and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness (p.252).

Whorf's conclusions concerning the effects of language upon thinking have been named the "Whorfian Hypothesis" and investigators since his time have attempted to formalize and extend it. However, attempts to verify Whorf's observations have proven inconclusive and we are left with an intriguing and partially illuminating theory about linguistic relativity (Diebold, 1965). It is true that our unconscious assumptions about the world have great impact upon our subsequent perceptions and behaviors. A person is word-bound if he does not realize that the words he uses and the things they refer to are not the same, and a person is culture-bound if he believes that the forms described by his culture are absolute.

The suggestion that a person is automatically prey to the unconscious assumptions of his language reduces the individual to a blind follower of hidden structures. Whorf (1956) says:

to restrict thinking to the patterns merely of English, and especially to those patterns which represent the acme of plainness in English, is to lose a power of thought which, once lost, can never be regained. It is the "plainest" English which contains the greatest number of unconscious assumptions about nature (p. 244).

The fact is that people have an ability to transcend the superficial linguistic levels. This transcendence frees him from the patterns that Whorf describes. Investigators (Bruner, Goodnow & Austin, 1956;

Carroll, 1964) find that the individual engages in sorting, analyzing and conceptualizing procedures that in themselves go beyond mere word-boundness. Thus, although Whorf's assumptions are logically derived, they do not account for the complexity of the human mind. If there are people who restrict themselves linguistically in the way that Whorf proposes, they likely will exhibit the kind of limited perception he describes; but such people may not exist.

Carroll (1963) offers the following revision of the Whorfian hypothesis, accounting for the individual's experience and his thinking being greater than his use of language.

Insofar as languages differ in the ways they encode objective experience, language users tend to sort out and distinguish experiences differently according to the categories provided by their respective languages. These cognitions will tend to have certain effects on behavior (p. 12).

If languages do exert influence on cognition and behavior, they do so mainly in the hidden assumptions with which the individual works.

In Bruner et al. (1956) concept attainment strategies are studied in order to understand the non-reportable thinking processes in individuals, those processes that influence the way he forms concepts but which he is largely unable to describe for himself. In seeking knowledge of what is entailed in making a conceptual distinction about objects or events in the physical world, he says, there are three questions that may guide the investigator. These are:

- a. How do people achieve the information necessary for isolating and learning a concept?
- b. How do they retain the information gained from encounters with possibly relevant events so that it may be useful later?
- c. How is retained information transformed so that it may be rendered useful for testing a hypothesis still unborn at the moment of first encountering new information (Bruner, 1973, p. 132).

Answering these questions has been the goal of concept attainment studies over the last twenty years. Problems of acquisition of knowledge, of memory, and of application in new situations are still perplexing to the psychologist. My suggestion that the assumed structure of events in our language plays a vital role in the way that concepts are attained, or, at least approached is suggested also by Bruner (1956) when he notes that subjects in his studies, when not given specific instructions about the nature of the concept to be attained,

will tend to assume that they are looking for a simple conjunctive concept of the certainty type. Is it indeed the case, as the late Alfred Korzybski urged, that Western man is burdened with a preference for conjunctive classification stemming from the tradition of so-called Aristotelian logic? Does the difficulty of dealing with disjunctive, relational, and probabilistic concepts reflect the difficulty of such concepts or does the difficulty perhaps reflect certain cultural biases in problem solvers (pp. 57-58)?

Since we do have classificatory biases inherent in the structure of our language, they point us toward certain conclusions about our world and about ourselves. Further investigations in cognitive studies may be able to illuminate the relationship more clearly. If conjunctive, two-value (either/or) classification is indelibly linked in language and thinking, we would find it operating powerfully in the person's perceptions and in his assumptions about how events are related.

Further considerations about the controlling aspect of language come from Alfred Korzybski's seminal principles of General Semantics. In his book Science and Sanity (1933) Korzybski proposes that the basic mode of thinking is an abstracting process. The individual abstracts

from his object experience "meanings" that are organized in levels that extend further and further away from the initial events. Levels of abstraction are intimately connected with language. Through the assumptions of Western languages, at least, we tend to believe that what we can say about something is what that thing is, so we tend to disregard characteristics and events for which we have no labels. We devise labels that select only some features of an event and we react to them in terms of the labels we have devised. Further abstractions may successively limit a person's perceptions and beliefs until he has reached a rigid, uncompromising conclusion on the basis of the controlling assumptions behind his abstractions.

Korzybski (1958) proposes that we can become conscious of our abstracting so that we avoid the pitfalls of the assumptions of our language. He says:

If, through lack of consciousness of abstracting, we identify or confuse words with objects and feelings, or memories and 'ideas' with experiences which belong to the unspeakable objective level, we identify higher order abstractions with lower. Since this special type of semantic identification or confusion is extremely general, it deserves a special name. I call it objectification, because it is generally the confusion of words or verbal issues (memories, 'ideas,') with objective, unspeakable levels, such as objects, or experiences, or feelings. If we objectify, we forget, or we do not remember that words are not the objects or feelings themselves, that the verbal levels are always different from the objective levels. When we identify them, we disregard the inherent differences, and so proper evaluation and full adjustment become impossible (p. 417).

If, indeed, proper evaluation of events becomes cluttered up with unconscious assumptions that distort the accuracy of a person's perceptions, then the plumbing of these assumptions should free the individual from misevaluations and distortions. This notion is a highly suggestive one. We know on one hand that the degree of distortion of events by an individual is proportional to his own feeling of adequacy in the situation (Combs, 1959). That is, if someone experiences an event as a threatening event he restructures it in order to fit it into his existing perceptual field. His need to maintain a consistent perception of himself may lead to severe denials of "reality." Combs (1959) explains how inadequate, distorted perceptions interfere with functioning in the world:

Distorted perceptions, it is clear, are unlikely to prove effective in helping individuals to new and better adjustments. To deal effectively with life requires the clearest possible perceptions of oneself and his relationships to the external world. The failure of adequate perception is the most obvious of the characteristics of inadequate personalities, and at the same time, the most vital factor in serving to keep them inadequate (p. 285).

What Korzybski proposes is that a person's perceptions can be made more adequate through changes in his language and through consciousness of his abstracting. This would lead to more adequate perceptions of oneself and a greater feeling of personal adequacy. In addition, Combs (1959) points out that "when we find ways of helping people change the ways they see themselves and the world in which they live, it may not be necessary to change their environments" (p. 316).

Of course, perception is not directly manipulable from without. The individual ultimately is the artificer of his own perceptions. However, given new words, he has available to him new concepts around which he may order his perceptions, and this may lead him toward greater accuracy of perception. On a different plane, if the person is presented with the implications of his assumptions this may be an occasion for perceiving anew, and if he comes to see how he uses words to maintain beliefs that are not necessarily so, this, too, may present him with an occasion for perceptual change.

The General Semantics approach--based on the work of Alfred Korzybski--is to concentrate upon the linguistic aspects of perception. This level of analysis of perception is fairly abstract in itself; it lends itself to overstatement. For example, Korzybski (1933) claims that the word is is the most insidious linguistic phenomenon because it gives the wrong impression that there is an absolute and exact identity between the things linked by is. "The cat is brown," he would say, suggests that brownness and cat-ness are necessarily joined together. However, since we cannot reasonably expect to alter the whole fabric of all languages, we have to look to the individual's uses of language to discover ways to improve perceptions. If we followed Korzybski literally we would be seeking an overhaul of all of Indo-european languages and we would be too removed from the dynamics of the individual.

There are ways in which an understanding of cultural relativity and unconscious assumptions within language can be utilized for increasing the adequacy of perception. Generally Whorf and Korzybski (and

those who have come after them) alert us to the fact that persons may be carrying around assumptions on the more formal, cognitive end of their experience that affect the more operational and emotional ends of their experience. Since feelings that a person has are a product of self-perceptions, perceptions of the world, and the meaning of the relationship to that individual, an understanding of the ways that a person has of relating these perceptions will lead to further understanding of the role of language in the perceptual process.

As members of the same culture we carry around similar means of appraising our experiences. In this sense we cooperate in our perceptions of events and in many of the meanings of those events. In perceptual psychology terms, commonly held perceptions make communication possible (Combs, 1959, p. 31). The degree of overlap of the phenomenal fields of individuals determine the degree to which they are capable of sharing their meanings and enlarging their experiences with each other. In the social sphere what is considered to be adequate, veridical perception of concrete reality is generally agreed upon by people as a whole.

What a person can say about anything is always limited. The pattern of any language, like the pattern of personality traits, is unified and consistent at some point of analysis. All systems are organized and structured and this organization means that the things organized are transformed. The creation and utilization of symbols (words, in this case) inevitably transforms the things symbolized. Hayakawa (1958) points out:

human beings live in a "semantic environment,"
which is the creation of their symbol systems,

so that even the individual who believes himself to be in direct contact with reality, and therefore free of doctrines and assumptions, thinks in terms of the symbols with which he has been taught to organize his perceptions, namely, the visual or verbal symbols, or images, which are the currency with which communication is negotiated in his culture (pp. 131-132).

Overlapping Perceptions

Living in an environment that shapes the form of one's symbols, while influential, does not absolutely determine the individual's thinking. Just as the word is not the object it represents, the symbol system in language is not the whole of perceptual processes. There is not a one-to-one correspondence between words and a person's concepts. The individual is also a word user and a word manipulator. Goodman (1971) points out that, above all, language is a coping behavior:

The common code is not identical with the power to speak and the actual speech of individuals, intimate groups, and functional groups, and the latter is normally always still plastic--it shapes the code as well as being shaped by it language is not a lifeless tool, but an act of coping. . . . It is because our power of speech is not in absolute correspondence with its code that we can pick up another way of saying things and tell it to ourselves, and so begin to understand the other culture--especially when, lo! in the other culture we find human actions that are relevant to ourselves (p. 49).

The finding of human actions relevant to oneself is the basis for communities and societies. Communities are held together and progress to the extent that members within that community see themselves as participants in common experiences and goals. The individual in a community fits in to the degree that he finds himself

involved in shared activity. Thus, when the goals of the individual and of society coincide, the individual experiences himself as a member of a significant group and he sees his actions as being human actions. Common experiences and common goals promote a feeling of belonging and participation.

As an organism in itself, a society has to have organization and structure. The different parts must cooperate in common functions. This places great importance upon communications with the social organism, and the symbols that are generated to hold together groups of people (e.g., religious, technological, economic, political symbols) help maintain the basic levels of communication. J. Z. Young (1951), the eminent biologist, links the function of the brain to a communications system that has developed in social contexts as an organ of communication. Saying that "the use of words to ensure cooperation is the essential biological feature of modern man" (p. 98), he cites man's creation of symbols of greater and greater power as the dominant link between the individual's mind and society as a whole.

The development of modes to ensure cooperation begins early in the child's socialization. There is, of course, the cooperative endeavor of feeding the infant that forms earliest senses of mutuality between child and mother (Sullivan, 1953). Later developments of cooperative human behavior extend further and further into the social world, and necessitate more communication between the child and others. As he learns how to express his needs or desires in ways that will elicit responses, the child builds up a repertory of behaviors and expressions that lead to further elaboration of social behaviors.

The structure and patterns of the language he is learning will provide him with basic descriptive capabilities and a sense of what is important to describe, but it is in the development of language as a coping device that he begins to formulate a social identity and a social mode of responding to others.

Channelling of Informational Modes

The information that a child possesses about himself and his environment maintains the overall relationship between him and society. If we look at the child for a moment in terms of cybernetic principles (Wiener, 1961)--also called information theory and, sometimes, communication theory,--we see that he develops means of acquiring, storing, using, and transmitting information about himself and his environment.

Strictly speaking, "information" in cybernetics is "a statistical function of alternations within a communication system including: (1) a sender capable of selecting a specific set of messages states out of a range of possible states; (2) a channel through which the selection of the sender can be indicated; and (3) a receiver capable of decoding this indication to determine the specific message states selected by the sender"(Sayre, 1967).' In these limited terms information is merely a quantitative term, not associated with human intentions, meanings, desires. It is a measure of the uniqueness of the symbol combination used at any time; low frequencies of symbol combinations (phonetically, lexically, or syntactically) have higher information value; high frequencies of symbol combinations have low information value.

In earliest verbal learning the child receives what to him is communication with high information value; that is, utterances are novel; he does not know the sound or the words that will follow. He is capable of hearing and imitating a wider range of sounds than those produced in any single language, but as he hears the words spoken around him certain sounds recur frequently, some others seldom, and others not at all. As he learns to discriminate the sounds that are produced the information value is reduced on the phonetic level. He can anticipate certain sounds and disregard others. As information decreases, that is, as uniqueness decreases, meaning, in cybernetic terms, increases.

Meaning for the individual develops out of recognizable patterns and forms. If there is too much uniqueness in the communication, it becomes chaotic, distorted, unpredictable, and unintelligible. Thus, a random series of words, unpatterned by grammatical structures or intention, would have high information value but make no sense. Too redundant a message, such as the same word repeated over and over again, loses whatever meaning it may have had. Information encompasses a greater area of perceivable phenomenon than does meaning, for meaning relies upon distinguishable patterns from a personal perspective. What is meaningful and coherent to an electrical engineer will be maximally "informative" but meaningless to a three-year-old.

In terms of an individual's perspective as a receptor of information there must be a balance between novelty and redundancy. The child learning to pick his way verbally through a jungle of sounds and expressions discovers meaning in the repeated and extended content words. He learns a variety of contexts and usages for the same word.

The redundancy of the word is balanced against the new applications he discovers for it. Thereby, his information input is kept at a sufficiently high level to extend the range of his verbalizations and his activities without overloading him with too much information to assimilate.

In his relations with others the child must develop sufficient skill in communicating internal states or external actions to be comprehended by those around him. The goal is to maximize the mutuality of information, to facilitate the transfer and comprehension of as much information as possible. Interference in this process, called noise in information theory, reduces the mutual possession of information F. J. Crosson (1967) says:

. . .the mutual information will be the amount of information which they [the sender and the receiver] share. For a perfectly noiseless channel and no ambiguity in coding, the mutual information will be maximal. As noise and equivocation increase, there will be less correlation between input and output ensembles, and the mutual information will decrease (p. 112).

The mutual possession of information is the first building block of the socialization of the child through language.

In an experiment conducted by Luria and Yudovich (1969) in the Soviet Union identical twins, who at the age of 5 years had not developed a common stock of words except for amorphous exclamations and privately shared expressions, were separated and given speech training. In three months they had developed relatively socialized speech. But the important changes occurred in their playing behaviors. Prior to the special linguistic training they exhibited the speech patterns and play activity of a child 1½ to 2 years of age. They did not draw, sculpt, or construct

objects from blocks; they did not engage in normal role and object play; and they did not engage in meaningful play. However, Luria points out:

with the development of speech, all the activity of these children was reorganized: role and object play appeared; disorderly drawing with a pencil on paper was replaced by meaningful content-centered drawing; disorderly rolling of clay was replaced by modeling; constructive activity, which had been absent earlier, appeared; and typical forms of intelligent and intellectual behavior were observed. The short time required to develop full-valued speech in these children eliminates maturation as an explanation and permits one to attribute the shifts in the structure of their activity to the development of new modes of speech (p. 145).

Since their social behavior, particularly their play, altered significantly after they acquired a socialized language, Luria concludes that language, as an internal representation of external relationships, has a regulative social function. As children develop a common language they also develop a common perceptual framework. Therefore, the overlap of perceptions held in common with each other and with society as a whole produce conditions for socialized behavior. About this process, Luria (1971) says:

With the appearance of speech disconnected from action, indicating an object, action and relations, it was to be expected that there should also arise the possibility of formulating a system of connections transcending the boundaries of the immediate situation and of subordinating action to these verbally formulated connections. It was to be expected that this would also lead to the development of complex forms of activity, manifested in play as 'the unfolding of subject matter' which would give play a steady character (p. 84).

On one level we can say that the mutual possession of information, the shared language and concepts, makes available to the child socialized play, for they both derive from a special perspective of the individual. To communicate a message a person has to consider in some way the person receiving the message. He has to separate the symbols he uses from actions in order to formulate an understandable message; that is, in information theory terms, he learns a coding procedure that has a high probability of being decoded accurately. In short, he learns to attend to the effects of his verbalizations. Likewise, in activity with others he learns appropriate roles for interacting socially.

Luria's analysis, that the reorganization of the child's mental processes through speech development permits him to evaluate his activity and produces objectively, suggests that one of the conditions necessary for regulated activity is the taking on of an outside perspective. This also suggests that the internal reorganization, as a product of the external perspective, becomes the rudimentary self system, that it arises out of the sharing of information and perceptions. The child begins to see himself in the context of others; his actions and his expressions are affected as is his sense of self.

The Elaboration of Self through Role Relationships

External Perspectives on Self

In social psychology, which considers the social context as the most salient dimension of human functioning, the self is described as a product of the interaction of individuals through the communication process. The person adopts external perspectives on himself, and treats himself as an object of knowledge. That is, he sees himself through

the eyes of others and comes to know himself in ways that he comes to know objects, events and other people. Thus he develops a theory of himself. Seymour Epstein (1972) suggests, in this respect, that the self-concept is:

a theory that the individual has unwittingly constructed about himself as an experiencing, functioning individual, and it is part of a broader theory which he holds with respect to his entire range of significant experience. Accordingly, there are major postulate systems for the nature of the world, for the nature of the self, and for their interaction (p. 409).

And recently Raimy (1975) has proposed that self-examination by a client in therapy can lead to the changing of misconceptions about himself in the same way that people change their conceptions in everyday life.

Self-examination is practiced extensively in everyday life when problems develop which interfere with living. If we suspect that we may be at fault, we customarily examine our behavior and our conceptions in the hope of discovering our faulty conceptions. If self-examination fails to provide us with suitable alternatives, we may then seek the advice of others (p. 48).

Since an individual understands himself through the taking on of an external view of himself, he may also mis-understand himself in the same way. Through the use of symbols the individual takes on the attitudes and assumptions of significant others. In his language these symbols channel his perceptions of himself along general cultural lines, but in the communication process itself, more specific self-perceptions are generated. To develop a "theory" or an "understanding" of himself the individual holds the attitudes of others before him as a mirror.

The effect of mirroring himself in others is circular (Combs, 1959), for as he sees his actions and their implications in terms of others' perceptions he modifies his actions and also his perceptions. His perceptual field becomes enlarged through his consideration of the effects of his behavior on others. The process becomes a self-fulfilling one when his beliefs about the effects of his behavior produces those effects he anticipates.

Roles

As the individual adopts the attitudes of others he learns to see himself as others see him. He controls his actions in relation to others; he develops attitudes about himself consistent with the attitudes others have. At least initially this is his primary mode of realizing his existence as a separate entity. He experiences himself as a self from the standpoint of external roles he finds himself in. He begins to see that he has a variety of roles and a variety of ways of looking at himself. He is his parents' son, his sister's brother, his neighbor's friend, etc. The dimensions of his experience are extended to his relations with others and to what these relations imply about how he is and how he should be. Hugh Dalziel Duncan (1968) says:

To become conscious of his self, the child must learn to take the attitude of others (who are, of course, different and indifferent and who hate as well as love). . . . Thus, it is only by taking the attitude of individual and general others into account that he can exist within the group, and get the kinds of responses he needs to stimulate himself to relate to others.

It is the child's ability to take roles, not simply to talk to himself or to 'think,' which determines his development. That is, the basic

form of communication as a social act, whatever its content, is histrionic. When the child talks to himself he addresses himself in roles (p. 79).

Role in Mead's conception is not merely the conscious roles or masks that a person may adopt, but instead encompasses all of his relationships with others. As the child adopts and modifies his roles vis a vis others he develops attitudes towards himself in terms of his experienced relationships. This is not set about in deliberate ways; it comes about as a perceptual process through which the individual becomes increasingly aware of his identity.

Using the common symbols of the group and the common attitudes of others as his basis for conversation with himself, he treats himself as an object of knowledge. He can know himself through the roles he experiences through others; he can consider himself as an external object by looking at himself through the eyes of others; he can talk to himself (what Mead calls "the inner flow of speech") and formulate intelligent responses to his various attitudes. With the development of an inner speech he then possesses the communicative modes that constitute the mind. As Mead (1938) says:

The essential condition for the appearance of what has been conceived of as mind is that the individual in acting with reference to the environment should, as part of that action, be acting with reference to himself, so that his action would include himself as an object. This does not mean that the individual should simply act with reference to parts of his organism, even when that action is social, but it does mean that the whole action toward the object upon which attention is centered includes as a part of this action a reaction toward the individual himself. If this is attained, the self as an object becomes a part of the acting individual, that is, the indivi-

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dual has attained what is called self-consciousness-- a self-consciousness that accompanies his conduct or may accompany a portion of his conduct (p. 367).

This sense of self, elaborated through social relations, is in only some ways the complex, dynamic self which we are investigating. As a source for internal regulation of behavior and of perception on a limited scale, the self that arises through primary socialization is, indeed, an identity. According to Mead there are as many selves in each person as there are roles that they engage in. However, these roles do not remain isolated from each other. A person is not entirely different in each of his roles. He may select out of his possible ways of behaving certain characteristics which will be organized into a coherent role, but it is unlikely that he will involve all of himself in any of the roles he maintains.

Roles, as social expectancies, particularly in the young child, exert tremendous pressure upon his conceptions of himself. The roles that he participates in promote self-perceptions that begin to stabilize to the same degree that the roles stabilize. When asked who they are most, people enumerate the roles they have: husband, student, sister, businessman, friend. Children gradually learn this response. They may begin with their name, knowing that is is a label they can apply to themselves, and then generate other labels, socially defined, to further describe themselves.

Primary Socialization

Primary socialization (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) is the process of creating in the child a concept of the "generalized other," setting up the conditions for the child to enter the social sphere. The

communication modes employed in primary socialization maintain pervasive, but not absolutely obligatory, concepts about society, self, and one's roles. Socialization is a stabilizing process. The child orients his perceptions in line with those around him. Although his internal experience is relatively amorphous and undifferentiated in relation to his external experience, which very early begins to be structured and differentiated, he learns to transform his external experience into a recognizable internal experience.

Berger & Luckmann point out that early in the socialization process the child does not distinguish the objectivity of natural phenomena from the objectivity of social phenomena. That is, in the terms that he has of dealing with them they both seem to be permanently, irrevocably the way they are. In Whorf's terms the child is word-bound and culture-bound by his unchallenged belief in the permanency of the forms he experiences. Social conventions are seen as unchangeable. They are not the product of human agreement or cooperation. Likewise, his roles and the language he has for communicating through his roles are fixed. They are experienced as objective reality.

As the child develops a social self he develops a concept of the "generalized other," in Mead's terminology. This concept of what an individual in society does and does not do becomes internalized as a guideline and touchstone for future activity through the process of considering himself as an object. Thus, standards of behavior become formalized. Berger & Luckmann say:

The formation within consciousness of the generalized other marks a decisive phase of socialization. It implies the internalization of society as such and of the objective reality established therein, and, at

the same time, the subjective establishment of a coherent and continuous identity. Society, identity and reality are subjectively crystallized in the same process of internalization. This crystallization is concurrent with the internalization of language. Indeed . . . language constitutes both the most important content and the most important instrument of socialization (p. 133).

As the child develops a sense of generalized other his private experience and his public experience begin to coincide. We would be hard pressed to determine the point at which one begins and the other leaves off.

In phenomenological terms, the individual's experience is his own perceptual field and the meaning of his experience or of an object depends upon his perception of the relationship between the object and himself. However, the concept of the generalized other urges certain perceptions of meaning in terms of society. He is told, explicitly or implicitly, that "big boys don't cry," that one should always tell the truth, that people don't run around without their clothes on. Thus, he learns to evaluate the meanings of an action in terms of the social meanings, which have become in many ways his private meanings.

The Creation of Common Meanings and a Sense of Cooperation

A person draws upon his own individual experiences and upon his experiences as a social and socialized being in forming perceptions about himself. The process of communication with others necessitates a bridging of the inner and the outer experiences, and it is this bridging of the two that directs the individual's sense of himself as

a unique organism on one hand, and of himself as a member of a sustained group with common ties on the other. His personal meaning is tied up in the balancing of these two experiences.

Personal meaning in any experience derives from the individual's perceptions of himself, his perceptions of the situation, and the relationship he perceives between them. If his overall perceptual field is organized in accordance with society's dictates, as has been suggested in the previous sections, the meanings he creates will reflect social expectancies. He may not be absolutely bound by them, but he certainly is not free of them either. His past experience, having many elements of commonality with others and of individuality, directs his expectations about whatever new situations he may encounter.

The development of social identities and of a stock of words, gestures, and meanings that help the individual interact smoothly with others, assumes social consequences of actions. Meaningful social actions derive from the individual's perceptions of the relationship between himself and others. Grounded in the cooperative dimensions of communication, interaction between individuals--even those involving disagreements--transform private individual experiences into public, common experiences. Anton C. Zijderfeld (1971) calls this movement of sensibility "meaningful intentionality." He says:

It is this meaningful intentionality that transforms movements of the body into social actions and interactions of persons. To this, the internalization of behavior as a cybernetic principle may be added: we are able to steer our actions in a meaningful way because we internalize the gestures and actions of others and feed them back in further communication--as in a spiral movement.

Participation is a function of this internalization. If man is no longer able to internalize actively, he will store up in his self meaningless, disconnected pieces of information--abstract images and empty stereotypes which are continuously reflected upon but do not stimulate any further communicative behavior. Moreover, in such a situation the actor will gradually lose the capacity to question or criticize the incoming information. He will slowly develop into an easy object for manipulation. Opinions are consumed passively and stored up in consciousness for abstract reflections (p. 87).

Zijderveld's conclusion on this matter is that the process of internalization is essential not only to the development of a social self but also to the maintenance of a fully functioning personality.

The picture we obtain at this point is one of an individual who assimilates the language patterns and the communicative modes of his culture in such a way that he develops an internal representation of the gestures, actions, and meanings of others. Through his internalized meanings he is able to organize further events into coherent patterns and he is able to participate meaningful in social activities. Thus, cooperation in the daily experience, particularly if this cooperation is perceived as a fulfillment of one's own identity, coincides with personal meaning.

Zijderveld's description of the effects of loss of the ability to internalize reminds us of Korzybski's description of the word-bound individual (1949). Both suggest that under certain conditions the individual forfeits the unique, productive ability to relate his language and his nonverbal experience. For Korzybski a person who confuses objects and words, who thinks that all things with the same name are the same, who reacts to words automatically, and who general-

izes and stereotypes experiences and people blindly, is an "intensional" being. He is caught in rigid, unchanging, narrow attitudes. He deals with surface similarities and ignores differences; he is uncritical of his experience and he is uncompromising in his perceptions. In short, he has not internalized the basic symbolizing principle: symbols are not the things they symbolize.

The social context informs the individual of the appropriateness of his symbols. Through interaction and participation he builds up a range of responses that both allow him to relate adequately with others and to discover personal meanings in his relations. He has to be able to distinguish social reality, which is based upon common agreement, from natural reality which is not based upon agreement, but which just is. The difference in these two realities means the difference between perceiving oneself as a party to agreements and cooperation, and perceiving oneself as a mere follower of unchangeable patterns.

CHAPTER III SYMBOLIZATION

The Extension of Perception through Language

In order for the individual to form a phenomenal self of whatever complexity, he must possess a capability of symbolizing his experience and himself. The symbolizing process itself allows the individual to perceive patterns, to abstract from sensory impressions, to draw conclusions, and to hold beliefs. It offers a means of ordering impressions into coherent, meaningful patterns. Without such ordering processes perceptual experience would be locked into rigid, non-continuous actions without a sense of direction or movement.

In listening to a musical piece we "understand" it because we are able to detect a pattern in the sequence of tones, a rhythm, and a flow of intervals and notes. Without the ability to represent and hold the notes in our awareness we would experience each note as an isolated sound, having no relation to what went before or what is to come. A person's ability to perceive music as a continuous, flowing, ordered, acoustic phenomenon is a product of his general ability to handle the accumulation of impressions and of his specific orientations and experiences with music. Brought up on Western musical structures (symphonies and concertos, for example), he might experience a disorientation upon encountering the structurally different music of traditional Eastern civilizations, but he would still be able to recognize it as music and not as random sounds.

Perception of Continuity

Symbolizing activity in man binds the past, present, and future for him. Before he can abstract from his perceptual impressions he must be able to experience duration from one activity to the next, from one impression to the next. Korzybski (1949) calls this distinguishing activity in mankind "time-binding," and suggests that man's capacity for abstraction, that is, symbolization, provides him with a continuous link between impressionistic data and human experiencing. Bergson (1912) too, claims that individual sense impressions are so "animated by common life"(p. 11) that we experience them as a flowing from one to the other.

This subjective feeling of continuity of experience opens the individual to further abstractions about his environment. The child appears to develop a sense of the continuity of his own existence before developing a comparable concept of continuity of objects and persons (Piaget, 1970). He orders his world around the subjective states of his own body and then gradually extends his awareness and symbolizing beyond himself into the physical and social world.

The experiences of living in time, of having a past and future as well as the present precedes the experience of any other continuous aspect of the self. To communicate this experience to others one must have a language, for the past and future cannot be expressed otherwise. By actions alone the child can only present his current experience. He might be able to signal the need for food or sleep or clean diapers, but that in itself is not symbolic activity. To represent

a feeling state requires at least some symbolization of that state, which means that it also must be felt as part of continuous experience. The development of language is the development of means for representing experience, and it extends the representation from the here-and-now signal to representation of past experiences and future possibilities. This is an important link in an individual's development. By learning language he learns more than the symbols to use for representing himself, his thoughts, his feelings. He learns to represent himself, which is a vast leap in mental functioning.

Labeling Experience

The representation of reality through symbols begins very early, but it is the blossoming of linguistic ability that opens the child's differentiation of elements in the environment. He begins to learn that people and things have names. Furthermore he learns that several objects can have the same name. As he learns to distinguish those objects from other objects with similar properties he is also learning methods for distinguishing them.

Brown (1968) suggests that in the naming activity the child's vocabulary is more determined by the practices of adults than by his cognitive preferences. The child learns the utility of the thing symbolized by language as well as learning the symbol itself.

Naming each thing in accordance with local frequencies, parents unwittingly transmit their own cognitive structures. It is a world where Prince is unique among dogs and papa among men, spoons are all alike but different from forks. It may be a world of bugs (to be stepped on), or flowers (not to be picked), and birds (not to be stoned). It may be a world in which Niggers, like

spoons are all of a kind. A division of caste creates a vast categorical equivalence and a correspondingly generic name. Mr. Jones and Mr. Smith do not come out of racial anonymity until their uniqueness is appreciated (p. 86).

Likewise the child's perceptions and personal experience are organized by the linguistic symbols he obtains from representing them. A child learns to see himself through the eyes of others and to describe himself through the vocabulary of others. As he learns to represent feeling states or physical attributes, he learns what states are significant for representation and what states are trivial or non-existent in other people's terms. The differentiation of what constitutes himself, his possessions, his capabilities, and his feelings begins on the linguistic level.

I watched my two-year-old nephew one day as he toddled around the living room of his grandmother's house. He would approach a cabinet that was "off limits" with obvious interest, but just before reaching it he would say, "No, Shawn," in exactly the tone of voice used by his mother. Other objects in the room elicited either the learned injunction not to touch, or, in the case of objects that were acceptable for him to touch and handle, a completion of his initial urge. Clearly, he was learning the language of limitations and rules and of subsequent actions that could be performed.

The activity of language orients the individual to attend to those features of his environment and of himself that can be named and communicated. Communicable phenomena must have a history, a continuity of existence, and some elements that are held in common with other

phenomena. The unique, the idiosyncratic can be communicated only if it is related in some way to the enduring and general. Thus the child as he learns to talk learns to attend to the things around him that can be communicated. He learns to see similarities in different objects, and he learns to deal with these objects in similar terms.

In his perception of himself he attends to repeatable physiological functions and recurrent feelings. Other phenomena he either learns to ignore because there is no word for them, or he learns to express in terms of something else. Ruesch and Bateson (1968) suggest that the limitations of language to recurring phenomena order the activity of all people around their perception of common occurrences. "Language can only deal with recurring phenomena: never can it specify the unique, and especially the uniquely personal developments and complex growth which are still in the future"(p. 233). This is one aspect of language development: its orientating effect upon perceptions of constancy, continuity, and similarity of sense impressions that shapes a person's attention. He learns how to respond to the facts of existence (that some things endure) and what facts are worth attention (those that endure).

In organizing his perceptual field, then, the child attends to impressions that are responsible along certain lines. He differentiates those elements that have essentially constant characteristics. Those that exist over an extended period of time, and those that are similar in features or consequences. He does not learn to distinguish phenomena for which there are not adequate words or concepts in his language.

For example, childhood synaesthesia, in which more than one sense modality are experienced together ("hearing" colors; "seeing" sounds; "feeling" the texture of tastes; etc.) is a common phenomenon, but it decreases in strength in later years. I suggest that, since we have no simple ways of expressing those experiences and tend to disregard them, the capacity for synaesthesia is diminished, if not lost.

It is a common occurrence for perceptual fields in people as a whole to be broadened and their abilities to experience new phenomena enhanced through the introduction of new words or concepts. In the last few years serious scientific investigation of auras around people's heads, sparked by Kirlian photography, has apparently legitimated the seeing of these auras by many people in their daily life. Now that it is fairly well accepted as a legitimate experience more and more people report having seen auras. The precise reasons for this are not clear, but it is clear that prevailing ways of cutting up and organizing experience affect the individual's private perceptions.

Adult linguistic practices shape the early perceptions of the child. Not only is the child learning a vocabulary for expressing his wants and his perceptions, he is learning the degree to which such expressions are acceptable. From the simple differentiation of physical objects to the more complex differentiation of significant aspects of his body and his experience, the child reflects the attitudes and assumptions of those he contacts. Eveloff (1971) summarizes this procedure:

By interpreting the world around him in an organized logical manner, the adult reflects facets of reality for the child that are incomparably deeper and more complex than those he would have gleaned from his own experimentations. The incorporated words of the parent become a tremendous factor which helps to form the very substance of mental activity.

When the child verbally establishes complex connections and relations between perceived phenomena with the help of an adult, the child introduces at each moment essential qualitative changes in the receptivity and interpretation of sensory input to his brain, that is, in the perception and cognition of his world. Thus, the word not only makes possible the coding of information but modifies the nature of that which is to be coded (p. 1896).

Language, then, is a means of extending one's perceptions into deeper and richer dimensions. The quality of perceptual experience is heightened by the ability of the child to orient his intake of information around symbols. This important facet of perceptual experiences suggests that construction of the child's experience goes on from his earliest symbolizing activities. Since he interprets his world, his actions, and himself through symbols and since these symbols carry with them the cultural assumptions of those who introduce them, his act of perceiving is a constructive act.

The Perception of Patterns and Relationships

Besides the basic symbolizing of events that comes from naming or labelling them, language also exercises a further representation of events through the patterns of words produced. Much of language is tied to no specific concrete phenomena, as Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956) points out. Speech, which incorporates the pattern system of the language--that is, the sentence structure itself--is more important than the particular words. He says:

That part of meaning which is in words, and which we may call "reference," is only relatively fixed. Reference of words is at the mercy of the sentences and grammatical patterns in which they occur . . . The sentence "I went all the way down there just in order to see Jack" contains only one fixed concrete reference: namely, Jack. The rest is pattern attached to nothing specifically (p. 259).

This means that the child learning a language acquires a particular system of patterns that influence his perceptions of the ways in which objects or persons can be related. Although the effects of this patternment are difficult to assess, there have been some notable attempts at describing the role of language patterns in perception: specifically, Whorf (1956) and Korzybski (1933). I will deal with these in more detail later.

Accepting for the now that patterning in language is important, we are led to ask how an understanding of this pattern develops. To find answers to this we need to look at the symbolic functions in regard to the internalization of patterns.

The Symbolic Function

The symbolic function not only enables the individual to symbolize experiences and manipulate symbols, but it also provides the modality for internalizing experience, for "making it your own," so to speak. Out of each person's unique interactions with the world he forms a complex organization that not only gives meaning to experience, but also provides him with a means of ordering experiences to come. Thus, there is a static element and a progressive goal to organization.

Static elements in perception derive from the labels we apply to events. There is a tendency to reify experience, to treat as an object non-physical phenomena or processes. For example, "love" is not a thing; it is a label attached to a way of behaving and perceiving. But we often talk about it as if it has real existence. We can fall in it or out of it. We can give or receive it. We call upon it as a panacea for splintered social relations. The quality of loving is almost systematically transformed into a static object. Most abstract conceptions are reduced to objectifications in this way.

The human tendency toward objectification of experience illustrates one way of knowing the world. We can know things by acting upon them, but that means that they must have some real or supposed physical existence. Love can be analyzed, categorized, and evaluated in physical terms only if it has been objectified first. Another way of knowing comes about through understanding relationships among things. To understand relationships the individual must be able to perceive patterns, to abstract from experience, to propose and test combinations of phenomena, to transform them systematically. In short, he needs to be able to bring to his experiences a vast range of synthesizing process.

Objects are not the only things that can be known, but they are our most ready sources of knowledge and provide us with models for knowing non-physical things. Piaget (1971b) says:

There are two ways of transforming the object we wish to know. One consists in modifying its positions, its movements, or its characteristics in order to explore its nature: this is action known as "physical." The other consists in enriching the object with characteristics or new relation-

ships, which retain its characteristics or previous relationships, yet completing them by systems of classification, numeral order, measure, and so forth: these actions are known as "logico-mathematical" (p. 67).

Systematic procedures for transforming objects mentally, in order to more fully realize their characteristics, apply combinatorial to the situation.

Although Piaget is concerned primarily with what he calls the logico-mathematical processes, especially as they are oriented towards exploration of physical reality, such processes are only part of a more extensive perceptual experience. We know that perceptions are differentiated on the basis of perceived qualities of nearness, similarity, etc. Piaget's description of the knowing process formalizes the above Gestalt description of perception in tightly defined areas. His development theory supported by wide ranging experiments by others that the child learns systems for transformation of physical reality allows the possibility that the child learns similar systems of transformation for all of his perceptual experiences, such as concepts about himself.

Evidence cited in the development of cognitive structures is corroborative but not directly applicable to the whole of experience. There is a strong suggestion that, if a person's perceptual field is a product of his mental activity, understanding the structures and processes in mental functioning will enable us to understand further the individual's organization of his perceptual field.

Piaget's formulation of logic-mathematical processes in simplified form looks like this: the individual "knows" reality as an existing and consistent phenomenon, that is he knows the basic properties of physical objects; he also knows and increases his power

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to know ways of manipulating and transforming his knowledge so as to deepen and widen his understanding; these powerful transformational abilities constitute knowledge in itself and also a means of extending knowledge; thus, the transformational processes are the most important dimensions of knowledge. If we can know how the individual organizes his understanding and transforming processes we will understand the nature of thinking itself.

Obviously, mapping the child's total perceptual process is a massive undertaking, and not likely to yield all the secrets of mental life quickly or easily. However, even as it stands in a nascent state this theory of the growth of knowledge contributes an important dimension in considering the whole phenomenal field. The ways that a person has of elaborating and extending the personal meaning of his experience can be understood in this model. A person has as his basic self concept a range of attributes that are central to himself. He also has as a part of his perceptual framework a set of logical processes that tell him how to alter conceptions of himself and of his world. Thus, the perceptual field of an individual is the total of his perceptions of himself, of his perceptions of the world, and the relationships he sees between them; the means he uses to discover relationships would be his transformational processes.

Internalization

One of the unique qualities of mental processes is the ability of the individual to reflect upon his own experience. This is important for it means that he is not bound up in the world of sensory experience but can make his own experiences more extensive by

considering them. This quality of consciousness has intrigued philosophers and psychologists alike. Perception refers to the quality and vividness of a person's experiences in his conscious state; self-perception refers, then, to his awareness of himself as a perceiver. This entails reflection upon his experience after the fact and a change in the level of his perception. Self perception or reflection may be extended indefinitely, like the images generated by two facing mirrors.

A person is initially a perceiving organism. He becomes a self-perceiving organism with the advent of language, for at this time he can conceptualize himself apart from his environment and roles. The degree of complexity in self-perception is a function of experiences and mental maturation. His experiences inform him progressively of consequences, patterns, attributes, et cetera in his world. His mental faculties provide him with powerful abilities to conceptualize, to abstract from his experience salient features.

By internalization I mean the process of assimilating experience and perceptions into the over all body of concepts that are the individual's reservoir of attitudes, thinking styles, symbolizing processes and meanings. Piaget (1970) relates internalization to the replacement of action with thought. To him actions that are performed on objects "are the basis for reflective abstraction"(p. 19) and they are internalized insofar as they "can be carried out in thought as well as executed materially"(p. 22). This externalistic view of the process of making something one's own breaks the perceptual process

into two parts, an event and the idea of that event; but if we look at the relationship of action to perception, we see that they occur simultaneously. Thus, the individual differentiates his perceptions as he acts upon the external world; those differentiated perceptions become "internalized" as the individual discovers the meaning of them to himself. Berger and Luckmann (1967) describe internalization as "the immediate apprehension or interpretation of an objective event as expressing meaning"(p. 129).

Internalization, then, is a process of making something a working part of one's perceptual processes. As differentiated perceptions are dropped out of the immediate experience of the individual they become part of the process of differentiating further perceptions. Combs (1959) describes this as a Gestalt formation process:

Events learned to the point where they are differentiated in clear figure soon fade into the ground of the perceptual field, being replaced in figure by some new or more extensive differentiation

The economy of the organism requires that we be able to drop what has been differentiated in clear figure further and further into the ground of the field. If every event had to be new and clearly differentiated at every moment, need satisfaction, even the very existence of the organism, would be impossible (p. 198).

Symbolizing experience on an overt, linguistic level begins the process of internalization of symbols and images used by the individual in creating new symbols. As he learns to abstract patterns from his experiences, the individual replaces these perceived patterns with others. The ones that are replaced are not precluded

or eliminated; they become more integral elements in his perceptual organization. They become his "sets," his assumptions, and his means of differentiating incoming impressions. What he internalizes, what he drops into the ground of his experience, then, can have great impact upon his later perceptions.

An example of this internalization is the objectification process. In order to express relationships we have to put them into words which tend to objectify the expressed event. What begins in perceptual experience as a process becomes a static object or relationship in order to communicate it. Not only does the speaker learn to apply labels to events, but he also learns that events are to be labelled like objects. He learns the objectification process and internalizes it as a part of his perceptual process. When he encounters new situations he asks "what is it called?" Eventually this orientation towards naming and objectifying is so much a part of him that it affects all experiences he has, including perceptions of himself.

Say for example, that a student uses external, inadmissible (from the teacher's point of view) sources on an examination. At the moment of acting the student is merely doing what seems to him to be the most effective thing he can to succeed on the test. After he has done this, actually at almost the same time that he does it, he sees his behavior as interpreted from an external point of view. The label attached to that behavior is cheating, so that makes him a cheater. If he is a "cheater" then he may be bad, for having cheated, or clever for having gotten away with it, but whatever he believes

about himself in that situation will be, partially at least, a product of his internalized tendency to objectify his experience, to attach labels and then to react to the labels.

Raimy (1943) describes the concentration of personal observations into symbolic shorthand as being important in the formation of one's self-concept.

Instead of a retention of all the details which occurred in actual experience, words or other symbols may be used to abbreviate and condense the results of personal observations so that only a vestigial symbol may represent the content of a large number of personal experiences. For instance, "I am guilty" may be the simple self-characterization which stands for a whole series of guilty self-evaluations (p. 101).

Symbolizing Personal Experience

The symbolic function, which makes it possible for someone to abstract from his experience and to deal with his abstractions as "real" objects or events, becomes elaborated through personal experience. This functioning is not an object that causes events, even though the essence of language leads me to describe it as if it were an object. The symbolic function is inseparable from mental activity, from perception, from abstraction, from experience.

Self-perception is possible because symbolization is possible. Symbolization of experience begins as a simple tool for sorting out the impressions and events that surround a person. It becomes an elaborate process of understanding, eventually extending beyond here-and-now phenomena to phenomena that are not immediately accessible to the senses because they are displaced in time or position. The self and the perceptual process are both displaced from immediate experience, but because they can be symbolized, they become accessible to each person.

Cassirer (1946) states that symbols and linguistic concepts help the individual find limits and draw outlines for experience. As this formation of linguistic concepts orders the internal structure of a person's perceptions and conceptions it helps lead him to a clear understanding of himself and of his world.

. . . the primary function of linguistic concepts does not consist in the comparison of experiences and the selection of certain common attributes, but in the concentration of such experiences, so to speak, in distilling them down to one point. But the manner of this concentration always depends upon the direction of the subject's interest and is determined not so much by the content of the experience as by the teleological perspective from which it is viewed. Whatever appears important for our wishing and willing, our hopes and anxiety, for acting and doing; that and only that receives the stamp of verbal "meaning."

. . . Only symbolic expression can yield the possibility of prospect and retrospect, because it is only by symbols that distinctions are not merely made, but fixed in consciousness. What the mind has once created, what has been culled from the total sphere of consciousness, does not fade away again when the spoken word has set its seal upon it and given it definite form (pp. 37-38).

As a person learns to organize his experiences along certain dimensions, abstracting patterns and internalizing them, so he learns to organize conceptions of himself. Erikson (1968) suggests that each stage of psychosocial development for the individual is characterized by an identity formation task that must be resolved successfully for the individual to increase his growing sense of identity and personal adequacy. Identity formation for Erikson is equivalent to self-concept and it becomes possible through self-perception:

In psychological terms identity formation employs a process of simultaneous reflection and observation, a process taking place on all levels of mental functioning, by which the individual judges himself in the light of what he perceives to be the way in which others judge him in comparison to themselves and to a typology significant to them; while he judges their way of judging him in the light of how he perceives himself in comparison to them and to types that have become relevant to him. This process is, luckily, and necessarily, for the most part unconscious except where inner conditions and outer circumstances combine to aggravate a painful or elated, "identity-consciousness (pp. 22-23)."

Even though it may not occur on the conscious level, a person is constantly relating himself to others in interpersonal terms and abstracting from those relations. He thereby is employing a highly sophisticated form of cognition capable of complex deductions, comparisons, inferences, abstractions, and meanings. The individual is capable of reflecting upon his characteristic ways of synthesizing experience, and making those abstracting and transforming modes more integral to himself by internalizing them.

What I am suggesting on a broad level is that internalization is a process in mental activity that derives its existence from the symbolic function. Only because the individual is capable of reflecting upon his experience, only because he both perceives and abstracts from his perceptions, is he able to internalize processes for manipulating and transforming his experience. First he learns to attach labels, then to label the labels, then to further label and abstract. Internalization of these abstracting processes increases his ability to organize his experience along certain lines; it also directs the ways in which he will organize perceptions about himself and his world.

A further indication of the power of the internalization process in personality development occurs in the social realm. Individuals who begin, say, disbelieving in their roles, but enact their roles vis-a-vis others in a prescribed manner often end up believing in those same roles (Goffman, 1959). For example, someone who moves to a new locale may find the social customs and manner of speech quaint or bizarre at first. He, however, enters into the community style with a faint sense of playing a role and sometime later has internalized these customs and speech patterns so that he is indistinguishable from the natives.

Transformational grammar

The acquisition of language may also be viewed as an internalization of labels (words) and patterns (syntax). The most notable attempt to describe language in terms of the individuals capacities is in the area of linguistic theory called transformational grammar.

Transformational grammar attempts to account for the fact that a normal native speaker of a language is able to understand sentences he has never heard before and is able to generate entirely novel utterances (Chomsky, 1957). The fact that all people can grasp intuitively what is grammatical and what is not grammatical in daily speech suggests that each person possesses an abstract, although it may be unexpressable, representation of the grammar of his language which allows him to sort through utterances and not only know what is a permissible sentence, but also how to disambiguate, to differentiate possible meanings of sentences. Noam Chomsky calls this linguistic ability compétence.

The concept of competence suggests that the person responds to several meaningful levels in sentences; he understands the sounds (phonetics) that characterize his particular language, and he understands the meanings of the words and the syntactic patterns of sentences. He understands more than the mere surface characteristics of sentences.

The development of linguistic competence proceeds from simple holophrastic utterances, wherein the child expresses one word that carries the equivalent in meaning to a sentence (e.g. "pencil" for "I see the pencil," or "give me a pencil"), to complex, syntactic, "adult" utterances. As he moves from one-word sentences to two-word and three-word sentences, the child is constantly testing out hypotheses, so to speak, about the relationships among words. He acquires subtler and richer knowledge about the pattern and structure of sentences as he differentiates grammatical forms and classes. In short, he operates like a scientist gathering data and organizing it into increasingly powerful categories.

Three Dimensions of Speech

Three dimensions in speech production are learned: the surface structure of sentences, deep structures, and transformational rules.

Surface structures

First, the surface structure of sentences is the organization of specific words, phrases, and their phonetic representation. The child learns to make the appropriate and characteristic sounds of his language; he learns to distinguish minimal sound differences that affect the meaning of the words he hears. He also learns the names of objects and events, and he learns the proper word order in sentences. These dimensions of linguistic knowledge are available in external (written

or spoken) utterances. With the ability to represent thought in words the child has a working knowledge of language. However, this by itself is not enough to account for the richness of linguistic ability.

Deep structures

Were the surface structures the only existing linguistic structures, language use would be limited to the manifest and obvious. All meaning would reside on the surface. Information that would be transmitted would have to express all the assumptions involved; nothing could be assumed because it would have no structure for being assumed. Since it is apparent that sentences do carry prior assumptions within their structure (e.g. personal pronouns, past and future tenses, conditional voices), we are led to specifying deeper structures which accommodate such aspects of language.

In deep structure (sometimes referred to as Kernel sentences) basic grammatical patterns of a language are given abstract representation. Being concepts about the native speaker's language, they are more generalized than surface structures. That is, in deep structure the individual has an abstract formulation about the acceptable utterances in his language. These concepts act as templates in that they allow the individual to sort out the acceptable and unacceptable sentences and to generate appropriate utterances of his own. As abstractions about language, deep structures cannot be expressed without additional components; the surface structure assigns appropriate sounds to the words thereby giving it final form.

Transformational rules

An intermediate step in sentence production occurs by means of transformational operations. Transformational rules consist of further abstractions about language. In transformational operations the individual applies his knowledge about the structure of phrases and how they may be recombined to produce variations on the basic phrases. Thus, at this level grammatical rules (such as the various tense forms, the changing from active to passive constructions, etc.) are applied to deep structures, giving the form the sentence will take on the surface. Transformational rules, it is believed, bridge the abstract level of representation and the surface level of production and understanding. A more detailed description of transformational grammar may be found in the appendix.

Coding of a sentence begins at a deep structure level. Semantic representations, personal meaning, motives for speaking, ideas and concepts begin to be formulated in terms of the speaker's language at this point. Appropriate grammatical constructions and transformations are applied, and the resultant sentence, being transformed into sound, is generated. The production of speech is a complex cognitive function that operates on several levels. In linguistic terms, motives for speech are not considered as part of the grammatical ability of the speaker. He may have diverse reasons for saying what he says, but whatever the reasons, his bringing of his thoughts to the surface follows this linguistic structure.

Language Acquisition

The course of language acquisition is two-fold. The child develops greater mastery of vocabulary and syntax on one hand, while he subordinates that knowledge to knowledge of transformational rules on the other hand. That is, he develops categories of words and phrases which can be generalized from to produce abstract principles of application. This is similar to Piaget's (1968) description of the learning of logico-mathematical structures. These principles reduce the amount of information the child has to store, and through them he becomes capable of generating all possible sentences from a basic vocabulary and a string of transformations.

As the child categorizes and differentiates categories, the deep structure becomes an internalized version of basic English or French, for example. When it is coupled with the transformational rules (the operative element), a means of bring forth the internal structure is available. McNeill (1966) says:

A child seems to operate like a professional grammarian who takes advantage of the fact that transformations are intrinsically more powerful than base-structure deep structure rules and so can express grammatical relations more economically. The pressure--or, if you prefer, the motivation--to devise transformation rules may come from the cognitive clutter that comes from not having them (p. 61).

The picture of mental and linguistic development that we obtain from transformational grammar approaches is one of progressive differentiation of specific, surface elements, and a concomitant internalization of powerful mental constructs which become the guiding principle in speech.

It seems that the child internalizes the structure of his language in ways similar to how he internalizes his knowledge about physical objects. In both cases the capacity for symbolizing opens the possibility of organizing knowledge in systematic ways and it follows that the more abstract, deep level representations will have the greatest effect upon the individual's perceptions. They become his unconscious assumptions in dealing with the world.

The Adequacy of Knowledge

The existence of transformational structure, that is, systematic ways of relating and structuring basic knowledge of events, although not capable of explaining all of human functioning, is highly suggestive of the process of knowing for the individual. Piaget (1970) working in a different framework from grammarians, explains his conception of knowledge:

Knowing an object does not mean copying it--it means acting upon it. It means constructing systems of transformations that can be carried out on or with this object. Knowing reality means constructing systems of transformations that correspond, more or less adequately, to reality. . . Knowledge, then, is a system of transformations that become progressively adequate (p. 15).

The dimension of adequacy of transformations in representing the true state of existence corresponds with a similar dimension in perceptual experience. A person's perceptions are self-correcting in that they are testable against reality; this applies particularly in the realm of physical reality.

If a person's perceptions of the world are wrong, he finds out when he acts upon those perceptions. If I think that a sliding glass door is open when it is not, I will discover my error, probably painfully, as I try to walk through it.

When perception of self is explored, however, "reality" becomes much less testable. Against what can the individual test his perceptions? The perceptions of others will elucidate some of his perceptions of himself, but since no one can know all of other's experience, there remain some aspects that cannot be checked against "reality." Bruner (1973) points out:

self cues are probably ambiguous in nature . . .
they rarely are very appropriate for confirming
specific hypotheses . . . self-information is a
good deal vaguer than the highly salient information we get from the external environment (p. 110).

This limitation in knowing places greater importance upon the individual's actual process of knowing or perceiving than upon the product of knowing, because the resultant conclusion is less testable in empirical terms.

If a person's processes of transforming impressions into assimilable form are based upon adequate ways of representing the impressions he receives, then the perceptions of the individual are like to be veridical. For example, if a child believes that because his father gets angry with him he is an unworthwhile person, his perceptions of himself will involve his unworthwhileness. If, on the other hand, he knows not to conclude that he is bad or unworthy because of his father's anger, he will resist forming self-perceptions about his inadequacy. It is in the abstracting process that his perceptions of himself are generated and it is in the

abstracting process, that is, in his transforming of impressions, that changes in self-concepts occur. His perceiving of relationships determines how he perceives himself.

Only tentatively can we draw connections between a person's abstracting and the linguistic structures that may influence his abstracting. Much work is being done in determining the extent to which transformational grammar depicts the development and activity of mental processes. Paula Menyuk (1969) summarizes the child's development of linguistic competence in her study of the sentences children actually use. Very general terms have to be employed when suggesting the relationship between linguistic structures and the perceptual processes.

. . .the child has the capacity (1) to perceive and identify abstract features with linguistic data that he hears, (2) to store these features and descriptions of possible manipulations of these features in memory in a retrievable form, (3) to apply these descriptions to each utterance he generates and hears to come to some realization or determination of a sentence, and (4) to add and reorganize this information in the light of what he already knows and what he continues to find in the linguistic data (p. 153).

The learning of language by young children, then, is highly complex, creative act in which the child participates fully in organizing and directing acquisition of abstract forms.

Language and Self in Daily Life

Linguistic patterns are not the only patterns an individual learns to recognize and to differentiate. The pattern of every day, as each person gradually establishes greater contact, asserts a kind of logic and meaning for him. The logic and meaning of social interaction, of diverse sense

impressions, of routines and roles helps the individual maintain his phenomenological equilibrium. Although each individual has his own unique perceptions and, therefore, his individual realities, the world is not merely a blank tablet, nor a cauldron of willy-nilly phenomena. Thus, the individual not only forges his own reality, but he also engages in discovering what the limits of that forging are.

In the previous discussions of the child's participation in the organization of his perceptions, through his development of labels for objects and structures for expressing himself in sentences, we can see that rudimentary language development introduces new elements to the perceptual process and directs the organization of a child's world. He is assimilating new experiences rapidly. With language this assimilating and organizing of experience is heightened. The child is not bound by immediate sense perception as a means of forming concepts about the world, for he can elaborate upon his experience, increase the depth of his knowledge, talk about things and people when they are not present, anticipate events, and remember experiences.

However, the world for the young child is a confusing and sometimes perturbing place. His burgeoning powers often are inadequate for understanding the complexities that seasoned adults accept automatically. Regular patterns of eating, sleeping, socializing are quickly seized upon and deviance from them may produce anxiety or frustration. One example of the desire for regular patterns is the child's delight in hearing the same story told over and over again and his insistence that not one word be changed in the telling. He knows how it should proceed and often will not accept it as being the same story if details are changed even slightly.

His representations of his world at this stage are monistic, not open to change, except very gradually. The sense he makes out of his everyday world comes from his manipulation of his environment. As he manipulates objects, and later the symbols for objects he forms more powerful representations of his environment, ones that enable him to extend himself more fully into the world around him while taking on greater control of himself.

Piaget (1971a) maintains that cognitive structures unfold along presented patterns in the child and that these cognitive structures, or mental abilities, if you will, arise through the child's acting upon objects. To him what is learned is not static properties of the environment, but the operations that can be performed on the environment. Thus, the patterns or relationships that the child discovers become more important than physical properties. The symbolic function engages the child in the transformation of events and objects, and through the transformations he learns to make he extends his knowledge of the world. Piaget (1970) says:

when we are acting upon an object, we can also take into account the action itself, or operation if you will, since the transformation can be carried out mentally. In this hypothesis the abstraction is drawn not from the object that is acted upon, but from the action itself. It seems to me that this is the basis of logical and mathematical abstraction (p. 16).

Through his abstraction from actions that may be performed the child penetrates the difficulties of daily life. He learns the perceptual cues that enable him to grasp an object beyond his immediate reach; he learns that objects exist even when he is not witnessing them. He learns to extend his knowledge of objects in productive ways and he learns

how to explore their characteristics mentally and not just physically. It is not merely the labels that are important to him but the means through which he may relate the labels that he has learned.

The reality of every day life, as Berger and Luckmann (1967) call it, extends beyond physical manipulations. There is a vast social sphere, established and maintained through speech, that informs the individual of his existence:

I know that my natural attitude to this world corresponds to the natural attitude of others . . . I also know, of course, that the others have a perspective on this common world that is not identical with mine. My "here" is their "there." My "now" does not fully overlap with theirs. My projects differ from and may even conflict with theirs. All the same, I know that I live with them in a common world. Most importantly, I know that there is an ongoing correspondence between my meanings and their meanings in this world, that we share a common sense about its reality (p. 23).

As the individual acts upon the meanings of his perceptions, he is informed constantly about the degree of correspondence these meanings have with the meanings of other people. To the degree that his meanings and the meanings of others overlap he is able to communicate his experience.

His reality, his meanings, formed through symbols and actualized in the company of others, reflect the day to day patterns that he has differentiated and he may not be aware of the extent to which his daily experiences are abstractions from his actions; he is more likely to be aware merely of the abstractions as actions in themselves.

In learning to symbolize himself, in learning to manipulate symbols in order to create more symbols (the process of abstraction, for example), the child discovers the nature of symbolic life. This is not a concept that is usually exercised as such. Children tend to believe that objects and names for those objects have absolute identity. Only gradually over a span of years is perception of the differences between the word and the thing developed (Church, 1961). Early communication in the child is experienced as actual manipulation of the objects that the words denote. The child sees a one-to-one relationship between words and objects so he believes that whatever he says is, in fact, what is.

As he begins to understand that he can manipulate ideas about objects with his words, but not the objects themselves, he enters into a more conscious process of symbolization. He learns that many things can be said about an event, an object, or himself, and that these words will have relative facticity. "Word magic," the belief in the power of words to alter existence, diminishes, although it seems to remain with each person somewhat throughout his life. It is a major step to realize that "sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me."

Realizing the separability of words and objects offers the chance to analyze intentions and connotations behind words. If the words are not existence themselves, then they represent someone's attempt to represent existence. This means taking into account the context of a person's words, the tone of voice, the hidden motivations and messages behind the words themselves. By understanding this the individual extends the range of his understanding beyond the surface of language use and into deeper levels of understanding.

As he learns to gauge intention and meaning in discourse, a person becomes familiar with the possible modes of symbolizing experience. It may be done to manipulate, explain, understand, intensify, or distort experience. The underlying characteristics of symbolization form the individual's conceptions of the desirability of symbolizing experience. Thus the child creates meaning about the creation of meaning, that is, communication.

The development of the symbolic self depends upon (1) the symbols the child has learned for representing himself and his experience, (2) the mental transformations he acquires for ordering his perceptions and relationships, and (3) the beliefs he holds about the process of symbolization itself. As the child moves further and further into contact with his environment, he develops means for internalizing his experiences, perceptions, conclusions. He organizes his experiences around symbols, constantly extending the range of his symbols and reorganizing them in light of further experience.

As he experience of the act of communication develops, the child develops a sense of himself in regard to others. The process of organizing his experiences depends upon the complexity with which he uses language in representing and exploring his private and communal experiences. As language use becomes more complex, so do his perceptions of himself. He "discovers" his identity and organizes it in the modes of thinking he has developed. This creates the conditions for differentiating out his symbolic self along complex and dynamic lines.

CHAPTER IV SOCIAL AND PRIVATE SPEECH

Communicable Experience

Each person has dimensions of his total experience that are individual, private, uncommunicable. Try as he may he will not be able to express to another person all of his experience. R. D. Laing (1967) suggests that because of the gulf that exists between two people's experiences a discipline of social phenomenology should concern itself with the inter-experience of individuals. He says, "I cannot avoid trying to understand your experience, which is invisible to me (and nontasteable, nontouchable, nonsmellable, and inaudible), yet I experience you as experiencing" (pp. 18-19). In other words, through our attempts to communicate with each other we develop some understanding of what each other's experience is like, even if we cannot know it directly.

The means most available and most effective for understanding what another person's experience is like is language. I am using language to stand for systematic symbol systems that a person may develop in order to represent and understand experience. Although I commonly refer to language as words, I mean to include other forms of symbolization as part of language. Aspects of experience that are readily expressed in language and through language are, in general, shared experiences. They are public in that they have an external frame of reference: words. The degree to which experiences among people overlap is the degree to which they are able to communicate with each other. Shared experiences may take many

forms; they may be physically shared in various ways, but they may be semantically shared through the linguistic process of relating through words salient features of personal experience. In this way can a person understand what another person's experience is like.

It is necessary, then for the sharing of experiences that language has the capacity to establish agreements among people. The most consistent attempt in this area is mathematical and scientific language. Scientists, interested in being able to express concepts accurately and transmit information effectively, establish agreements, though they may be implicit agreements, to organize data in particular ways, to define or categorize observed phenomena in ways that enable another scientist to replicate experiments. Mormal, daily language is less precise than scientific language, but to a great extent involves similar agreements to organize experience in certain ways and not in other ways.

However, language by itself does not cover all the range of human experiencing. Social language, at any rate, does not even product all of the possible means of communication among people. Likewise, it will not account for all the cognitive processes available to an individual. As Whorf (1956) points out:

language for all its kingly role, is in some sense a superficial embroidery upon deeper processes of consciousness, which are necessary before any communication, signaling, or symbolism whatsoever can occur, and which also can, at a pinch, effect communication (though not true AGREEMENT) without language's and without symbolism's aid (p. 239).

By "superficial" Whorf does not mean "insignificant," but overt and accessible forms that may differ markedly from the less accessible forms or processes.

What this suggests is that the external, social speech system (including writing and sign-language) may differ from the internal, private speech system in the ways that public, communicable experience differs from private experience.

I have indicated that the individual, as he learns his native language, develops a system of symbolization that enables him to extend his understanding and manipulation of his environment while simultaneously becoming more autonomous in respect to his environment. He also takes on the attitudes of others and through the use of significant symbols establishes an inner language based upon the social meanings he had differentiated through communication. Furthermore, in learning the grammatical structure of his language he abstracts from the available utterances of complex structure that relates meaning, pattern, and sound.

With the above information in mind, we can ask what is the structure of inner speech is, and how it relates to external speech. To answer that question I turn to Piaget's (1955) and Vygotsky's (1962) work on egocentrism in language.

Egocentric Speech

In the young child the development of language and the development of communication with others are not the same process. A child learns the grammar of his language more rapidly than he learns social speech. Although it is necessary to develop both dimensions of communication in order for the individual to relate adequately with his environment, the conditions for the rise and elaboration of each are different.

Language assists in the transformation of external impressions into concepts. It is an organizing process, extending sensory experience into symbolic realms and elaborating symbols into networks of associated symbols and meanings. Thus, language learning is the acquisition of the capacity to know, to create meanings and organize knowledge from experience. Learning language means learning to organize and conceptualize.

Bronowski (1974) in his film essay The Ascent of Man relates the learning of language, any language, to the learning of ways of knowing. When he was thirteen he learned English which became his language for the rest of his life. However, he could not have learned English at thirteen had he not learned Polish at two. Even though Polish completely disappeared from his speech repertoire, he still learned language. That is, he learned how to develop and employ a complex symbol system. Language is not a tool, an extension of human abilities; according to Bronowski; it is the human ability. As Langer (1951) points out, "young children learn to speak . . . by constantly using words to bring things into their minds, not into their hands"(p. 109).

Social speech, on the other hand, involves the bringing of concepts, ideas, perceptions into the public realm. In his study of the functions of speech in children, Piaget (1955) draws an initial distinction between "directed thought" and "autistic thought." Directed thought, which is exhibited in external speech, has an aim, a conscious goal in the individual's mind; it is adapted to reality and also influences it; it can be logically or empirically tested for veracity; and it can be communicated through language. Autistic thought is non-directed; it does not deal with

the same problems or goals as conscious thought; it does not adapt to reality, but exists on an imaginative level; it is not testable against reality for its veracity; and it is incommunicable in its existing form.

Piaget proposes that the course of intellectual development is a socialization process that increases the individual's ability to use concepts in the world, to test experiences and knowledge for the individual. Thus autistic thought, which is primarily undirected and uncommunicable, becomes transformed into directed thought, which is communicable. As the individual learns the language of directed thought and the operational mode of directed thought he becomes socialized.

An intermediate stage in the transformation of thought is egocentric thought. Although Piaget in recent years has given up the use of the word egocentrism because of the confusion that word creates, it is still widely used to describe particular forms of childhood thinking and speaking. Egocentric thought is directed thought, but it is uncommunicable. It shares the properties of directed thought and autistic thought, and offers a chance to see how the two ends of the speech functions relate. Piaget's diagram (1955) for the relations looks like this:

	Non-communicable Thought	Communicable Thought
Undirected thought	<u>Autistic thought</u>	(<u>Mythological thought</u>)
Directed thought	<u>Ego-centric thought</u>	<u>Communicated intelligence</u> (p. 65)

Mythological thought, which he tentatively places in the region of communicable, yet undirected thought, need not concern us here.

While the goal of understanding is common to egocentric thought and communicated intelligence (directed thought), the degree of communicableness in the two is quite different. From studying the speech output of two six-year-olds, Piaget concludes that egocentric speech, present in about half the utterances of young children, reflects the dominant perceptual style of children. In egocentric speech the child essentially is talking to himself; he does not expect or wait for replies to his utterances; he talks as if the listener completely understands what he says and what he means without the need for elaboration. In effect, he is talking to himself. As the listener he does understand what he as speaker means, and he often replies himself. Piaget says:

Apart from thinking by images or autistic symbols which cannot be directly communicated, the child up to an age as yet undetermined, but probably somewhere about seven, is incapable of keeping to himself the thoughts which enter his mind. He says everything. He has no verbal continence . . . The child has less verbal continence simply because he does not know what it is to keep a thing to himself. Although he talks almost incessantly to his neighbors, he rarely places himself at their point of view. He speaks to them for the most part as if he were alone, and as if he were thinking aloud. He speaks, therefore, in a language which disregards the precise shade of meaning in things and ignores the particular angle from which they are viewed, and which above all is always making assertions, even in arguments, instead of justifying them (p. 59-60).

Egocentric speech utilizes the child's grammatical knowledge of language, but it is an imperfect act of communication because the child does not take the listener's point of view into consideration in what he says. In fact, it appears that the child actually cannot take the other's point of view. He has not developed an idea of perceptions other than

his own. He assumes, because he cannot assume otherwise, that what is understood by him is understood by others and that there is no need to fill in the details of information that would make his experience intelligible to others. Piaget explains:

We shall quickly realize the full importance of egocentrism if we consider a certain familiar experience of daily life. We are looking, say, for the solution of some problem, when suddenly everything seems quite clear; we have understood, and we experience that sui generis feeling of intellectual satisfaction. But as soon as we try to explain to others what it is we have understood, difficulties come thick and fast Conclusions which we deemed positive no longer seem so; between certain propositions whole series of intermediate links are now seen to be lacking . . . arguments which seemed convincing because they were connected with some schema of visual imagery or based on some sort of analogy, lose all their potency from the moment we feel the need to appeal to these schemas, and find that they are incommunicable; doubt is cast on propositions connected with judgments of value, as soon as we realize the personal nature of such judgments. If such, then, is the difference between personal understanding and spoken explanation, how much more marked will be the characteristics of personal understanding when the individual has for a long time been bottling up his own thoughts, when he has not even formed the habit of thinking in terms of other people, and of communicating his thoughts to them (p. 65).

Studies on the development of social understanding indicate that egocentric speech does pass out of the child's behavior as he enlarges his ability to see things from another's point of view. In their perceptions of social interaction children progress from factual reporting of events to explanations in terms of interpersonal perceptions (Flapan, 1968). With age the child begins to elaborate upon the thoughts and perceptions of others, reaching a plateau in adulthood of being capable to greater or lesser extents of seeing and responding to other persons' point's of view.

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Piaget suggests that this development in communicable thought proceeds directly from autistic to egocentric to directed thought, each stage being transformed into the next. The incidence of egocentric speech is determined by the number of utterances that are generated without regard to a listener. Just by observing the surface forms of utterances the function of the utterances can be classified.

Inner Speech

As it is used in Piaget's formulation, egocentric speech becomes a measure of the socialization of the child. He learns concepts through his use of words and becomes increasingly socialized, increasingly adapted to his social environment. The form of thinking which Piaget calls autistic is presumed to remain untouched by language, not developing the modes of symbolization and logic that directed, socialized thought develop, but remaining an undifferentiated pool of images and associations.

In the phenomenological perspective inner speech is equivalent to the undifferentiated, but constantly differentiating ground of impressions, images and meanings. On a deep level of functioning the individual as a reservoir of experiences that may be brought into varying degrees of clarity and availability in other experiences. What I call inner language is, in effect, the basic assumptions and symbols that a person utilizes in differentiating his experience. Language operates as a mediating function between figure/ground relationships in a person's experience. As Lecky (1945) has pointed out, the personality is a structural whole; processes that contribute to the organization and reorganization of inner structure, such as language, assume much importance in the total personality.

Since the individual is a highly organized organism, a holistic look at the relations between deepest mental activity and that which is more available to observation, external speech, is warranted. Problems, however, revolve around the inaccessible nature of private, inner speech and thought. They are not directly manipulable from without; in fact, they are not even directly observable, either from without or within. Although the individual has a limited capacity to witness his mental processes through reflection, the act, itself, of reflection changes the situation that he is attempting to observe. Thus, the essential means we have of understanding inner thought is through inference and analogy.

One of the apparent functions of egocentric speech in children is to focus his own attention upon an activity that has been disturbed in some way (Vygotsky, 1962). For example, a child drawing a picture will, when his crayon breaks, comment on the broken crayon, propose a solution to the problem, enact the solution or a variety of possible solutions, and resume his activity--all the while following each stage of his interruption verbally as if he were telling it to someone else. Language in this case becomes an expression of the child's means of becoming aware in his activity. It is "thinking out loud," not only in the usual logical way in which adults think out loud, but in a highly personalized exploratory fashion.

As a product of interrupted activity--not all egocentric speech fulfills this mode, but much does--egocentric speech is a tool for personal awareness. The child is developing a language and logic for bridging his inner experience and his external experience. Thus, egocentric speech does not exhibit the characteristics of social speech as much as it exhibits the characteristics of inner speech or "autistic" speech.

Vygotsky (1962) extends Piaget's notion of egocentric speech by suggesting that it is not merely a stage in the socialization of child speech, but that it is the dividing line between the development of inner speech and external speech. I have talked a lot about external speech because it is readily observed; to look at inner speech what is known about external speech must be applied. Vygotsky's approach is to compare the structure of egocentric speech with the structure of highly intimate communication between two people who understand each other so well that they do not need all the syntactic or semantic structure that clarifies thought in normal speech.

The significant difference in the two forms of speech is the degree to which ellipsis may be tolerated. It is presumed that, if language is highly elliptical between two people who understand each other's points of view, it will be at least as much and probably more elliptical when someone is conversing with himself. Interestingly enough, egocentric speech has the same characteristics as intimate speech. Vygotsky says:

The inner speech of the adult represents his "thinking for himself" rather than social adaptation; i.e., it has the same function that egocentric speech has in the child. It also has the same structural characteristics. Out of context, it would be incomprehensible to others because it omits to "mention" what is obvious to the "speaker." These similarities lead us to assume that when egocentric speech disappears from view it does not simply atrophy but "goes underground," i.e., turns into inner speech (p. 18).

In Vygotsky's experiments with young children he discovers that the incidence of egocentric speech is tied in with the child's illusion of being understood. Since he has not differentiated speech for himself

and speech for others, he exhibits egocentric speech most commonly in social situations, even if there is so much disruption in his environment that other children actually do not hear him.

Not only is the illusion of being understood necessary for egocentric speech, it also provides the conditions for the differentiation of speech for oneself and speech for others. As the child extends his verbal abilities and improves his communication with others, the necessity for being understood arises. The social context for six- and seven-year-olds is quite different from that of a four- or five-year-old. He is learning in school to work with others on particular projects or in general activities. His language will change into forms that promote his establishing agreements with others. Egocentric speech becomes less and less appropriate in such an environment, but it becomes no less functional.

Vygotsky observes that just prior to the disappearance of egocentric speech it is at its greatest level of individualization. Instead of progressively becoming socialized, thereby shedding its idiosyncratic structure little by little, it becomes more idiosyncratic and less intelligible immediately before it disappears. If Piaget were right in his proposal that egocentric speech is an intermediate stage in the development of social speech, we would find a gradual dropping away of egocentric utterances instead of this increase. Vygotsky (1962) says that the reason for an increase in egocentric speech is that it is a "phenomenon of the transition from interpsychic to intrapsychic functioning, i.e., from the social, collective activity of the child to his more individualized activity" (p. 133).

This suggestion brings us back to Mead. Mead says that the mind originates in interpersonal contexts; the child develops a socialized intelligence which is born from the communicative act. He takes on the attitudes of the generalized other and internalizes these attitudes, thereby generating an inner speech which becomes the basis for his personality. Vygotsky resembles Mead in his placing attention upon the development of the individual out of the social sphere, but his is not merely an alternative way to describe the development of self. His focus upon the characteristics of language provides a glimpse of the relationship between thought and language. Although Vygotsky assumes a similar relation between the individual and society that Mead does, he pushes into a different domain the understanding of intrapsychic functioning.

The process of differentiation of inner language from outer language suggests a differentiation of self from others, or at least the establishment of processes that direct this differentiation throughout life. Vygotsky says:

In the beginning, egocentric speech is identical in structure with social speech, but in the process of its transformation into inner speech it gradually becomes less complete and coherent as it becomes governed by an almost entirely predicative syntax. Experiments show clearly how and why the new syntax takes hold. The child talks about the things he sees or hears or does at a given moment. As a result, he tends to leave out the subject and all words connected with it, condensing his speech more and more until only predicates are left With syntax and sound reduced to a minimum, meaning is more than ever in the forefront. Inner speech works with semantics, not phonetics. The specific semantic structure of inner speech also contributes to abbreviation. The syntax of meanings in inner speech is no less original than its grammatical syntax. (p. 145).

Inner Speech and Deep Structures

In an interesting, yet unexpanded, aside McNeill (1966) suggests a linguistic explanation of the development of inner speech out of egocentric speech. In transformational theory, especially in the earlier version (1957), surface structure is linked to base structures through transformational rules, and realized as speech through the application of phonological rules. McNeill points out that the child's earliest speech does not reflect the operation of transformational rules, that in early language development the child seems to be talking untransformed structures. This means that surface structure and deep structure coincide and the child gives utterance to base strings directly.

We can conceive of their phonological rules as interpreting base structures rather than surface structure in the generation of sentences. Children, according to this view, begin their grammatical careers with the part of syntax that is necessary to semantic interpretation and only later attach the grammatical machinery that in mature grammar provides input to phonological interpretations. This hypothesis might, in part, account for the widespread impression that children's early speech is exclusively semantic (p. 51).

It is not clear that transformational theory actually does describe the characteristics of language production that influence the incidence of inner speech and external speech. There may be relations, not necessarily casual relations, between grammatical dimensions and operational dimensions of inner and external speech. I have suggested some global ways in which language affects the thinking process, but it is still a relatively unplumbed area of human functioning.

McNeill (1966) offers a possible way of relating the deep structures of grammar, which are presumed to carry the semantic inter-

pretations, with inner speech. The linguistic competence of the child suggests that grammatical structure may influence inner speech:

If phonological rules apply to deep structure directly, it should be difficult to avoid saying whatever you think. The privacy of inner speech may be afforded by the existence of transformational rules; and until they are added to the grammar, inner speech would not occur. That situation is roughly what Vygotsky observed in young children. Perhaps, therefore, these children were pretransformational, not necessarily excessively social, as Vygotsky thought. Vygotsky said that inner speech is 'speech almost without words,' made up almost entirely of psychological predicates. The fact that inner speech is almost without words would follow naturally from the assumption that it consists of the untransformed base structure of sentences. In fact, inner speech should be completely without words because phonological interpretation is not applied directly to base structures for mature speakers (p. 52).

Suggestive as this notion is, we cannot automatically draw the conclusion that development of grammatical transformations introduces a step in the bringing of private thought into overt expression. My conception of transformational structure is that even at the deep structure level we are still talking about thoughts and speech that have a social function and which, therefore, are functionally different from the inner speech that Vygotsky proposes. Maybe there are important links in the structure of language and thought that account for the myriad uses that communication has.

An absolute division of inner speech and external speech is untenable. Transformational theory provides supportive, but not conclusive, evidence in propounding a structural whole in grammatical dimensions of language. Deep structures that undergo transformations in their ascent to surface structures and actual utterances provide a model for relating inner speech and external speech, although we are not in a position at this time to accept a congruence between the two descriptions.

If we look at the differentiating figure/ground relationship as a continuum of degrees of clarity and sharpness, we place language processes in the middle dimensions, such as below:




Figure 1.

Using the transformational grammar model, the undifferentiated ground begins to differentiate in deep grammatical structures and ascends to sharpest clarity and expression by means of transformational processes. Thus, grammatical structure parallels the psychological processes of understanding and bringing to the surface the individual's inner experience.

Exploratory Symbols

In Mead's (1954) conception of inner language a person who is "talking to himself" is carrying on an inner representation of external speech, a simple internalized dialogue. In fact, it appears that this

is the way a person discovers what he is talking about. However, this conception of inner speech assumes that it is a conscious activity, having the same ends and beginnings. If this were so for all forms of inner speech, all the psychologist or linguist would need to do is map external speech and apply his investigations to that area of speech functioning. However, as it has been indicated, even in linguistic structures we must propose internal representations of grammar that involves more knowledge than is represented in external speech. Thus, we are led to the position of positing an internal speech that is not only different in its lack of vocalization but also different in its forms and functions.

The first important difference between inner speech and external speech is the way in which the word, the symbol, is organized internally. In Osgood's (1957) development of the Semantic Differential we see that concepts are experienced across cultural bounds as being organized along three dimensions: Potency, Activity, and Value. Although different individuals and different cultures may conceive of a particular word or concept in quite different ways, the terms of their conceptions are similar; that is, they distinguish events according to the same overall criteria (see appendix).

This suggests that in the accessible experience of individuals they tend to constellate attributes of concepts or objects around each other, that there is an ordered means of realizing a concept through language. In inner speech, which is less accessible to measurement devices, we would suppose similar, yet more diffuse and global connections among an individual's experience of symbols.

We can continue to talk about words existing in inner speech, but they function more directly on the symbolic range, so it often is appropriate to refer to the symbolization process and symbols instead of sentences and words. However, I will be using both sets of expressions in discussing the construction of inner speech. Jakobson (1949) says that the relation between thought and language is established by words (signs) and syntax in external, social speech, but that this is not so in internal thought.

Signs are a necessary support of thought. For socialized thought . . . and for the thought which is being socialized . . . the most usual system of signs is language properly called; but internal thought especially when creative, willingly uses other systems of signs which are more flexible, less standardized than language and leave more liberty, more dynamism to creative thought(p. 97).

How would we expect a person's thought to function without the steady, elaborative support of language? We know that in formal discourse, in writing, in presenting speeches, the relation between the speaker and listener is more tightly controlled by the social expectancy of the situation, by the demands of the subject matter, by the need to indicate all the logical steps in an argument, etc. In this way language standardizes people's thinking and speaking. Private conversations are less governed by the formal qualities of language, yet they, too, have a logic and expectancy that control thought and its expression. And so, the relation between thought and language exists on a continuum ranging from highly organized formal characteristics of one speech situation to less formal arrangements, and to the least formal of all, which probably is the deep dream state.

In between the deepest level of consciousness and the overt levels there is an area of functioning which often is called inner speech. Judging from what we know about dreams and about social speech we would expect inner speech to have characteristics similar to both. May (1961) interprets the deep levels of unconscious as being potential areas of experiencing that can be brought to conscious levels, but which might not be brought forth. He says:

The unconscious . . . is not to be thought of as a reservoir of impulses, thoughts, and wishes that are culturally unacceptable. I define it rather as those potentialities for knowing and experiencing that the individual cannot or will not actualize (p. 19).

Other theorists, too, have suggested that the unconscious is an area of human experience that is more than a swirling pool of stored up images and associations. It constitutes an important experiential level for each person. However, before exploring that dimension more fully it is helpful to return to the organization of inner speech.

In inner speech the relation between symbols and experience is a flowing process with a goal. Although Piaget (1955) claims that autistic thinking is non-directed, I believe that it is directed; only it is aimed at different ends than external thought. For one thing, external speech and language is essentially representational. It brings forth words, sentences, complete utterances that mainly attempt to communicate an idea from one to another. In inner speech, however, the exploratory aspects of language is dominant. Although conversation for oneself may still be representational in that one still can carry on an inner dialogue and present a variety of points of view for consideration, in deeper levels the representational mode gives over to the exploratory.

In regard to the use of symbols for oneself, Jung's (1917) analysis is quite informative. "The significance of a symbol," he says, "is not that it is a disguised indication of something that is generally known but it is an endeavor to elucidate by analogy what is yet completely unknown and only in the process of formation"(p. 469). In all areas where man has probed into the unknown he has been forced to use symbols from the known to extend his knowledge of what he is seeking to know.

In atomic theory, for example, Bohr produced a model of the structure of atoms based upon astronomical knowledge of planetary motion. In Heisenberg's Physics and Beyond (1971) Bohr explains that in his early work he lacked a language to say what it was, but he had a language to say what it was like.

I hope that they [the Bohr models] describe the structure of the atoms as well, but only as well, as is possible in the descriptive language of classical physics. We must be clear that, when it comes to atoms, language can be used only as in poetry. The poet, too, is not nearly so concerned with describing facts as with creating images and establishing mental connections (p. 41).

Similarly, in personal experience people generate images and symbols that connect their various experiences.

Inner speech, as a systemic organization of thought and language, engages in the generating and relating of symbols that help the individual elaborate and differentiate his experience. Vygotsky (1962) proposes that basic relations between thought and language on this level is a process, not a static relation or a "thing."

The relation of thought to word is not a thing but a process, a continual movement back and forth from thought to word and from word to thought . . . Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into existence through them. Every thought tends to connect

something with something else, to establish a relationship between things. Every thought moves, grows and develops, fulfills a function, solves a problem. This flow of thought occurs as an inner movement through a series of planes (p. 125).

A child's thought, in this conception, begins with an amorphous structure. It organizes events and impressions holistically and gradually begins to differentiate the various experiences he encounters. With the rise of speech and development of a complex grammar and lexicon he is able to progress to well-defined conceptions about himself and about his environment. However, thought and language are not exactly the same, so his inner speech differs markedly from his external speech and his representation of his experience on a deep level is different from his surface levels of representing experience. The flow of words and images from undifferentiated wholes to particularized elements is the most salient feature of inner speech.

Syncretic Thinking

Since inner speech is speech for oneself, the role of the speaker is different than in external speech. A person is not conversing with himself in the way that he converses with others. For one thing, in conversation with others a fairly limited range of word meanings is involved. Each person may have his own personal experience of a word or concept but to bring it into the social context he relies upon the prevailing understanding of the word. He has to if he wants to make sense.

In her encounter with Humpty Dumpty, for example, Alice finds that he uses words with his own private meaning attached:

"I don't know what you mean by 'Glory,'" Alice said
 Humpty Dumpty smiled: "I meant 'there's a nice, knock-
 down argument for you.'"

"But 'Glory' doesn't mean 'a nice, knock-down
 argument,'" Alice objected.

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, "it means
 exactly what I choose it to mean, neither more nor
 less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make
 words mean so many different things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to
 be master, that's all (Carroll, 1963, p. 269)."

The social context obviously limits the role of private meanings and Humpty Dumpty's assertion of mastery over words and their meanings is inappropriate. However, in the intrapersonal context, private words may have such diverse meanings. In children these meanings gradually differentiate out into the cultural context, taking on the aspects that make it communicable. Where private meanings dominate, the manner of association between them is syncretic; that is, thinking is done by means of symbols and images that do not have a logical, syntactic relation necessarily, but instead are combined along simple, yet functional dimensions. Vygotsky's experiments in concept attainment demonstrate this.

Vygotsky observes that in the early form of conceptual thinking concepts are related haphazardly; elements are combined into unorganized congeries. The shifting character of the heap of elements that the child puts together reveals, says Vygotsky, that "word meaning denotes nothing more to the child than a vague syncretic conglomeration of individual objects that have somehow or other coalesced into an image in his mind. Because of its syncretic origin, that image is highly unstable"(pp. 59-69). By syncretism is meant the organization of

diverse objects or images into a whole not based upon the observable characteristics of the images or objects, but upon some very incidental characteristics. Over a period of years the child's organization of elements into "true" concepts follows a line of progressive stabilization of words and thoughts. The relationship among concepts become increasingly abstract and more powerful. However, this, again, is external, directed, social thought and speech. Inner speech continues to have a syncretic character. This means that inner speech is organized perceptually in the same manner as the undifferentiated field of impressions.

The functions of syncretic thinking in the child appears to be exploratory. In dealing with objects or concepts that he knows and understands he exhibits practical thinking, a firm juncture of thought and word. He can direct his activity and other people's attentions to the goals he has available to him. However, in areas where he has no experience or conceptual knowledge he resorts to syncretism to explore and understand. This suggests that syncretic thinking may not be merely an inefficient mode of concept attainment, but may, in fact, be a significant link between experience and knowledge.

The ever-present problem of relating how an individual develops a working knowledge of himself and of his world out of the experience he is exposed to may best be tackled through the symbolization process of individuals. If that is the case, then understanding something of the means in which the symbols are generated, elaborated, differentiated, and communicated becomes essential. Syncretic thought, apparently the earliest form of thought deals in the "raw images of experience"--what Harry Stack Sullivan (1953) calls the prototaxic form of cognition.

In syncretic thought the meanings of words or concepts flow into each other. They are not clearly differentiated as they are in syntactic thought. Likeness dominates. What an image is like controls the flow of images, not what it is unlike. In logical discourse we are taught to differentiate concepts according to what they are like and what they are unlike. Thus in defining an object we specify its similarity to a general class of objects and its dissimilarity. A desk is a table with drawers and a surface for writing or reading. It is like other tables (general class) in some ways and unlike them in others. In this manner we are able to define and understand concepts. However, in syncretic thought the ways in which objects or concepts are unlike each other often are ignored. The glossing over of distinguishing characteristics produces a conglomeration of related images which do not stand up under logical analysis but which have an inner congruence for the individual.

Relations among words are different in syncretic thinking. Inner speech associates words globally, what Vygotsky calls an "influx of sense." Meanings of words give over to the sense of the words; that is, associations with words are based upon a complete organization of lexical meanings, private meanings, and related meanings. According to Vygotsky, "a single word is so saturated with sense that many words would be required to explain it in external speech"(p. 148).

A single word (or meaning) in inner speech may be so linked with an individual's sense of himself that he feels a bond with that word, as if the word were him. That is not so in external speech, normally. People may have strong reactions to a spoken word that is so automatic that they do not hear anything else. Communism is a good example of

this, or certain swear words that produce "signal reactions" in the auditor. The meanings of these words to individuals go beyond the dictionary meanings, even beyond the operational and practical meanings of the words. In these cases we might be able to guess correctly the experience of the individual in regards to that word, but the total range of its private meanings remains in the intrapersonal dimensions.

Inner speech is not accessible to outsiders any more than individual perceptions are accessible. In fact, it may be less accessible in that it is so intimately linked with the individual's infrastructure, with the assumptions and mental processes that determine his conscious perceptions. Vygotsky says:

Inner speech is not the interior aspect of external speech--it is a function in itself. It still remains speech, i.e., thought is embodied in words. But while in external speech thought is embodied in words, in inner speech words die as they bring forth thought. Inner speech is to a large extent thinking in pure meanings. It is a dynamic, shifting, unstable thing, fluttering between word and thought, the two more or less stable, more or less firmly delineated components of verbal thought. Its true nature and place can be understood only after examining the next plane or verbal thought, the one still more inward than inner speech (p. 149).

Vygotsky places thought itself at the next level of human functioning. The distinction he draws--that thought is holistic, synchronistic, and individualistic--is only an artificial distinction between thought and inner speech. Thought in this conception corresponds to the individual's perceptual field in that it cannot be separated from the individual. Since the individual acts totally with regard to his perceptual field, we would conclude that he acts totally with regard to his thinking.

Inner language, a systematic organization of the person's symbols and symbolization processes, cannot be separated from thought, for out of the symbolic constituents is thought derived. Thus, although we may talk of thought as a thing within the person, it is a process of relating symbols and organizing perceptions. Understanding the functions of inner speech in relating experience and symbolization of that experience would lead to an understanding of the individual's personality structure.

Inner Speech and the Preconscious

The above description of inner speech sounds similar to the preconscious in the psychoanalytic tradition. A brief comparison may be helpful, particularly for those well acquainted with psychoanalysis.

The traditional psychoanalytic approach to describing a person's continuum of experience is to place the undifferentiated dimensions of one's experience in the preconscious realm and the differentiated, language-based, "rational" thinking process in the conscious realm. Preconscious images in these terms are highly creative, fluid and idiosyncratic. At this stage of consciousness the images apparently are little more than unresolved desires or impulses that are in the process of becoming more conscious (Freud, 1913), and hence more available to the individual. If this is so, then preconscious images are roughly equivalent to inner speech and the undifferentiated ground. The bringing of such images to the surface, in Freudian terms, involves overcoming resistance (Freud, 1913) to making them evident.

It is believed in psychoanalytic terms that repression of images and impulses leads to rigidity and extreme perceptual limitations. Hall (1954), for example, summarizes the psychoanalytic position this way:

Although repression is necessary for normal personality development and is used to some extent by everyone, there are people who depend upon it to the inclusion of other ways of adjusting to threats. These people are said to be repressed. Their contacts with the world are limited and they give the impression of being withdrawn, tense, rigid, and guarded. Their lips are set and their movements are wooden. They use so much energy in maintaining their far-flung repressions that they do not have very much left over for pleasurable and productive interactions with the environment and with other people (p. 86).

His flow of experience must remain open in order for the individual to be able to function fully in normal life. Thus, access to one's preconscious images is a necessary link in creating and controlling one's perceptions. If they cannot be controlled, experienced fully, made available in other experiences, or communicated in some way, they remain unattached to the individual's firm sense of himself. Sullivan (1953) calls the covert, preconscious process reverie, and believes that not only does it begin during infancy but it continues throughout life as a nonverbal referential process.

So far as language process is concerned, reverie continues all through life to be only infrequently and in special circumstances of a type that, if it were expressed, would be clearly meaningful and communicative to the hearer. Only those reverie processes which are in preparation for the expression of something, take on the attributes which we at least hope our spoken and written thoughts will show. Reverie continues to be relatively untroubled by grammatical rules, the necessity for making complete sentences, and so on.

Incidentally there are people who seem completely staggered when one talks about nonverbal referential processes--that is, wordless thinking; these people simply seem to have no ability to grasp the idea that a great deal of covert living--living that is not objectively observable but only inferable--can go on without the use of words. The brute fact is, as I see it, that most of living goes on that way. That does not in any sense reduce the enormous importance of the communicative tools--words and gestures (p. 185).

The bringing of the nonverbal referential processes (inner language, reverie, preconscious, etc.) to the overt level is cited by Jones (1968) as being essential: "a feeling, or image, that cannot be controlled is frightening; a feeling, or image, that cannot be shared is estranging; a feeling, or image, that cannot be put to work is belittling" (p. 245).

The individual who has developed appropriate control over his environment and over himself is capable of responding creatively to new situations as they arise. Over-control, on one hand, leads the individual to rigid perceptions and a failure to respond to situations in their own terms. Under-control, on the other hand, leaves the individual with an amorphous, confusing, diffuse perception of circumstances; it is difficult to respond well to situations when they remain vague and unattached to other experiences. The creative individual, then, is one who maintains a balance between the channelized control of one end and the looseness of the other end.

In educational and therapeutic situations flexibility in handling images and symbols become paramount (Jones, 1968). Lawrence S. Kubie (1958) relates the need for flexibility to the preconscious and the process of bringing images from the non-verbal level to the verbal, communicable level.

Where conscious processes predominate at one end of the spectrum, rigidity is imposed by the fact that conscious symbolic functions are anchored by their precise and literal relationships to specific conceptual and perceptual units. Where unconscious processes predominate at the other end of the spectrum, there is an even more rigid anchorage, but in this instance to

unreality; that is, to those unacceptable conflicts, objects, aims and impulses which have been inaccessible both to conscious introspection and to the corrective influence of experience Yet, flexibility of symbolic imagery is essential if the symbolic process is to have that creative potential which is our supreme human trait (p. 38).

It is the constantly changing, flowing experience of bringing the external world into the self and the inner world of the self into the external world that comprises creativity. In psychoanalytic terms these two ends of the continuum are called the primary and secondary processes. The primary processes (Freud, 1913), associated with the individual's inner experiences and needs, are brought into the social world and modified to conform with the reality of events through the secondary processes, associated with thinking and abstracting. Maslow (1971) says:

In the healthy person, and especially the healthy person who creates, I find that he has somehow managed a fusion and a synthesis of both primary and secondary processes; both conscious and unconscious; both deeper self and conscious self. . . . What happens in this fusion is that both the primary processes and the secondary processes, partaking of each other, then change in character. The unconscious doesn't become frightening anymore. This is the person who can live with his unconscious; live with, let's say, his childishness, his fantasy, his imagination, his wish fulfillment, his femininity, his poetic quality, his crazy quality (p. 89).

A person's language, his means of referring to and symbolizing his experience provide the link between the primary and secondary processes as they are conceived of in Freudian terms. Maslow's and Kubie's ways of describing the creative process as an integration of all levels of perceiving and experiencing are highly suggestive of the relationship

between a person's language and his total perceptual system. Ultimately, however, it is simpler and more appropriate to describe inner speech in terms of the differentiating of inner experience than to describe two separate processes. In perceptual terms there is merely a continuum of experience from the undifferentiated field to the point of greatest clarity. Language is a means of bringing the images, symbols and meanings to sharpest focus.

CHAPTER V

INNER SPEECH AND THE SELF CONCEPT

Inner speech, being the "preconscious" undifferentiated ground of personal experiencing is more imagistic and syncretistic than outer speech, but it is not unstructured or unorganized. In fact, as I have indicated in previous chapters, with the emergence of an inner speech the individual possesses a complex perceptual repertoire that consists of the symbols he can use, what the meaning of those symbols are, and how they may be elaborated and differentiated. Part of this perceptual repertoire are the symbols and meanings about himself that are structured and organized according to his environmental conditions and which are available to him as data for his self concept.

Inner speech, then, operates as an intricate differentiating process, sorting out and organizing the individual's here and now experience in terms of his past experience. The complex self-perceptions that are common to adults and older children (Erikson, 1968) derive from the evocative nature (Sullivan, 1953) not only of social role and expectancies, but of the referential process of language. The continuum of experience for each person is evoked through the individual's use of language derived symbols to reflect upon and "discover" his inner experiences.

The child learns to discover himself, his organismically based experiences, in the way that he learns to manipulate his environment. He uses words to explore the nature of objects and events mentally and transforms them without having to do so physically. Just as, in Piaget's (1969)

conception, the child learns what operations and transformations he may work on objects around him, so, too, he learns what mental operations and transformations he may work on himself, or, rather, his concept of himself. In these terms the reflexive character of inner language is that symbol manipulation process as it is directed towards one's own private experience, through which the individual clarifies himself in ways that he clarifies his physical environment. Although subjective experience differs from objective experience of the world, the process of symbol manipulation in each is similar.

Inner speech has one function in common with external speech, for they both extend man's capacity to understand more than superficial characteristics. However, in the language of inner speech the functions diverge from that of outer speech. In fact, it is misleading to call this dimension of perception "speech" or "language" if we take "speech" or "language" to mean that a precise syntax and lexicon is involved. The symbols a person generates and explores for himself are not words, but are word-derived, and they are not grammatical except that they do have a systematic character. It may be more accurate to replace "inner speech" with "inner symbol system," for that is certainly what it is. However, calling this process inner speech has the advantage of retaining a sense of the link between the individual's inner symbols and the external symbols that are produced in communication with others.

The utterances that we make public--and also many that we keep private--proceed from some image or idea that, to become intelligible to others, must be shaped into an expressive mode (writing, talking, using sign language) and into a series of symbols. Making an idea intelligible

to others transforms the individual's own experience of the idea, for he must consider the other's point of view enough to be able to find expressions that are meaningful to the other. In so doing, his private, possibly even unformed, experience becomes embroidered with the linguistic organizations of his language.

The individual's subvocal speech--what is called thinking, or, if uttered with no one else around, thinking out loud, is not much different from public utterances. The same kind of consideration for logicity, accurate expressions, the point-of-view of others, and so forth enter in, although it may be run through mentally in a shorthand version with some ellipsis and skipping of logical steps, because the individual need not express all those to himself. This form of inner speech is what Mead calls "mind" and which he believes arises out of communication with others. However, we do not merely think in the socially designated ways, but also in more individual ways, which, although influenced greatly by the learned social communication, have different properties.

Harry Stack Sullivan (1953) relates learned social communication to "experience in the syntactic mode"(p. 183). Through the syntactic mode, he says, the child learns to organize experience along consensually validated lines.

A consensus has been reached when the infant or child has learned the precisely right word for a situation, a word which means not only what it is thought to mean by the mothering one, but also means that to the infant. Incidentally, an enormous amount of difficulty all through life arises from the fact that communicative behavior miscarries because words do not carry meaning, but evoke meaning. And if a word evokes in the hearer something quite different from that which it was expected to evoke, communication is not a success (pp. 183-184).

Thus, the syntactic mode of referring is only successful to the degree that it helps people establish a consensus of meaning based upon the evocation of their own experiences of that word.

Inner speech, as opposed to syntactic or socialized speech, does not evoke established meanings, but engages in the process of discovering and organizing personal symbols that comprise personal meaning. In discovering symbols for himself the individual applies the sorting and categorizing indicators from external speech to his inner organismic experience. These symbols are discovered first and communicated or understood later. The process of discovery in inner language comes from the organism's tendency toward an inner consistency (Lecky, 1945) on all levels of his functioning. Thus, the symbolizing process in inner language moves toward resolution of disparate dimensions of the individual's experience, combining in increasingly powerful and complex ways the vast range of personal experience that each person has. Through this process the individual is able to extend and integrate certain significant areas of his experience. The most important of these, his development of a complex self concept, derives from his available modes of symbolizing, which will be discussed in the following section.

Development of a Complex Self Concept

The extensiveness of the individual's self concept, the degree of complexity of his self-symbols and their relationships, is a product of his symbolizing process. In forming abstract concepts about himself he may delimit his experience in terms of either/or, dichotomous, two-value symbols, which close off possible ways of experiencing, or he may use open,

multi-value symbols. An open-ended symbol system, incorporating multi-value symbols from external language use, directs the course of the individual's self-perceptions and provides him with the means of elaborating and differentiating himself throughout life.

One of the basic properties of the self is that it is constructed by the individual through his perceptual and mental faculties--those same general faculties that organize impressions he receives from his environment (Koffka, 1935; Lewin, 1951). As an organization of beliefs the self has a systematic structure. It is a whole, a unity in itself with hierarchies of organization. The maintenance of this organization is a dominant activity of the individual (Lecky, 1945) for it preserves the individual in the present and provides him with capacities for dealing with the future. About this, Combs (1959) says:

[M]an seeks not merely the maintenance of a self but the development of an adequate self--a self capable of dealing effectively with the exigencies of life, both now and in the future. To achieve this self-adequacy requires of man that he seek, not only to maintain his existing organization, but also that he build up and make more adequate the self of which he is aware. Man seeks both to maintain and enhance his perceived self (p. 45).

In seeking to enhance his perceived self the individual develops more powerful and complex organizations. He moves into new experiences or finds new ways to deal with old experiences, because the capacity to anticipate and deal adequately with his environment means having the capacity to extend himself further into his environment. The maintenance of one's self as it is organized at any one time is stasis, anti-life. The quality of biological systems is to continually develop and elaborate structures and functions towards greater complexity and adaptability (Grobstein, 1964; Piaget, 1971a). In the individual his capacity to

maintain and enhance his existing self depends upon his perceptions of himself along complex lines. A monistic, limited self has little chance of enhancement.

The complexity of the phenomenal self depends upon the individual's range of experiences, in general, but more specifically it depends upon the symbols he generates and applies to himself. Experience gives him the data from which he may draw concepts, but he is the artificer of his own symbolic representations. Whether we talk about cognitive structure or perceptual field we are still talking about representations of personal reality for the individual, and in doing so we have to accept that the process of symbolizing experience stands at the core of human capacities (Langer, 1951).

In some ways man simplifies his experiences. He does not absorb all the visual detail of his environment, but selects out detail and pattern that provide him with the necessary components to act adequately in terms of his environment. He builds concepts of reality that may be highly schematic and simplified at times, or quite specific at other times. The concept that he forms usually are not static; they change as new experiences provide further information. Likewise, the self that a person constructs is a product of his organization of impressions on all levels of consciousness. It is thus a complex array of attitudes, beliefs, abstractions, conclusions, hypotheses, assumptions, convictions, and judgments. Such a complex organization is build up as he is developing and changing throughout life. From the initial distinctions of "me" and "not me" that the infant makes, to the actualizing of multifaceted abilities and conceptions of the individual, the self is progressively differentiated throughout life.

If the self is a complex and dynamic organization of perceptions and conceptions, how does it become complex? My belief is that it does so significantly in the course of language development. Through language the child extends his contacts with the environment. He develops concepts about reality and himself. Through the act of communication he becomes socialized and learns to see himself from a variety of perspectives. Through language acquisition he develops powerful means of abstracting from experience, and through the development of an inner language he becomes capable of elaborating symbols relating to himself in progressively adequate terms.

Development of a complex phenomenal self becomes a relatively late phenomenon in growing up. Not until the child has developed a sufficient grammatical, lexical and cognitive base is he capable of seeing himself as a complex organism with many attributes that can be called upon in a variety of ways. I suggest that the organization of the complex self is similar to the organization of knowledge about physical reality and language. That is, the phenomenal self is composed of some central, hard to change, concepts and also composed of transformational processes by means of which the individual knows how to extend his concepts into new realms or alter those concepts through experience (Kelly, 1963). The individual develops a series of perceptions about himself, which gradually become central conceptions. A person's perceptions of himself are part of his phenomenal field at any time; they are what he identifies as being him in any given moment. His conceptions of himself, however, are more central, more global and embracing; they are abstracted from the phenomenal self, and, hence, like the focusing of past experiences into one word they are distilled and

refined into short-hand representations. Self concepts, then, evoke the whole range of personal experience and meaning in the same way that words evoke personal experience and meaning. The basic difference between self-perceptions and a person's self concept are that the conceptions have been abstracted and distilled so much that they do not alter very quickly while perceptions are dominated situationally.

He also develops modes of relating his perceptions, transforming them into useable symbols that can be related further. The degree to which he has available to himself a complex array of transformations is the degree to which he is capable of seeing himself as being adequate in diverse ways. In fact, one of the central conceptions of himself might well be a concept of himself as a complex, hence capable, person, or simplex, hence incapable person.

The Complex Self and Preferred Performances

The complex personality has a greater ability to adjust to new situations because he sees himself as being capable in many contexts. He is able to identify more fully with others because he is likely to find points of similarity between himself and others. Perception of oneself in complex ways, then, is an essential part of functioning adequately in one's environment. Kurt Goldstein (1939) relates the degree of a person's preferred behavior to his ability to abstract. This bears consideration for it is central to the notion of complex self concepts.

Goldstein (1939) says that in any situation, either real-life or experimental humans will have a range of performance which is preferred. Some people are quite rigid in their preferred performances, and hence find few situations which will permit them to behave adequately. Others,

with a wide range of preferred performances, can tolerate vastly distinct situations. As Goldstein (1940) says, "the experiences a person has, or is able to assimilate or acquire, hinge upon his capacities, and these we can infer from his preferred ways of behavior. . .the more the demands made upon him corresponds to his preferred ways of behaving, the more nearly perfect will his achievements be"(pp. 249-250). This is another way of saying that the degree to which the individual's own predispositions are evoked in any situation determines the degree to which he will be able to act effectively in those situations.

With that in mind, we can engage in setting up situations for individuals that will fit with their existing ways of perceiving and behaving or we can help the individual change his ways of perceiving himself in various situations (Combs, 1959). The individual's perceptions of himself in any situation are composed of his concept of himself, his perceptions of the situation and his manner of realizing himself symbolically. Thus, he combines all these in his abstracting process, whereby he forms an integrated conception of the meaning of that situation to him.

It is the capacity for abstraction or symbolization of experience that influences a person's preferred behaviors, for through his abstracting from experience and forming concepts the individual develops perceptions of his adequacy in a variety of contexts. It is well known that success or failure in one activity is generalized across other activities (Raimy, 1943). The person who fails at one task is likely to see himself as being less competent in other tasks. But this phenomenon is intensified in the rigid, narrowly defined personality, for he has few occasions for seeing himself in different terms. Thus, he is likely to be more threatened by the possibility of failure in tasks that are meaningful to him.

A narrowly defined standard of performing which allows for little deviance is most common among people with rigid self concepts. The rigidity of self concepts, however, comes about through failure to symbolize or abstract appropriately in a variety of contexts. In his ability to abstract man is capable of resilient and adaptive behavior, because he is always capable of extending his perceptions further.

Goldstein's (1939) work with brain injured patients reveals that people with severely impaired thinking are unable to think in symbolic terms. They take things quite literally and manifest uncompromising attitudes about reality. Like small children with regard to contrary-to-fact statements, they deny the possibility of considering something that contradicts direct experience. We have seen that language provides the means for the individual to free himself from direct, surface impressions. Considering "what if" situations requires the ability to manipulate reality symbolically, in inner and external speech, and to alter properties mentally. Thus, if the abstracting and symbolizing processes are inhibited or impaired the individual becomes locked into rigid perceptions.

To Goldstein this means that the abstracting process frees man from limited perceptions and limited behaviors. The ability to abstract and symbolize reality and to symbolize oneself in complex fashion are tied together. With the ability to abstract the individual increases his ability to function adequately. Goldstein (1940) says:

A normal person because of his capacity for abstraction and voluntary action, is able to execute tasks in a not so preferred condition. . . he is capable also of preferred performances on a higher level, which corresponds to his higher level of performance in general. The abnormal person is either wholly incapable of this, or less capable of it, because of his lack of the capacity for abstraction. As a consequence, he is subject in a higher degree to preferred behavior (pp. 240-241).

The capacity to abstract appropriately is not a function of intellectual prowess but of perceptual style. A person can be highly educated and "intellectual" and still maintain rigid, uncompromising conceptions of himself and of reality. In his concept attainment studies for example, Jerome Bruner (1973) observes that "in general people who are not able to shift categorizations under gradually changing conditions of stimulation tend also to show. . . 'over control' on other cognitive and motivational tasks"(p. 33). That the individual controls his perceptions of visual phenomena by the way he labels and categorizes them is evident in Bruner's studies. It is as if the individual has templates against which he compares experiences and if they can be fit at all into his existing expectations, no matter how much he has to wrench them, they will be considered in that light.

In a different kind of study Denner (1970) indicates that there is a relationship between a person's abstracting style and his perceptions of himself. He finds that "a certain orientation toward symbolizing experience--namely evasiveness and lack of concreteness--can produce a state of anxious conservatism in which one is out of contact with what actually has happened or is happening but is reluctant to entertain change"(p. 308)." His subjects exhibited a similar over control in problem solving situations and in situations asking them to describe themselves in open ended, contrary-to-fact situations.

In both these cases there is an important link between the individual's abstracting, symbolizing, conceptualizing styles and his phenomenal field. In organizing his phenomenal field the person who attends to a greater number of impressions, who maintains an open-ended abstracting process is likely

to see himself as having some identity with his surroundings. In addition, if he views himself as a complex individual--that is, identifies with a wide range of attributes about himself--he is more inclined to establish a sense of participation and identity with the world around him. Hence, he is more inclined to accept diverse experiences in positive fashion. Instead of contrasting himself with others, he identifies with them. Instead of limiting himself to rigid preferred behavior he is able to tolerate a wide range of behaviors. Toleration of ambiguity of this type corresponds to one of the characteristics of self-actualizing persons according to Maslow (1962)

Differentiation in the Complex Self

Symbolizing one's self is a continual activity. Each person constantly generates, elaborates, and differentiates symbols about himself as he engages in further experiences. These are differentiated in the same way that perceptions are differentiated in figure/ground terms: in terms of nearness, similarity, intensity, common fate, novelty, and movement or direction.

Let us say, for example, that a person identifies strongly with being masculine in the traditional he-man style. His symbolization of himself as a he-man may be a central concept for him. He will have a large number of individual symbols that connote to him aspects of being masculine; athletic successes, aggressive driving, blunt speech, firm handshake, rough-weave suits, wood panelling, etc. These symbols of masculinity accumulate around the concept he-man to the degree that they satisfy the overall image he has of himself. Thus their nearness to his

ideal conception affects his differentiation of them as belonging to himself. Similarly, the intensity of the symbols depend upon how close they are perceived to be in relation to his phenomenal self. A strong he-man symbol will be associated closely with his overall concept of himself, a weak symbols may have little or no value to him, being easily replaced by others.

Some symbols will be more abstract, for instance, individuality as a masculine characteristic. A good example of the collocating of images around the concept of individuality is the Camel Filters magazine ads, wherein the non-faddish, down-to-earth, individualistic male is carefully distinguished from the put-on flighty, wishy-washy people around him. What people want may not be the symbol itself, but a larger, more abstract and central internal symbol. In the case of the Camel cigarettes, the cigarette and the life-style associated with it are symbolic representations of what it is assumed people really want: to be superior and self-sufficient.

Adler (1929) explains the relationship between the symbols a person generates and responds to as being fictional--not really the goals or desires themselves but merely representation that a person may work toward. Having a common fate or future meaning for the individual, these symbols are associated with the phenomenal self. A cigarette may mean much more than a smoke; it could mean security, prestige, individualism, rebellion, adulthood, or whatever to different people. Thus, the importance of these symbols lies in their potential for gaining or maintaining the organization of other dimensions of the phenomenal self.

The complexity of the individual's symbols, the degree to which they can be altered to stand for different things at different times, depends upon the individual's ability to identify himself in multifaceted ways. To a rigidly construed person an object is likely to have few meanings, if more than one, but to the liberally conceived individual one with multi-valued symbols for himself, the same thing or the same activity may have many different facets. Walt Whitman (1855), for example, identifies himself with so many aspects that he can admit of being inconsistent. He says,

Do I contradict myself?
Very well, then, I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes) (p. 74).

As the individual develops from a child with monistic and simplistic perceptions of himself to one with increasingly diverse and complex self-perceptions, he develops procedures for elaborating and transforming his impressions. I am talking, of course, about the development of the adequate personality, the inadequate personality clings tightly to rigid, self-limited perceptions. His phenomenal field is not fluid, or at least it is severely limited in its range of acceptable performances or perceptions. For the adequate, fully-functioning person, however, complex symbolization is the rule.

The question arises, then, of how an individual develops and changes the complexity of his symbols for himself. In inner speech he is differentiating his experience and bringing it into awareness through his process of representing it in symbolic form. But the representations he develops are built upon each other in an ascending process, which Goldstein calls abstraction and which, as I will be indicating more fully in the following section, is organized in levels.

Levels of Abstraction

The process of forming concepts, either of oneself or of the world, is one of drawing distinctions, seeing patterns, inferring relationships and drawing conclusions. Thus this process is an abstracting process that enables the individual to form more powerful and manageable conceptions of the world. In figure/ground terms the abstracting process is one of differentiating elements in the field. The relationships perceived are always differentiated out of the possible perceptions in the field.

The level of a person's abstractions may be specified by an outside observer but for the individual involved his thoughts are a continuum of relationships. When I speak of levels of abstraction, then, I am talking as an outsider about the inner organization of others. ~~Although the perceptual process is a unit and is not experienced~~ by the individual as a series of steps or levels, in actuality his inferential process do have levels. This is exhibited most clearly in the careful, step-by-step logic someone may use to solve a difficult problem. Usually, however, the abstracting process is not step-by-step, but a mental lunge forward. The assumptions and habitual ways of relating phenomena are not made explicit to the individual as they are in formal logic, but they still influence the relationships he sees and the phenomena he perceives.

By abstracting I mean inferring or placing an interpretation upon something (George Kelly, 1963, calls it construing). Such abstracting, were it made overt or verbal, might be expressed as "then that means . . .," which, in fact, is used by people to draw inferences in daily

life, but which is most often an unexpressed link between observations and abstractions. Even on the non-verbal, non-explicit levels, then, abstracting is a process of finding meaning in situations. The symbolizing process, that of discovering symbols for himself and generating ways of relating those symbols with each other, is contained in the abstracting process as a whole. In inner language the individual is differentiating his experience along these interwoven lines. The diverse representations he may have formed for himself at one level of awareness are unified on a higher, more abstract level, which are also related to his identification of himself with many aspects of his world. His conclusions about an event, including his own relationship to that event, become the meaning of it to him.

Abstracting, therefore, is the way we have of making events meaningful. The level at which a person ceases abstracting from his experience is the level at which he finds meaning and the level at which he reacts and interacts. Since this is not immediately clear, an example of the process is needed.

Let us say that two people are engaged in conversation. One observes the other as having a furrowed brow, down-turned corners of his mouth, a somewhat fixed stare, and rigid body posture. If he reacts to these physical properties at this low level of abstraction (having formed no labels for the event as a whole) he may not even pay much attention to what he observes. However, he may label the constellation of physical properties frowning. Now, frowning could be a reaction to visual glare or bodily discomfort, a sign of thinking intently about what is being said, an indication of disagreement, an

exhibition of anger, and so forth. If the first person does not go beyond the level of labeling the event frowning, the possibilities of all these motives remain open.

If, however, he abstracts further, and assigns a motive to the event, say, anger, his response may be to find out in some way what the other is angry about. His inferences, his abstractions about the relationship between frowning and a persons' emotional state, lead him to conclude that the meaning of what he observes is anger, not any of the other possibilities. This kind of abstracting and determining of meaning occurs over and over again in daily life. Through our perceptions of common meanings with others we are able to communicate. So it is both an individual process of abstracting from our impressions and also a process of abstracting toward the commonly held meaning of events.

The "reality of every day life," in Peter Berger's apt phrase, has an extensive social dimension that engages the individual's abstracting process. Berger and Luckmann (1967) says,

I know that my natural attitude to this world corresponds to the natural attitude of others, that they also comprehend the objectifications by which this world is ordered, that they also organize this world around the "here and now" of their being in it and have projects for working in it Most importantly, I know that there is an on-going correspondence between my meanings and their meanings in this world, that we share a common sense about its reality (p. 23).

The meaning of events is often judged by the common sense, the public consensus about the meaning. Thus, in our society frowning is not considered to have the common meaning of joy. The individual's inferences are drawn from his culturally biased manner of differentiating features and of

forming conclusions in regard to them. Still, the personal meaning of an event may take the abstracting process out of the common sense realm and into the private sense realm.

Returning to the frowning example, the person who construes frowning to mean anger might abstract further and decide (infer) that the second person is angry at him. Evidence available to him may be accurate in this respect, but it still is an inference, an abstraction, to conclude that he is the object of the other person's anger. The meaning of the situation might be further elaborated to include a belief that the other person's anger means that he no longer likes the first person, or even further, that because he is not liked, he is an unworthy, despicable person.

Meaning in interpersonal situations can be extended indefinitely. That is, as two people interact their common meanings may become further and further abstracted until they are interacting at such a high level of abstracting that the original "causes" may be long forgotten. The highest level of a person's abstracting carries with it the most assumptions about what is happening and what meaning it has. By reacting at a high level of abstraction the individual relies upon the information presented last--which differentiates the total meaning of the situation--as the controlling variable. If his conclusion has a high degree of personal meaning--that is, if his beliefs about the situation are close to his phenomenal self, he will react in more personal, less "objective" terms.

The movement in abstracting in this manner is toward the central, phenomenal self, lower level abstractions are perceived as being more distant from the individual. In fact, the lowest levels may seem so unrelated to the phenomenal self that the individual maintains a high degree of detachment for them.

The above illustrates a pyramidal effect in perception. At the lowest levels of abstraction the possibilities of different reasons and motives for a particular phenomenon are quite open and wide. At successive levels of abstraction a greater number of assumptions are built upon in creating a narrower conception of the event. At the highest levels of abstraction, we find the greatest number of assumptions underneath and the least latitude of possibilities of interpretation.




Figure 2

Higher level abstracting is necessary in order for the individual to be able to extend his behaviors and perceptions beyond the immediate and superficial. However, with the increase in conceptual power that comes from abstracting also comes the risk of misinterpretation and misunderstanding. His assumptions may be totally divorced from reality (pathological) or merely out of touch in some lesser way. If his assumptions are accurate, however, he is likely to be considered intuitive, brilliant, prophetic.

Abstraction and the Perceived Self

Since at higher levels of abstraction there is a tendency for the individual's self-perceptions to enter in, we need to look more closely at how people form abstractions about themselves. Again, the level of abstraction determines the individual's level of response. The most important variable in the movement from one level to the next is the individual's allowance for himself as a complex open-ended entity.

In the poem "Song of Myself" Walt Whitman (1855) expresses a belief in himself as a vast, complex, multi-facted being. This means that he is capable of accepting unfavorable characteristics of himself along with the favorable (Maslow, 1962) because part of his conception of himself is based upon diverse all-emcompassing characteristics.

If he took on an external person's attitudes about the necessity for him to be more consistent across a wide range of actions, he would find it difficult to allow himself to be contradictory in those terms. The lower level abstraction, incorporating outsiders' points of view--what David Riesman (1950) calls the outer-directed person--severely limits his conceptions of himself. Likewise, each person has the capacity for construing himself a vast range of levels. The level at which he stops influences the way in which he will order his perceptions of himself.

For example, a student may exhibit a diverse range of behaviors during one day at school. He laughs and jokes his way through homeroom. He doodles, talks to his friends, passes notes, and so forth in his history class. He works diligently and excitedly on the lab experiment in physics, hardly paying attention to the people around him. In English he takes a lot of notes, but does not really understand what

the teacher is saying about poetry, so he asks questions spontaneously. In algebra he is intimidated by the teacher and never raises his hand even if he does not understand. At lunch time he withdraws from the large group and talks quietly with his girlfriend. During the day he varies in the quality and quantity of his involvement with the subject matter and with his friends.

If he accepts his different behaviors as being appropriate in different situations, he maintains a view of himself as a complex being, one who is not defined rigidly. If he responds to outside pressures to be "consistent" in all these situations he may develop ways of responding that will bring his behavior in line with the expectations of others. The pressure to reduce dissonance (Festinger, 1957) in such situations will direct his conceptions about himself along either the prescribed lines or toward denial of those prescriptions.

Maslow (1962) states that the healthy personality resists rubricization from without and tends to see himself and to want others to see himself in his own terms. People as a whole, it seems, do not want to be treated as a "type," an "example," a member of a class of objects, but so much of the social sphere directs people toward seeing others as specimens or types that it is difficult for the individual to resist being labelled. The degree to which he is capable of shifting categorization of himself determines the degree to which he is freed from rigid assumptions about himself.

The self-abstracting process has a different structure from the pyramidal structure. In some ways the complex person experiences himself at lower levels of abstraction (Hayakawa, 1953). His assumptions

about what he should be like are less operative, so he is capable of allowing a greater latitude in conceptions about himself. Instead of jumping to conclusions about the meaning of what he does, instead of trying to fit every thing together in a simple package, he is capable of letting himself be as he is.

However, it is not just that he experiences himself at lower levels of abstraction. He also, experiences himself at higher levels of abstraction. The problem area of self-abstraction is the middle ground. Or, rather, the problem comes from an impetus to formalize self-perceptions along only one dimension, to select limiting labels instead of open-ended labels.

Limiting labels assume monistic determinations. For example, a person who labels himself an American and takes on the traditional attitudes that that label incorporates without respect to situational factors, brings a set of attitudes to whatever experiences he may encounter that drastically delimit the possibilities. The one label does not provide for other ways of being at one time. The fact is that each person has a number of roles or relationships that exist simultaneously. If the individual limits his perceptions to only one category he effectively denies the difference within himself and seizes upon only the similarities--the aspects that are similar to his monistic conception.

Open-ended labels exist at a higher level of abstraction, for they account for all the rich and varied experiences of the individual. A person may see himself as an American, a world-citizen, a father, a son, a husband, a friend, a physical being, a lover, a professional person,

etc. in rapid sequence, or differentiate his images of himself on the level of self as complex person with diverse roles and feelings, instead of along either/or dimensions.

The dichotomizing of one's experience or perceptions of one's self is a product of being word-bound. Closed or dichotomous constructs--either/or conditions, are always tied up with the labeling dimensions of language. Being a "big boy," for instance, means that only certain characteristics are tolerable; the rest are not part of what big boys are or do, so they are eschewed. Korzybski (1933) says that the unconscious assumptions carried in our language, such as the dichotomizing of experience into either/or propositions, makes us unsane in that it channels our experiences away from holistic perceptions. The individuals who are word-bound, to the extent that they let their language do their thinking for them, are caught in what Korzybski calls the "intensional" trap.

Intensionality

The prime error in intensional orientations is the failure to recognize that words are not the things they stand for. As Korzybski (1951) points out, the map is not the territory. That is, just as a map is only a schematic representation of a geographical area, a word is only a schematic label for the concepts or events it represents. Thus, to treat the label as the thing labelled, or the symbol as the thing symbolized is a grave mistake.

One way to understand the effects of taking the symbol for the thing symbolized is to look at the primary and the secondary processes, as formulated by Freud (1900). In the primary process, which is associated

with the id and with tension reduction, a memory image of the condition or object needed to satisfy some need is produced. However, the id fails to distinguish between the image and the thing for which it stands. Freud calls this a "perceptual identity." Obviously, if an individual could not distinguish between a picture of a steak and a steak, itself, he would have difficulty in obtaining the nourishment he needs.

The secondary process is part of the mediating function of the ego. In the ego structure problem solving, based upon the reality of events, allows the individual to instigate plans of action that will actualize the images formed by the primary process. Thus, the secondary process operates with a recognition that the symbol is not the thing symbolized. This basic perceptual difference in the two processes permits man to formulate long-range, complex behaviors.

On more complex levels the need to keep one's symbols straight is also important. Failure to distinguish between the word and the object in every day life takes more subtle forms than those pointed out by Freud, but the ultimate effect, that of misrepresenting reality and disorienting the individual, still remains. The either/or orientation is "two valued" in that it reduces experience to distorted halves: good or bad, clean or dirty, night or day, me or not-me.

Intensionality is prey to another false assumption, that what you can say about something is what it is. This is equivalent to believing that all the aspects of a geographical area are presented on one map, when in fact--at least with good maps-- all there is is a presentation of the most important aspects. The intensional individual confuses his levels of abstraction because of his assumptions of identity between what he

can say about something and what it is. Thus he confuses inferences with observations, conclusions with inferences, truths with hypotheses. This leads him further and further away from "what is." As Paul Valéry (1972), the French poet says:

Most people see with their intellects much more often than with their eyes. Instead of colored spaces, they become aware of concepts. Something whitish, cubical, erect, its planes broken by the sparkle of glass, is immediately a house for them--the House!--a complex idea, a combination of abstract qualities. . . . They perceive with a dictionary rather than with the retina; and they approach objects so blindly, they have such a vague notion of the difficulties and pleasures of vision, that they have invented beautiful views. Of the rest they are unaware (p. 19).

Extensionality

The extensional orientation, in Korzybski's terms, moves away from word-mindedness and toward fact-mindedness. The extensional individual does not confuse the map and the territory. Like the doctor who knows that, as much as an electronic apparatus can tell him about the patient's blood circulation, his own direct observation of the patient's vital processes are irreplaceable (otherwise he would be letting his machines do his thinking for him), the extensional individual relies upon his own observations and understanding of an event.

By avoiding the tendency, which is common in our language, to label something and then react to the label, the extensional individual has a greater opportunity to appreciate things for what they are. His perceptions are more spontaneous and fresh. A sunset may be appreciated for itself as if he had never seen a sunset before. In interpersonal

relations he is likely to see the individual for himself not as a stereo type or representative of some group. In terms of himself he is not likely to categorize himself unduly or limit himself to one side of a dichotomy. He is, in Maslow's terms, more integrated in himself. In reference to the two-valued orientation Maslow (1971) says:

My psychologist's way of saying the same thing is "dichotomizing means pathologizing; and pathologizing means dichotomizing." The man who thinks you can be either a man, all man, or a woman, and nothing but a woman, is doomed to struggle with himself, and to external estrangement from women. To the extent that he learns the facts of psychological "bisexuality," and becomes aware of the arbitrariness of either/or definitions and the pathogenic nature of the process of dichotomizing, to the degree that he discovers that differences can fuse and be structured with each other, and need not be exclusive and mutually antagonistic, to that extent will he be a more integrated person, able to accept and enjoy the "feminine" within himself (the "Anima," as Jung calls it) (pp. 161-162).

In abstracting features about himself the individual succeeds better at integrating his personality by having an extensional orientation than an intensional one. This is another way of saying that a person's self concept, being a product of abstracted and internalized perceptions, is realized as being more adequate when the individual adopts open-ended symbols for himself instead of closed or dichotomous symbols. Thus the pyramidal abstracting process for self-abstraction looks like this:




Figure 3

Intensional Self Concepts

The urge to maintain and enhance the perceived self is affected strongly by the individual's orientation toward words--not just his personal meanings in a particular word, but his ways of generating symbols about himself through words. Consider, for example, the circular effect of self-labels.

A young boy, let us say, in his first year of school is more active and more disruptive than his companions. In the course of a day he behaves in a variety of ways, some of them acceptable and some unacceptable to the teacher and classmates. His unacceptable behaviors, however, are the ones they notice and attend to in their behaviors. He is labelled a trouble maker by his teacher, and, although he does not hear the label she assigns to him, he experiences her reactions to that dimension of his behavior. He forms a concept of himself as being essentially a trouble-maker, one level of abstraction away from the totality of his behaviors.

Consequently, his self-label as a trouble-maker, which may even have positive meaning to him, orients him towards perceiving his actions in that perspective. The possibility of behaving in other ways is reduced because he begins to differentiate only those characteristics that fit his concept, his label. Further experiences may solidify his perceptions of himself and his perceptions of other people's negative attitudes towards him. He comes to see himself almost exclusively in terms of his trouble-making, and he is assured of that self-perception because people treat him in the same way.

It is likely that his self concept, a product of the labels and symbols he has been using for himself, will have at its center an understanding of himself as a trouble-maker. Increasingly it becomes harder to free himself from the either/or orientation that says that he is either bad or good, because even behaviors that would be considered good, or at least neutral, in others take on a different meaning. They become further proof of his being a trouble-maker. The labelling of himself and then reacting to the labels is a circular process, leading further and further to rigid, self-contained conceptions of himself. Thus, his self concept is based upon an intensional orientation, based upon the labels and symbols that implicitly say "you have either this or that." Since he can see more easily the "bad" side of his behavior, it becomes a simple matter to exclude other considerations and behaviors not fitting the labels.

The effect of the intensional orientation upon self concepts is a distortion of one's possible perceptions. In the above example, the effect is to limit further and further the individual's perceptions and behaviors as a problem individual, but it could also work in the opposite way for someone else producing a narrow, yet essentially positive, self concept. Korzybski maintains that the intensional orientation inevitably leads to misevaluations and distortions. Statements made about the world or about oneself are deceiving unless the individual is careful to avoid the pitfalls of two-valued, intensional thinking.

The road to adequate self concepts needs to be cleared of the rubble and stumbling blocks of distorted symbols. As Hayakawa (1958) points out:

insofar as . . . statements about the self are based on experience and behavior patterns and reactions that we have observed in ourselves without distortion or self-deception, we have healthy and realistic self-concepts (p. 43).

Self Concepts in a Double Bind

The conditions under which an individual is able to conceive of himself in open, realistic terms must be open-ended in themselves; that is, non-threatening experiences allow the individual the opportunity to explore his range of abilities, and thus present the possibility of enlarging his conceptions about himself. However, threatening environments can force the individual into rigid postures.

The double bind theory of schizophrenia is an example of the deleterious effects of a threatening environment, one in which two injunctions are simultaneously communicated to a person, each denying the other yet forcing the individual into responding to them. Gregory Bateson's proposal (1972), that schizophrenia is caused by conflicting messages that cannot be differentiated adequately, suggests that a severely limiting, two-valued environment interferes with the individual's discriminatory and abstracting processes. He says:

When a person is caught in a double bind situation, he will respond defensively in a manner similar to the schizophrenic. An individual will take a metaphorical statement literally when he is in a situation where he must respond, where he is faced with contradictory messages, and when he is unable to comment on the contradictions. For example, one day an employee went home during office hours. A fellow employee called him at his home, and said lightly, "well, how did you get there?" The employee replied, "By automobile." He responded literally because he was faced with a message which asked him what he was doing at home when he should have been at the office, but which denied that this question was being asked by the way it was phrased. . . . This is characteristic of anyone who feels "on the spot," as demonstrated by the careful literal replies of a witness on the stand in a court trial. The schizophrenic feels so terribly on the spot at all times that he habitually responds with a defensive insistence on the literal level when it is quite inappropriate, e.g., when someone is joking (p. 204).

The threatening aspect of double bind situations is that experience is limited to an either/or formula and then the choice of one or the other is removed. The classic joke, "have you stopped beating your wife," is an easily recognizable double bind, carrying the assumption that whether you have stopped or not, you still are a wife-beater. Of course, real double binds are more complex, and it is the insistent regularity of them that creates a defensive posture. However, at any level of severity the double bind comes out of a two-valued either/or orientation.

In the case of an individual's self perceptions, the threatening quality of being either a reformed wife-beater or an unreformed wife-beater limits his ability to be other than a wife-beater. The label persists beyond the activity, and even in spite of the activity. Thus, conditions for open, realistic self concepts can be so denied through the habitual language use and symbolization of an individual that he misevaluates himself and distorts what he is.

Taking literally the symbol or statement about himself, the individual becomes bound up in the intensional trap. Not only is he giving himself no alternatives to his labels, but he is taking his labels to be that which they stand for: himself. He becomes a two-valued person, accepting only those characteristics that fit in with his existing perceptions of himself and denying those that fall outside the range of the perceived self.

CHAPTER VI. EXPERIENCE AND EXPRESSION

The Integration of Language and Experience

In the previous chapters we have seen how the individual's use of language enables him to go beyond simple, superficial aspects of his experience and to understand and control both his experience of the external world, and, through the development of an inner language, symbolize and construe himself. This double nature of language--representational and exploratory--opens up both the external and the inner worlds of experience for the individual. Language, which entails a complex symbolization process and a fitting of those symbols into communicable form, affects a person's perceptual processes drastically.

The symbols an individual has available to him in inner speech, from which springs all other speech, both channel the meaning of situations for him and also are products of his differentiating personal meaning for himself. Thus, while he internalizes the symbols and concepts of his culture through the language he acquires--thereby orienting his experience in conformity with prevailing forms, he is constantly bringing to awareness personal experiences and relating them with each other as a means of exploring and understanding himself.

Besides the important functions of language in providing ways of symbolizing experience for the individual, another function of language and symbolization is the making of experiences and meanings available to

the person in new experiences. This area of language use involves a congruence between a person's experience and his expression of that experience to himself and to others. Intrapersonal and interpersonal communication, then, are significant areas of experiencing that determine the individual's experience as a whole. With that in mind, we turn to looking at the ideal communicant and the conditions under which he flourishes.

The Ideal Communicant

In the ideal communicant we find congruence between the verbal expressions he uses and the inner experience that those words represent for him. A person, ideally clear in his perceptions and free from threat in external situations, is able to express his feelings and thoughts with clear symbols. However, these conditions are relatively rare for most people. What a person says he is and what that person really is may not be the same at all. Some of the factors affecting a person's self-report about his perceptions and feelings are: the social expectancy of the situation, the degree of cooperation on the part of the individual, the degree of freedom from threat and the degree of personal adequacy he experiences, the clarity of his own awareness about inner states, the presence or lack of adequate symbols for expression, and a change in field organization for him (Combs, 1959).

These variables are present to some degree in all communication. While some have greater interpersonal dimensions (such as, social expectancy or cooperation), others are essentially intrapersonal processes. Of course, since the individual and society are interwoven, there is no dimension that is purely one or the other. For example, the change in

field organization for each individual is a constantly shifting process as he receives communication from the outside (verbal, gestural or graphic) and relates that to his own experience, then brings his personal experience to the external world by finding the appropriate symbols for it. In all forms of communication the field of perceptions is continually altering. This process of self-referral is one's own experience and subsequent bringing of that experience into play in other experiences is an important one, for it encapsulates all of the other factors involved in interpersonal and intrapersonal communication. Congruence between his inner speech and his external speech, as we will be seeing in the following pages, is necessary in order for the process to remain clear and open to change.

Congruence

In attempting to provide the conditions under which an individual may develop congruent expressions of himself, some dimensions are easier to establish than others. Carl Rogers' client-centered therapy (1951), for example, places great emphasis upon the interpersonal relationship. By being congruent, empathic, and unconditionally positive in his regard for his client, the counselor often is able to free the situation from threatening aspects, reduce the superficial social expectancies that lead someone to hide his true feelings, and establish a trusting atmosphere in which the client can cooperate. Furthermore, the counselor acts as a model of being real for his client. To Rogers "being real involves the difficult task of being acquainted with the flow of experiencing going on within oneself, a flow marked especially by complexity and continuous change" (1971, p. 88). Thus, the interpersonal situation can lead to increased clarity and representation of inner experience on the intrapersonal level.

Congruence is a process of becoming and of remaining in touch with one's own experiencing; it is a self-affirming activity for the individual. As a person learns to affirm his own experience he learns more about his own experience, and, as he learns to represent his experience accurately and fully to himself he learns to be more self-affirming. So far this process has been fostered best through the interpersonal relationship established between two people. Jourard (1964) expresses his faith in the quality of the relationship between therapist and client as allowing the individual to grow:

If they are themselves in the presence of the patient avoiding compulsions to silence, to reflection, to interperetation, to impersonal technique, and kindred character disorders, but instead striving to know their patient, involving themselves in his situation, and then responding to his utterances with their spontaneous selves, this fosters growth (p. 62).

To understand more fully how the congruence between a person's inner speech and his external speech produce the quality of full experiencing and growth, and how a lack of congruence can lead to pathological conditions we have to look more closely at the ways he has available for discovering and clarifying personal meaning for himself through his inner language and symbols.

Personal Meaning

In any given situation the meaning for an individual is a product of his perceptions of the situation, his perceptions of himself, and his perceptions of the relationship between the two. In an emergency situation percpetion of self and events is sharpened to include only the most salient characteristics. For example, seeing a rapidly moving car bearing down on

him the individual acts to remove himself from the present danger; he does not contemplate complicated features of the situation. In less threatening circumstances, however, the individual may elaborate upon his conceptions of the relationships between the situation and himself. Close friends, for instance, may spend a lot of time exploring further dimensions of their relationship, either verbally or non-verbally.

As he sees himself momentarily, and as a continuing identity, the individual determines meanings for himself. The meanings that he differentiates symbolically can themselves be elaborated and extended. Gendlin (1962) explains the process this way:

any datum of experiencing--any aspect of it, no matter how finely specified--can be symbolized and interpreted further and further so that it can guide us to many, many more symbolizations. We can endlessly differentiate it further. We can synthesize endless numbers of meanings in it. (p. 16).

The process of differentiation of figure/ground relationships is a continual one; as it is elaborated through symbols it may be extended for an individual further and further. Thus experiencing, symbolizing, and perceiving are involved in the differentiating process. It is the nature of symbols and man's symbolizing activity to be able to be extended indefinitely. Symbols are not isolated, gem-like images, but are constantly experientiable in terms of other symbols. Meaning does not exist apart from the individual; it exist only through the individual. Perls (1972) says,

A meaning does not exist. A meaning is a creative process, a performance in the here and now. This act of creation can be habitual and so quick that we cannot trace it, or it can require hours of discussion. In every case, a meaning is created by relating a figure, the foreground, to the background against which the figure appears (pp. 64-65).

In figure/ground terms the indefinite relating of symbols arises out of the endless possible relationships that may be brought to the foreground. It is possible to extend one's symbols and personal meanings further and further until one discovers his relation to all things. However, each person has such a richly varied personal experience that he is not likely to bring all of his experiences into conscious awareness. He can, however, respond to enough replications and symbols of himself so as to perceive himself as a complexly functioning individual.

The function of differentiating and symbolizing his experiences is to make them freely available in other experiences. Through the relating of symbols, his representations of his experience and of himself are constantly being associated in terms of each other. Elements that appear similar to each other aid in the gradual differentiation of personal meanings, but they also provide a means of going beyond simple, momentary meaning to more complex, long-standing meanings. The more experiences are made available in other experiences the more appropriate will be the individual's responses to new experiences. He will have a repertoire of ways of to respond adequately and he will be able to see continuity between his past experiences and his present ones.

Since in any situation the individual will have some perceptions less clear than others (Lewin, 1951; Combs, 1959), we would not expect equally clear perceptions of himself and his relationship to the situation across all areas of his experience. However, it is important that he be able to clarify and bring to readiness his perceptions when occasions call for them. The process of clarifying experience--that is, bringing to foreground something that rested in the background, while a complex and elusive process, may be enhanced through paying attention to the individual's communicating modes.

A person is likely to be more clear and more capable of acting clearly in new situations if he has his past and present experiences freely available to him. This means that the more he conceives of himself as a complex individual the more he will be able to draw from his rich body of experiences. Also, the more he is capable of experiencing the continual and gradual changes in his life, without holding onto inappropriate, outmodeled symbols for his experience, the more he will be able to deal with the present in present terms and not in terms of the past (Perls, 1969). If he has developed congruence between his experience and his symbolization of it, he will be able to appreciate the personal meaning of situations.

To perceive clearly the personal meaning of situations an individual needs to perceive himself as having a stake in the events and changes around him. Alvin Toffler (1974) suggests that, if individuals fail to experience themselves as changing entities in a changing society, they experience an impersonal future, a future without real consequences for themselves as persons. This, he says, makes people more susceptible to future shock, to a divorce between their abilities to change and the need to change with society. Reporting an, admittedly, impressionistic survey of teenagers' images of themselves and of society, he states:

I believe that the schools and universities, with their heavy emphasis on the past, not only implicitly convey a false message about the future--the idea that it will resemble the present--but also that they create millions of candidates for future shock by encouraging the divorce between the individual's self-image and his or her expectations with regard to social change. More deeply, they encourage the student to think of his or her "self" not as subject to change, growth or adaptation, but as something static (p. 11).

A person is more likely to view himself as static and not subject to change if he has a narrow conception of his range of capacities and a limited view of his relationships with events around him. Having a language of change and process rather than a language of static relationships and compartmentalized objects would help lead toward perceptions of himself as a changing, growing individual. However, this could not exist only on the external language level; it would have to have equal representation in the individual's inner speech in order for him to stay acquainted with the inner flow of experiencing.

The Inner Flow of Experiencing

Personal experiences are not necessarily related to each other in logical fashion, yet they are related on an inner level for each individual. Some people may be more inclined to relate their experiences in a formal logical pattern while others may be highly impressionistic in relating experience. Whatever the overt style of relating experiences, in inner speech these relations are experienced according to perceived similarities. Most events or objects or people can be compared to each other in some way, because, being richly endowed with characteristics, the human mind can find many ways in which they may be related.

In the inner symbolizing of experience meaning dominates over pattern and pattern dominates individual symbols (Vygotsky, 1962). Thus, the individual is oriented in global, holistic ways towards realizing his experience. The degree of clarity of his experience to himself, however, will be determined by the ways he has of referring to experience and of bringing his experience intact to a higher level of awareness. To understand how the individual brings his experiencing into focus we need to look at the relationships between experiencing and the symbolizing of experience.

Combs (1959) has pointed out that feelings are the result of perceptions of ones self and ones situation and the meaning of it to the individual. The meaning of ones relationship to something else is a perceptual whole; it is not set off from the person's experience. In fact, it is the individual's experience. However, it is his experience as he symbolizes it that the individual reacts to, so it can also be looked at as having two main parts: the raw experience and the symbolizing of that experience.

Perceived similarities and relationships among personal experiences are based upon the individual's capacity for symbolizing for himself relatively complex data into a schematic representation (Raimy, 1943). Since his raw experience is complex, he develops a means of referring to it that will simplify the experience for him.

This simplifying of experience is achieved on the linguistic level when a word or words are used to stand for a complex array of personal experiences, and on symbolic levels (inner speech) when images are generated to differentiate personal meaning. The inner flow of experiencing and the process of symbolizing experience merge in inner speech; that is what Eugene Gendlin (1962) calls "felt meaning." He points out:

meaning is formed in the interaction of experiencing and something that functions symbolically. Feeling without symbolization is blind; symbolization without feeling is empty. . . .If we do not have the felt meaning of concept, we haven't got the concept at all--only a verbal noise. Nor can we think without felt meaning (pp. 5-6).

The concept of felt meaning is misleading in that it suggests that feeling and meaning are two different things or processes that may coincide at some

places. In actuality, feelings are indications of the meaning of events to people. There is no split in the individual's personality between thinking and feeling--they are one process of differentiating meaning for the individual. What Gendlin is suggesting, however, is that personal meaning that derives from the individual's innermost experience and which is representable at a higher level is integrated with all areas of experiencing. On deep levels of experiencing, on the level of inner speech, there is a background of data, impressions, feelings, images, etc. from which some organized figure may emerge into a symbolizable form.

Gendlin says:

A concept in actual thought is not only the logical pattern and implications that it has at a given moment. It also involves a felt experiencing of meaning, which can lead--in the next moment-- to radically different concepts, new differentiations of meaning, contradictions in logic yet "predictable" as human behaviors (p. 6).

The process of figure emerging from ground not only makes possible the changes in our perceptions but also operates as a clarifying process. Out of confused and obscured emotions can only come further obscurity and confusion for the individual. To the degree that he has his inner experiencing available to him he will be able to act upon his feelings. Thus the two edges of the process are that (1) symbolization sharpens and clarifies feelings, giving them meaning so the individual can act, and (2) that feeling fleshes out a person's symbols, makes them real for him so that he experiences an impact in the symbols he uses. Whorf (1956) says that "a change in language can transform our appreciation of the Cosmos (p. 263)," and this is so, but only if the individual experiences a direct connection between his language, his symbols, and personal meaning.

Experiential Signals

Personal experience is concrete, organismic. As a non-mediated experience it can only be pointed at while we remain silent. That is, without symbolization any experience is a unitary, non-extended phenomenon. With symbolization experience is always unfinished in some way; it can be symbolized further and further indefinitely. The extensive nature of the symbolizing and differentiating functions make the interrelations among one's experiences and meanings too great to be formalized logically. Inner speech, as a bridge between the un-mediated experience and the represented experience, functions at the level at which we have meaning at all. These meanings may not be expressible verbally, but they may be marked off by a symbol, either verbal or not.

The bringing of one's unmediated experience--that is, one's innermost organismic experiences--to a level of conscious and logical awareness is performed through symbols. Since inner speech works with unsolved problem situations (Vygotsky, 1962) in that the exploratory, discovery aspects of inner speech dominate the representational aspects in order to bring to some conclusion unfinished dimensions of a person's experience, the function of inner speech is to organize the images and meanings for the individual. In inner speech those experiences that are not understood or that have an unfinished quality become explored and elucidated through symbolic representations. If we understand that symbolized experience is indefinitely extendable into other experiences, then we see that it is the process of extension and relation that constitutes the individual's self-knowledge. To have a sense of having meaning, that is, of having an inner experience that connects with one's external experience, is to know oneself as a richly endowed, experientially full individual.

The subject feeling of having a self and of having experiential processes that arise from within oneself are important ingredients in the healthy personality. Maslow (1971) says, for instance,

in most neuroses, and in many other disturbances as well, the inner signals become weak or even disappear entirely . . . and/or are not "heard" or cannot be heard. At the extreme we have the experientially empty person, the zombie, the one with empty insides (p. 33).

Experientially, the individual needs to be able to refer directly to his inner experience, to his inner language, as it were. By so doing he is capable of realizing himself as a more fully functioning person. Reference to inner meanings does not mean finding one's personal meaning in some situation, although that certainly is one of the functional dimensions of relating symbols internally; reference to inner meaning means a mode of knowing that there is a meaning at all. This latter form of knowing is a form of meta-perception for it employs reflective processes within each person. To refer to one's images and symbols directly is to be in "touch" with the flow of one's own experiences, to be in contact with the facticity of experiencing so that the person perceives himself as being in a constant state of becoming.

Richard M. Jones (1968) suggests that insight and outsight enable the individual to function fully and to experience himself on all levels. By insight he means the making of a person's "conscious life more receptive to his imagination" (p. 78): this may be done, for instance, through the psychoanalytic approach. Outsight, which Jones says is the province of education, works in the other direction; it is the method of mastering the properties of the world "by virtue of gracing it with this-or-that private

image"(p. 80). In short, insight and oversight are integrative processes that lead the individual towards ease and mastery of his own experiencing and control and understanding of the phenomena of the world.

The processes of insight and oversight, which are like the processes of representation and exploration that I have discussed, are ways of structuring experience symbolically. Insight gives form and definition to the deepest levels of experiencing; it is a means of contacting and exploring inner language and symbols in any situation. Oversight gives body and life to the symbolic representations of the environment; the individual discovers the personal meaning of a situation through his imbuing of externals with his already existing meanings. Movement back and forth between insight and oversight, between symbols and experiences, between outer and inner speech, enables the individual to remain in contact with all areas of his experience.

The experiential signals that the individual responds to are progressively felt as coming more and more from the "inside" rather than the outside. In the course of language development and communication the child becomes more capable of understanding and accepting emotions as being generated and occurring within himself. The research of Wolman, Lewis and King (1971) on the development of a language of emotions indicates that:

As children develop and acquire greater facility with language and its referents, they are more able to pinpoint processes occurring within themselves.

The findings presented confirm the common sense notion that as children mature their language repertory increases in their descriptions of their perceptions of altered bodily states, that is, their emotions. This increased repertory parallels the development of cognitive skills, with some difference: even a word like "nervous" which appears to be the most "psychological" in nature, has a concrete somatic component (p. 1292).

External, social language use progressively orients the individual towards perceiving his emotions and his body experiences as internal organismic processes. As he develops a language of emotions he is also learning where to look to find the locus of control over his emotions. As he builds up experiences and ways of referring to them his language becomes more evocative; that is, it evokes the meanings that the individual associates with his symbols. This movement towards a perception of one's internal experience suggests that, as Piaget says (1970), as the individual gains control over his external world, including his language, he becomes more autonomous in his experiencing of himself.

By saying that the individual becomes more autonomous in experiencing himself, I mean that he builds up a referential system (his symbolic representations) for getting in touch with his inner flow of experiencing and his images associated with his experiencing. Insofar as he is capable of referring to his own experience, insofar as he pays attention to his experiential signals and is able to act upon those signals, he is functioning fully on both the experiential and the symbolic levels.

Keeping in mind that the process of symbolizing and fully experiencing oneself as an organism is a holistic process that unites all dimensions of a person's personality, we can turn to a look at what may happen if a person fails to maintain contact with his inner flow of experiencing.

The Split Between Language and Experience

Distortion and Separation

Often what a person experiences on a deep personal level and what he experiences on a surface level are in conflict. This can be as simple as the distinction between what a person believes and what he says he

believes, or it can be as complex and confusing as denying one's experience through evasive and elusive verbalization. The choice situation for people usually involves whether to affirm one's own experience or whether to accept the social or consensus experience of others. Maslow (1962) describes this choice situation as a fork in the road:

The primal choice, the fork in the road, then, is between others and one's own self. If the only way to maintain the self is to lose others, then the ordinary child will give up the self (p. 50).

If one's self is his system of meaning, to give up one's self is to surrender one's meanings to the meanings of others. In short, that entails endorsing the perceptual system of others instead of one's own. Herbert Eveloff (1971) points out that in the case of young children who have learned basic linguistic symbols, the congruence between the child's perceptions and the symbols that are given to him to organize his perceptions is important.

If symbols do not reflect reality as it is, if the child's perceptual system constantly invalidates the symbols (i.e. conceptual systems) that the parents are transmitting, a great deal of inner confusion can occur. For example, if a child endorses his perceptual system, he is possibly threatened by disapproval of his parents. If he endorses the distorted communication, he may invalidate in some way his perceptual system. Certainly, the child has enough cultural distortions to deal with anyway, for instance, religious practices, cultural mores, and so forth. Obviously, the earlier such dissonance occurs, the more fundamental will be the distortions in obtaining a true symbolic language for the purposes of negotiating with reality or with self. Thus, constant meaningful communication with adults is of decisive significance because the acquisition of a language system involves a continuous reorganization of all the child's mental processes in accord with his expanding universe (p. 1905).

When dissonance (Festinger, 1957) between one's own experience and the representation of that experience by others or by self occurs, the individual becomes less capable of referring directly to his own experience. Enough habitude in invalidating his own experience leads to the experientially empty person, one who does not know how he feels about things. Moustakas (1967) relates this phenomenon to a difference between creativity and conformity in the individual. Through open and honest communication people not only endorse the perceptions of others, thereby creating new experiences, but they also endorse their own perceptions. Thus, relating one's personal meanings to others is a creative, growth-producing activity. Moustakas (1967) says:

When people are genuinely related they create for themselves and for each other new feelings, new experiences, a new life. . . but when a person says something that is appraised and adjusted, reacted to and balanced off, when he speaks in order to put his idea in "proper perspective" and to compete for status, then he is no longer present as an integrated human being. . . he is not a spontaneous person, involved in real living (p. 217).

Not all situations call for intimate, spontaneous communication. In daily life the individual may find himself having to distort or adjust his experience as he communicates with others. The problem in communicating directly one's own experience is more complicated than turning an off/on switch, but this often is the way that communication of meanings is described.

A person can communicate to others his own experience only as well as he can communicate it to himself. Thus, a prior condition to spontaneous communication must be a spontaneous flowing of experience within the person. His experiences must be freely available to him, either in a

symbolic form or in a direct form, in order for him to even begin to make them available to others. Speaking which is part of one's inner language and experience is quite different from using words as an elusive process. Perls (1969) cautions against thin verbalizations as a way of avoiding contact with one's feelings. Gendlin (1962) describes the difference between talking mere words and talking meanings:

The extent to and mode in which the individual refers to his experiencing, the mode in which he relates the symbols he speaks to it and brings it into interaction with the other person--these variables of process will determine whether he is merely using words, or whether his words are part of a deeper process. What his words are about will not tell us this (p. 37).

What Gendlin means by this is that we cannot specify on a one-to-one basis whether a person's words and his experiencing are congruent. Since words will have different shadings of meaning for each person, it is not the word, itself, that we should look at to determine if he is using words that distort or that accurately represent his inner experiencing. In fact, it is difficult to specify as an outside observer if someone's expressions adequately and honestly reflect his experience. Everyone develops a certain amount of "feel" for the language of others, and we have all had experiences in which we disbelieved the other person's statements.

As outsiders we can look for incongruities between the words a person uses and his tone of voice, his body posture, etc. in order to discover the degree of adequacy of his language. Careful attention to non-verbal signs may give the outsider much information about the inner processes and experiences of others. However, from an inside point of view, from the point of view of the speaker himself, a lot of these

non-verbal signs are not evident. Still, there may be a feeling of "rightness," a feeling that the words one is using are exactly right, that the symbols representing his experience are in perfect alignment with his experience. These moments of congruence between one's external speech and one's inner speech may stand out as being especially centered experiences (Margaret Korb, personal communication) or especially poetic and rhapsodic (Maslow, 1962). At such times there may be a feeling of being in touch with basic, deep experiential processes.

This feeling of "rightness" in one's expressions and experiences has been indicated by many psychologists as an important identity experience. Erikson (1968) describes a process in which the individual is more vital and animated in his functioning as being one in which he overcomes some estrangement and is able to react holistically to his environment; that is, at some deep level he "solves" a "problem" or resolves an identity deliemma. Earl Kelley (1962) says that the fully functioning personality knows no way to live except in keeping with his values, which means that in his basic experience of himself, in his exploring and discovering of meaning he has a subjective experience of valuing and of being in touch with his individual identity. Horney (1945) explains that loss of spontaneity, the power to experience oneself freely, leads to alienation and emotional sickness. Maslow (1954, 1962) says that one can choose wisely for his life only if he is capable of listening carefully to his own needs and wishes. Rollo May (1969) suggests that through repression of his experience modern man has lost the image of himself as a responsible individual, and Perls (1969) echoes this statement when he divides the word responsiblity into response-ability, the ability to respond.

Lest all this sounds too poetic or hortatory, I point out that what the above psychologists (and many others) are providing is a description of the link between an individual's experience of himself in full-bodied terms (as a valuing, responding, creating, choosing, and becoming organism) as opposed to bifurcated, hollow terms. The important variable in the subjective experience of self is the individual's capacity to realize his experience, to hear his inner signals, to respond to the meanings that exist for him. In his symbolizing process, learned and extrapolated from language, the individual creates meanings, but if he has no means of bringing those felt meanings forth he becomes lost in a maze of disembodied meanings and empty symbols. As Zijderveld points out (see Chapter 3), he stores up disconnected meaningless images and symbols that are reflected upon but which go nowhere.

A case in point concerning this is cited by Margaret Korb (personal communication, 1974) from her private practice as a therapist. "George," her client is described by her in this way.

He had no sense of being a real person; he felt himself to be an empty shell that functioned, but with mist and vapor inside and no solidity or strength. I perceived George to be personable, above average in intelligence, and to have an excellent command of the English language. In fact, George talked a lot--about himself, about his family, about his animals, about his schooling, about his job prospects, about his girlfriends (or lack of), about his apartment, about his car troubles, and on... and on. He talked a lot. After several sessions George confessed that he felt totally unconnected from his voice and his words, which came as off a tape recorder and floated away in space. We made real contact at that point.

George's divorce from the words he spoke highlighted the experience he had of not being in touch with himself as an experiencing, meaningful person.

I suspect that the symbols he generated and related were unconnected with the level of feeling that animated his symbols and gave them life.

Isolation from a sense of becoming and experiencing, which are other ways of saying meaning, separates the individual from organismic processes and leaves him at the control of unassimilated, unintegrated activities. In these contexts the language of the individual may be divorced from his feelings and his actions may have the feel of disembodied behaviors, the kind of divorce from oneself that T. S. Eliot describes in "The Hollow Men" (1925):

Our dried voices, when
We whisper together
Are quiet and meaningless
As wind in dry grass
Or rat's feet over broken glass
In our dry cellar

Shape without form shade without color,
Paralysed force, gesture without motion.

Personal Mythology

In the process of bringing one's experiences and perceptions to the surface and communicating them an individual is able to test his experiences against "reality." The communication process balances a person's inner symbols against the external symbols and thereby engages him in a process of organizing and validating his personal experience. However, images, symbols or beliefs that are divorced from the integrative process of expression find no resolution, no connection with the individual's experiencing as a whole. Rogers (1959) points out that self and experience, that is, one's symbolization of himself and his deeper level experiences, may be divorced from each other. He says:

Following the development of the self-structure, this general tendency toward actualization expresses itself also in the actualization of the portion of the experience of the organism which is symbolized in the self. If the self and the total experience of the organism are relatively congruent, the actualizing tendency remains relatively unified. If self and experience are incongruent, the general tendency to actualize the organism may work at cross purposes with the subsystem of that motive, the tendency to actualize the self (pp. 196-197).

In drawing a distinction between the self and the organism as a whole, Rogers indicates that the two elements of experience may contradict and undermine each other. If they are aligned relatively well, if the individual's experiencing is representable to himself along adequate lines, the individual is able to make his experiences available to himself in new experiences and he is able to move toward further actualization of his capacities. However, if the individual is out of touch with his images and symbols in inner speech, these images, which normally would aid him in functioning fully, become disconnected.

In such a disconnected state images and symbols are constantly being combined and recombined in search of meaningful dimensions. Organization of the self becomes too fluid, incapable of sustaining an identity for the individual and so he experiences himself as being hollow. The lack of resolution of the individual's identity leads him toward building up of personal mythology designed to find the meaningful dimensions.

By personal mythology I mean a body of images, symbols, beliefs, and stories that an individual inappropriately develops in order to bring to some resolution the lack of organization and meaning for him. Personal mythology, therefore, is more than the collected beliefs that constitute the perceived self; it is the body of unattached symbols and beliefs, which have a specific function: the press for resolution of disorder.

I am drawing a distinction here between adequate inner speech that leads to the individual's integration of language and experience, and inadequate inner speech which, because it has no clear means of organization and understanding, leads away from integration of all levels of experience. These two dimensions of inner speech are contained in the self concept.

Lecky (1945) says that "all the acts of an individual have the goal of maintaining the same structure of values"(p. 10). This is the goal of the self concept. However, personal mythology is an inadequate process of discovering and maintaining values. Since symbols and images are not connected with the individual's firm sense of experiencing, personal mythology is disorienting to the individual. To understand personal mythology more fully we need to consider some of the work done by Claude Levi-Strauss on mythology in general.

Levi-Strauss (1966) distinguishes between magic and science in terms of the strategies employed by them in seeking objective knowledge. Magic, which is at the root of mythology, he says, "postulates a complete and all-embracing determinism. Science on the other hand, is based on a distinction between levels. The scientific, non-mythological strategy is to understand things hierarchically and differentially, organizing knowledge into abstract structures and relating those structures carefully. For example, science differentiates the molecules, cells, tissues, organs, etc. of the body into different structures with different organizations. The individual in perceiving himself generally does the same thing. His self concept is hierarchically and abstractly organized with some element dominating and encompassing others (Purkey, 1970). With such an organization of the perceived self the individual is capable of relating and bringing forth his personal experiences.

The mythological strategy, however, treats all elements as equal. They are constrained by their symbolic nature and the fact that they come from a language that distinguishes elements according to their combinational properties but not according to their personal meanings. That is, the creation of myths employs a syntactic strategy without the semantic, or meaningful, strategy that is part of "scientific" approaches. As Levi-Strauss (1966) says,

The characteristic features of mythical thought is that it expresses itself by means of a heterogeneous repertoire which, even if extensive, is nevertheless limited. It has to use this repertoire, however, whatever the task at hand because it has nothing else at its disposal (p. 11).

For the individual, then, personal mythology is a constantly shifting process, but ever locked in a limited pattern. The continual combining and recombining of images and symbols, while possibly providing adequate means of dealing with the situation of the moment, lacks the overall organizational properties of a unified self concept. Images and symbols in personal mythology, according to Levi-Strauss:

are. . . condensed expressions of necessary relations which impose constraints with various repercussions at each stage of their employment. . . this logic works rather like a kaleidoscope, an instrument which also contains bits and pieces by means of which structural patterns are realized. The fragments are products of a process of breaking up and destroying, in itself a contingent matter, but they have to be homologous in various respects, such as size, brightness of coloring, transparency. They can no longer be considered entities in their own right in relation to the manufactured objects of whose 'discourse' they have become the indefinable debris but they must be so considered from a different point of view if they are to participate usefully in the formation of a new type of entity: one consisting of patterns in which, through the play of mirrors, reflections are equivalent to real objects, that is, in which signs assume the status of things signified (p. 36).

Personal mythology, being a consequence of unresolved individual meanings and divorced from the individual's experiencing, becomes a private arena of experiencing in itself. Locked into a perceptual framework that assumes that all meanings are equally important and that the symbolized meanings are in themselves the things that are symbolized, the individual has at his disposal only half of the possible organizing processes. He lacks the capacity for distinguishing levels of meaning for himself, so he constantly is reworking his available images into new or repeated patterns. This constant recombination of symbols and mythical images, I suggest, is directed at an identity solution.

For the individual who is out of touch with his direct experience and who relates solely on the basis of his excognitated symbolic representations of experience a thorough, firm sense of his identity is impossible. To see himself as an experiencing individual his experiences must be available to him in other than merely symbolic terms. Otherwise he is limited to constantly reorganizing his existing symbols and meanings, which are inadequate representations by themselves, instead of creating new meanings that will increase his sense of self and his capacity to deal effectively with the environment.

Circularity of Personal Myths

There is a structure that exists among myths, although that structure is different from that of logical, "scientific" structures. Essentially the difference between the two is that one is planar, two-dimensional, synchronic while the other is hierarchical, multi-dimensional and historical (Levi-Strauss, 1966). Mythological structure, whether personal or cultural, assumes the totality of the present, and the

equality of events; scientific structure assumes historical, that is, progressive knowledge and hierarchy of events and elements. The difference in these two structures is the difference between an undifferentiated field and a differentiated one.

In the undifferentiated field no figure stands out clearly from the myriad elements of the field; thus, clear action is impossible because there is no clear perception. Mythological thinking, by its not having principles of organization that will distinguish different aspects, leaves the individual with an undifferentiated field of perceptions.

In therapy situations one of the primary roles of the therapist is to act as an agent for differentiation. A client often will complain of being confused unsettled, dissatisfied in some way, but he may have no knowledge of what the source of his confusion is. The therapist aids him in sorting through his confusion and in finding out where to look for his solutions. In addition the client may become educated to his personal processes.

The confusion over one's identity or one's actions often is circular. The individual, because he fails to distinguish important areas of his experience, such as confusing his observations and his interpretations, returns again and again to the same personal issues without satisfactory resolutions. R. D. Laing's (1969) work and observations on the circular discourse that characterizes certain mental disorders points this out effectively. Having a logic all their own, these people spin a spiral of perspectives on themselves and others that do not allow the individual to get out of the situation.

In Knots Laing (1972) presents verbal patterns, such as the one below, to illustrate the circular impasses that are possible.

<u>therefore</u>	I am not entitled to what I have everything I have is stolen. If I've got it, and I am not entitled to it, I <u>must</u> have stolen it.
<u>because</u>	I am not entitled to it.
<u>because</u>	I am not entitled to it I have stolen it.
<u>therefore</u>	I have stolen it I am not entitled to it.
<u>therefore</u>	I am not entitled to it I must have stolen it.
<u>because</u>	Or, it has been given to me as a special favor by someone who is entitled to it so I am expected to be grateful for all I have what I have has been <u>given</u> , not stolen (p. 34).

This form of circularity in thinking and speaking is what I call personal mythology. The individual is inserted into a perceptual system that is constantly being turned in on itself and although apparently reaching a solution, never quite gets there. Ultimately the person builds up a body of myths and beliefs that control his perceptions in new situations only in the limited terms of the old situations.

What Octavio Paz (1970) has to say about the creation of meaning through cultural myths applies to the personal realm as well:

Each myth reveals its meaning in another one, which, in its turn refers to another, and so on in succession to the point where all these allusions and meanings weave a text: a group or family of myths. This text alludes to another and another; the texts compose a whole, not so much a discourse as a system in motion and perceptual metamorphosis: a language. . . . Myth is a sentence in a circular discourse, a discourse which is constantly changing its meaning: repetition and variation (pp. 38-39).

The constant recombining of myths in cultural contexts is presumed by Levi-Strauss to be an attempt to resolve the most basic questions about the world and existence. Since these questions are not resolvable in these terms the myths remain part of the cultural heritage. In a similar vein, personal myths exist for everyone. Since there is always some area of experiencing that the individual is not in command of, he will exhibit some amount of elemental organization along these lines. It is in the individuals without sufficient modes of referring to direct experience and making it available to them that personal mythology becomes the dominant mode of perception.

Congruence of Experience and Expression

In positing a level of felt meanings which constitute the individual's most significant experience and in positing an inner language which is the individual's referential process through which he generates and relates symbols that represent himself, I have suggested that these two processes must be integrated in order for the individual to maintain an experientially full sense of his identity. The congruence between experience and expression is not limited to the representations he may make public, but also extends to the individual's capacity to match the two on some inner, personal level,

Rogers (1971) suggests that the valuing process, which is clearly present in an infant's preference for some experiences and not for others, is the source for an individual's most firm personal experiences. The individual prefers some things to others initially on an organismic basis, with the locus of the valuing process being within himself. This process,

however, may become subverted in the individual's experiential modes if he adopts external values that do not coincide with his personal valuing system. This replacement of values occurs through communication with others and through the internalization of external unassimilated symbols. Rogers says that:

in an attempt to gain or hold love, approval, esteem, the individual relinquishes the locus of evaluation which was his in infancy, and places it in others. He learns to have a basic distrust for his own experiencing as a guide to his behavior. He learns from others a large number of conceived values, and adopts them as his own, even though they may be widely discrepant from what he is experiencing. Because these concepts are not based on his own valuing they tend to be fixed and rigid rather than fluid and changing (p. 9).

The valuing process in each individual may be highly varied, some values coming from introjected concepts and others coming from a deep, personally felt preference. In daily choice situations and in life-choice situations the experientially full person, the person who has his experiencing most available to him, chooses according to those values within him. Thus, his choices are likely to be the best choices for him in terms of his own experience. The experientially empty person, however, is likely to make blind choices, choices in terms of others and in terms of undifferentiated self-images.

Congruence among valuing, experiencing and expressing is tied in with the individual's ability to integrate the various elements of his functioning. The act of communication, interpersonal and intrapersonal, is an integrative function in healthy, whole people: through communicating openly and broadly one's own experience the individual finds more of himself

becoming accessible to himself. Language integrates the symbols, the experiences and the meanings of the individual or it isolates them, creating a bifurcated personality out of touch with the whole of his experience at any one time. Jourard (1964) sums up the relationship between communication and experience when he cites self-disclosure as a process of achieving mental health.

Self-disclosure. . . appears to be one of the means by which a person engages in that elegant activity which we call real-self-being. . . . Full disclosure of the self to at least one other significant human being appears to be one means by which a person discovers not only the breadth and depth of his needs and feelings, but, also the nature of his own self-affirmed values (p. 27).

Self-disclosure, valuing, communicating. The interpersonal context informs the individual of his meanings and relationships among them. The movement towards appropriate symbolizing and experiencing of oneself is a movement towards full integration and congruence. The alienated self, the loss of attention to inner signals and inner meanings, gives over to the integrated, accepted self through the process of disclosing and expressing personal values. The process of establishing full-bodied symbols for one's experience directs the individual away from undifferentiated, privately held and isolated images and towards differentiated, cohesive experienced meanings.

I suggest that it is through the linguistic process of establishing symbols, concepts and modes of referring to one's experience that a person orients himself. He learns either to generate and relate symbols without respect to his personal organismic experience or to establish and maintain an experiential mode that makes his experience maximally available to him.

If this is true, then the communicative process in all of its dimensions is a relevant and important area of investigation for anyone interested in the ways that people develop and maintain the organization of their perceptions. Without adequate modes of referral and expression of one's experience the individual amasses a body of unassociated images, isolated symbols and undifferentiated concepts. He becomes prey to distorted senses of himself, even to the point of experiencing himself as a hollow, dissociated being.

The solution to this psychological problem is to integrate the split and bifurcated dimensions of the personality into a cohesive whole. As E. M. Forster (1954) expresses it in his novel Howard's End,

Only connect! that was the whole of her sermon.
Only connect the prose and the passion, and both
will be exalted, and human, love will be seen at
its height. Live in fragments no longer. Only
connect, and the beast and the monk robbed of
the isolation that is life to either, will die
(pp. 186-187).

CHAPTER VII

LANGUAGE AND THE FULLY FUNCTIONING SELF

A person's use of language as the basis for his representing and exploring the world around him channelizes his thinking processes. It affects the ways in which he tends to abstract from his experiences, the ways in which he establishes a sense of his relationship to others, the way he generates and manipulates symbols and images about himself. Thus, language permeates the individual's experience at many levels, providing him with the means of freeing himself from superficial appearances on one hand, and of chaining himself to distortions and misperceptions on the other hand.

The implications of language as a perceptual control in people's lives are multiform. In some respects we are just beginning to understand the relationship between language processes and thinking and perceiving, but in other respects--as I have described in the previous chapters, the role of language in personality and perception seems to be well established. The picture we obtain in looking at the individual in this way is one of dual movement: the individual learns to master his environment through his increasingly powerful representations of it and he learns to master himself through the internalization of externally devised cues.

If we look at the speech process itself, including the language of gestures, we see the individual finding ways of bringing to public shape his personal thoughts, feelings, impressions, and ideas. In so doing,

the individual discovers more about the experience he attempts to communicate to others; he has to reflect upon it, symbolize it, and transform it into some communicable state. The other side of the speech process, speech for oneself, highlights the exploratory, bringing-to-an-understanding process even more, for through it the individual develops his characteristic modes of perceiving himself and of relating his experiences to each other. Operating at a lower level--in most cases, probably a prior level of functioning--a person's inner speech affects his overall psychological structure, particularly his ability to function fully throughout his life.

In this work I began with diverse descriptions of the self and chose the phenomenological approach to personality at the one that offers a holistic approach to the self in terms of the individual's own perceptions. I am returning in this last chapter to a consideration of the self, particularly the healthy, fully functioning, self-actualizing, adequate self. To do this I am relating the role of language in personality development to two major descriptions of the fully functioning personality: Maslow's self-actualizing personality and Combs' adequate personality. The first provides an externalistic description of characteristics that comprise the self-actualizing individual; the second provides an internalistic, "perceptual" description. Both descriptions have value to the psychologist.

The Self Actualizing Self

According to Maslow (1962) the observed characteristics of healthy, fully functioning people are:

1. Superior perception of reality.
2. Increased acceptance of self, of others and of nature.
3. Increased spontaneity.
4. Increase in problem centering.
5. Increased detachment and desire for privacy .
6. Increased autonomy, and resistance to enculturation.
7. Greater freshness of appreciation, and richness of emotional reaction.
8. Higher frequency of peak experiences.
9. Increased identification with the human species.
10. Changed (the clinician would say, improved) interpersonal relations.
11. More democratic character structure.
12. Greatly increased creativeness.
13. Certain changes in the value system (pp. 23-24).

Taking each of these in turn we may see the degree to which language, as I have described it, affects or may affect characteristics leading toward self-actualization.

1. Superior perception of reality

The individual who is not word-bound, who does not take the word or symbols for the thing represented, is much less likely to confuse or distort the world-as-it-is. He will have available to him a wide-range of ways of symbolizing reality and of relating it to himself; thus, he is capable of discovering his personal meaning in a situation along valid lines without the automatic distortions that come from unchallenged and undifferentiated assumptions. His awareness of himself and of the world is likely to be more accurate and more operational.

2. Increased acceptance of self, of others and of nature.

Because he sees his relationship to the world and to others more clearly and accurately he is capable of accepting what he sees as being truly him. Also, when he is able to explore and make available his inner experiences through the referential process of language, he is capable of making intelligible and admissable the entire range and flow of his experience. Thus, congruence among the various experiential modes (Rogers, 1959), not only by means of one's language, but significantly through language and symbolization, leads to greater acceptance.

3. Increased spontaneity.

The degree to which an individual is "in touch" with and comfortable with all of his experiences determines the degree of spontaneity in his actions. Language functioning, then, would have a less central but strong role in the interplay among his bringing of these experiences to the surface and into the world. Other factors affecting spontaneity are: the individual's readiness in new situations (Moreno, 1946), security (Combs, 1959) and honesty with himself and others (Moustakas, 1967). Since spontaneity is a product of a total integration of dimensions of a person's experience, language will play only a supporting role.

4. Increase in problem centering.

Being less "self-conscious" and being less personally threatened by a situation allows the individual to direct his attention to solving a problem efficiently and effectively. I do not think that language, except as it may help him understand what the problem actually is, affects the individual's ability to center on problems.

5. Increased detachment and desire for privacy.

Here, too, a person's language is not more than tangentially related.

6. Increased autonomy, and resistance to enculturation.

One of the major theses of this work has been that language provides the individual with the means of becoming more autonomous, more self-directed in his dealings with the world. In a social sense, however, autonomy means being inner-directed, relying upon one's "inner signals" instead of external forces. The resistance to rubricization that Maslow (1962) cites as characteristic of self-actualizing persons is a resistance to the classificatory, labelling elements exhibited in external experience or his inner symbolization of it in favor of externally generated symbols. If he followed only external symbols he would eventually lose touch with his inner experience and become a shell without the insides. He would become prey to all the assumptions, values, labels, and dictates of the culture he inhabits. and, thus, would be culture-bound because he is word-bound.

In George Orwell's 1984 the chief propoganda strategy of the totalitarian Big Brother is to loosen people's strongly held beliefs about the construction of the world. This is done by pairing off antithetical concepts and equating them with each other. Thus, "war is peace" and "ignorance is strength." By confounding the peoples' inner experiences of those concepts by getting them to accept the contradictory statements whole cloth, the government makes them out of touch with their own inner signals. Thereby, the private citizens become less and less capable of resisting or questioning the dictates of their culture.

7. Greater freshness of appreciation, and richness of emotional reaction.

This characteristic, too, has been explored extensively in the preceding pages. Richness of emotional reaction is contingent upon the individuals' capacity for referring to his inner experiences and upon his ability to make his personal meaning available to him in a variety of new situations. This involves what Rogers (1962) calls "being real" by which he means "the difficult task of being acquainted with the flow of experiencing going on within oneself, a flow marked especially by complexity and continuous change"(p. 88). The greater the individual's ability to refer to this flow of experiencing the greater his ability to exhibit freshness of appreciation and richness of emotional reaction.

8. Higher frequency of peak-experiences.

Peak-experiences are usually non-verbal experiences, I suspect. But Maslow (1962) points out that "expression and communication in the peak-experiences tend often to become poetic, mythical and rhapsodic, as if this were the natural kind of language to express such states of being"(p. 104). At such times cause and effect between language and experiencing breaks down; they are likely to be totally integrated in the individual. Thus, I cannot say to what degree language and expression would lead to more or less frequent peak-experiences. Further investigation of this relationship would yield some interesting results.

9. Increased identification with the human species.

I take this to be one of the most significant aspects of self-actualizing, fully functioning individuals; it incorporates many of the other characteristics cited by Maslow. In addition, identification

with the human species involves symbolizing oneself in broad, open, all-encompassing ways--seeing oneself in full-bodied terms, accepting those perceptions and thereby seeing oneself and one's stake in others (Kelley, 1962). If the development of language and symbolization affected only one dimension of personality, this, I think, would be the most important one, for out of his perception of identity with all of humanity the individual can come to know, accept and enhance himself.

10. Changed interpersonal relations.

The work of Transactional Analysis, General Semantics, Gestalt therapy and encounter movements as a whole has been directed at improving interpersonal relationships through improved communication. Since both interpersonal and intrapersonal communication depends upon the person's language there are many ways (excellently described in such books as John Stevens', Awareness, 1971; Perls', The Gestalt Approach, 1973; Peter Farb's, Word Play, 1974; Thomas Harris', I'm OK - You're OK, 1969; etc) in which interpersonal relations may be improved through changes in language.

11. More democratic character structure.

This is not directly or significantly affected by language, except in a global orienting effect upon the individual's overall conceptions of his relationship to others.

12. Greatly increased creativeness.

If, as I have indicated, a major determinant in the creative process is the individual's ability to merge the preconscious symbols and images with conscious, "rational" representations, then creativeness is

a product of the individual's use of language to discover and extend his levels of experiencing. Both in the holistic sense (Maslow, 1962) of creativity as psychological health and in the specific sense of creativity as "special talent creativeness" the individual's ability to bring to awareness and functionality the continuum of his experience relies upon his capacity for symbolization.

13. Certain changes in the value system

Valuing according to Rogers (1951) is an organismic process, a preferring of some things over others. To the degree that the individual perceives his values clearly and symbolizes them adequately he is able to act on those values. This means that values may be distorted through mis-representations of one's self (Raimy, 1975), which in turn are affected by the symbol systems a person has available for developing concepts of himself. An increase in adequate symbolization and congruence among his levels of experience would, therefore, lead to changes in the value system as a whole.

In the valuing process personal meaning for each individual is the strongest determinant and indicator of what values a person will embrace (Combs, 1959). What is valued is what is perceived by the individual as leading to the greatest maintenance and enhancement of himself.

The Adequate Personality

According to Combs (1962) the adequate personality has the following characteristics: a positive self concept, openness and acceptance of his experience, a broad identification of himself with others, and a rich

extensive and available phenomenal field. These characteristics, all from the internal approach to personality are affected greatly by the individual's language and symbolizing.

1. Positive self concept.

As has been pointed out a person's self concept, as it is a product of his symbolizing function, is a short-hand distillation of his self symbols. It acts as a producer of new experiences and as a product of the individual's past and present experiences. Thus, the self concept, whether it be positive or negative, cannot be separated from the individual's language.

2. Openness and acceptance of experience.

Insofar as the individual is aware of himself as a responsive organism with continuing meanings and values he will be able to accept his experiences and remain open to new experiences. The adequate personality, having the capacity to make his experiences available in other experiences he has differentiated himself rather completely from his environment and from other people. This has occurred through his capacity to symbolize his experiences in a variety of ways and to use his symbolic functioning as an abstracting process. He is in command of his perceptual organization in that he does not mistake symbols for the things symbolized. He is reality-oriented in that he bases his conceptions of himself upon an accurate appraisal of situations and events without the distortion that comes from feeling threatened in some way.

The inadequate or partially-functioning person has different perceptual and symbolizing characteristics. He is limited to two-valued terms in defining himself so he tends to be more rigid perceptually,

operating in either/or terms. Thus, he is likely to define himself in negative terms, in respect to what he is not instead of what he is. He confuses symbols and the things they represent, which leads him to reacting to the wrong elements frequently and distorting the situations he finds himself in, he acts with a great quantity of unchallenged assumptions about what is and what is not.

Furthermore, if in using his language he loses direct reference to his experience he becomes experientially empty, incapable of knowing what he feels and what he thinks. Thus, he has a limited amount of personal experience available to him in new situations, so he is limited in his being able to respond fully and well.

Finally, out of his lack of participation in experiential modes, his symbols and meanings are constantly being shuffled through into a mythological structure, representing not so much what really is but what he thinks is; this inadequate means of organizing his perceptions, having little or no means of sorting out levels of organization and meaning, severely limits his sense of identity.

3. Broad identification with others.

As the individual symbolizes himself and his myriad experiences he may progress toward a greater and greater acceptance and appreciation of his diversity. If he comes to see himself as a complex person with a personal stake in the similarities between himself and others he comes to identify himself with the fates of others. Eugene Debs (1917) typifies this broad identification with others in his famous statement:

While there is a lower class I am in it; while
there is a criminal element I am of it; while
there is a soul in prison, I am not free (p. 14).

4. A rich, extensive, and available field.

Throughout this work the effects of language upon the individual's phenomenal field have been presented. Not only does language enable the individual to go beyond the information given in forming concepts, abstractions, strategies, and constructs about his world and about himself, but it also provides him with the means of making his past experiences available to him in new situations. The degree to which the symbolizing process is kept open, multi-dimensional, and clear determines the degree to which the individual's phenomenal field is rich, extensive and available.

Meaning

At the final levels of analysis, discussion about language, perception and experience becomes a discussion about meaning. For each individual the meaning of his relationships to others, to the world at large and to other parts of himself is the most significant area of his life. That these meanings may be influenced greatly by one's language processes, I hope, has been amply demonstrated. Many areas of language use deserve much more investigation. I anticipate that in the coming years we will learn more about this, the most pervasive form of symbolic functioning; more links between language and perception will be established, and others modified by new, more sophisticated evidence. However, meaning for the individual must never be neglected, for through his personal and felt meanings the individual lives out the sum of his existence. He experiences himself as having meaning above all other experiences. While we may discover more about the creation and development of meaning, we will not discover an area that supplants meaning as the summation of one's experience of himself and his world.

APPENDIX
Toward Discovering Universal Linguistic Processes

Semiotics

The search for linguistic universals has been going on for as long as men have studied language. The basic reason for this is the belief that linguistics as a descriptive discipline should base its conclusions about language upon the features that are common to all languages, not only for the sake of formal elegance in description but for the sake of making a bridge to descriptions about what it is like to be human. As J. B. Carroll (1964a) points out, "anything that is universal in natural languages is likely to have psychological significance as a basic property of human communication"(p. 29).

There are several levels on which we may look for linguistic universals. The most comprehensive level would be the logico-philosophic level, represented most cogently by Charles Morris (1938). In this approach language is classified into three areas of investigation: syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics. Syntactics relates signs (words) to one another, which entails formal descriptions of patterns of relationship. Semantics relates signs with their referents (things), and pragmatics relates signs to their interpreters, that is, their users. In this classification of language one begins with the assumption that the most salient universals of language are that words have relationships to each other, to their designata and their users. Thus further elaboration

of linguistic universals would carry on from these elements. Charles Morris calls his theory of signs "semiotic," explaining its function as a unifying discipline.

Semiotic has a double relation to the sciences: it is both a science among the sciences and an instrument of the sciences. . . .it supplies the foundations for any special science of signs, such as linguistics, logic, mathematics, rhetoric, and (to some extent at least) aesthetics. The concept of sign may prove to be of importance in the unification of the social, psychological, and humanistic sciences insofar as these are distinguished from the physical and biological sciences (p. 2).

On this level of analysis man is viewed primarily as a sign-using and sign-generating organism. In this respect his symbolizing propensity directs all his other activities. Since it occurs in dimensions of semantics, syntactics, and pragmatics, an understanding of how these dimensions are related becomes the task of a philosophy of language and also, possibly a psychology of language.

The intimate relation of the semiotical sciences makes semiotic as a science possible but does not blur the fact that the subsciences represent three irreducible and equally legitimate points of view corresponding to the three objective dimensions of semiosis. Any sign whatsoever may be studied from any of the three standpoints, though no one standpoint is adequate to the full nature of semiosis. Thus in one sense there is no limit to either point of view, i.e., no place at which an investigator must desert one standpoint for another (pp. 53-54).

The pragmatic dimension, to use Morris' term, is the main focus of this discussion on language, but considerations pertaining to the syntactic and semantic dimensions constantly arise. We cannot consider the psycholinguistic processes without some understanding of the role of semantics and syntax as building blocks for language use. Especially in postulating some universality in language we need to consider the other dimensions and what they offer.

Semantic Space

If man is essentially a symbolizing organism, how much does he have in common with the rest of his species? Charles Osgood (1966) suggests that "the dominant ways of qualifying experience, of describing aspects of objects and events, tend to be very similar, regardless of what language one uses or what culture one happens to have grown up in"(p. 304). In his devising the "semantic differential," which allows a person to evaluate a concept along several dimensions, he has discovered that the dimensions for evaluating remain relatively constant from culture to culture.

Having strong bearing upon the understanding of linguistic universals is the assumption that people generate a range of impressions, images, and further symbols around a particular symbol. That is, if asked what Birthday means, someone can define it in accurate dictionary meanings, in terms of personal experience (such as what he does to celebrate his birthday), and in terms of affective responses. Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957) have concentrated mainly on the latter category of responses in devising scales that tap most, if not all, the relevant dimensions of associations a person may have with regard to a word or concept.

Three dimensions for judgment have been distilled from an initial list of many possible dimensions. People use the dimensions of Evaluation (good, bad, pleasing, etc.), Potency (hard, soft, heavy, light, etc.), and Activity (active, passive, fast, slow, etc.) in their judgments about concepts. These dimensions are related on a scale that indicates direction and distance from dichotomous constructs.

The point in space which serves as an operational definition of meaning has two essential properties--direction from the origin, and distance from the origin. We may identify these properties with the quality and intensity of meaning, respectively (p. 26).

Thus, a person's concept as a whole is graphically represented by its constituent dimensions, suggesting a composite structure of relations within the individual. Although it would be a mistake to assert that the semantic differential scale is a duplication of some internal mental structure, it is relevant in indicating how an individual relates his symbols or concepts to each other. Meaning for each person in these terms may be a constellation of associated concepts and symbols.

In producing cross-cultural comparisons of the semantic differential Osgood, et.al. have found that there exist very similar bases for judging concepts. Similarities in factor structure--the dimensions of Evaluation, Potency, and Activity--in diverse cultures suggests that, the Whorfian hypothesis notwithstanding, there is more similarity among people and their perceptual processes than differences.

However, the issue is not that easily resolved. Differences do remain and they may be accounted for more on the basis of linguistic relativism than the similarities accounted for on the basis of linguistic similarities. Faced with a world that at least in its physical properties is about the same for all people, and having as our human inheritance physical attributes that are biologically the same, we would be expected to experience the physical properties of the world in similar ways. Osgood (1966) points out that the panhuman characteristics of phenomena and of experiences will orient people towards shared perceptions of

qualities and meaning, but also the culturally different experiences and means of sorting experience will produce variable conceptions of some kinds of events.

First, as far as the affective mediating system is concerned, our data show that it is the factorial structure--the basic dimensions along which feeling-tones are differentiated--that is immutable and overrides differences in both language and culture. Phenomena which depend upon this shared structure display universality. Thus, since good, sweet, bright, white, up, smooth, and the like share positive affect, they will tend to appear as metaphorical and synesthetic equivalents all over the world. On the other hand, since the affective meanings of particular concepts, like MOTHER, COMMUNISM, SNAKE, and RICE will depend upon the affective learning experiences of individuals and hence upon their cultures, we can expect psycholinguistic relativity (arbitrariness, uniqueness) (p. 321).

With that we are thrown back to a modified position on linguistic universals and linguistic relativity. Semantic considerations by themselves cannot elucidate all the elements of language and experience. They can offer a picture of relationships among concepts that are common to almost all people, but applicability towards a full understanding of language and experience is limited.

Grammatical Universals

Notable attempts have been made to describe grammatical features that are common to all natural languages (Greenberg, 1966). The problem involved in such a description, however, have limited the conclusions that can be drawn at the present. There is a sampling problem, for example; even if we could fully describe all the existing languages of the world--an arduous task in itself--there would still be "dead" languages that existed historically and of which we have limited data. One procedure,

adopted by Joseph H. Greenberg (1966) has been to select thirty representative languages as a sample and then discover what properties may be generalized from them. This procedure has the advantage of manageable proportions in collecting data, while it provides a basis for generalizing about all languages. Results of such investigations remain tentative and they are subject to revision as counter-examples from other languages are discovered.

Charles F. Hockett (1966), recognizing the methodological problems involved in generalizing about language, proposes that universality does not have to mean existence of a feature in all known cases. An example from physiology may help understanding of this. It is a human "universal" to be born with the capacity for speaking and hearing. However, some people are born deaf and/or mute. Their deviation from the normal human capacity does not weaken the claim of speaking and hearing as an important, "universal" characteristic, but suggests that there sometimes are factors that inhibit such capacities and that we can understand more about the nature of speaking and hearing by investigating the cases in which this does not occur. Likewise, in language study the existence of cases that are contraindications of a particular feature offers opportunity for greater insight into what is important in language as a whole. Hockett says,

Suppose that some feature, believed to be important and universal, turns out to be lacking in a newly discovered language. The feature may still be important. To the extent that it is, its absence in the new language is a typological fact of importance about the language.

Conversely, if some feature is indeed universal, then it is taxonomically irrelevant (p. 4).

If we are using linguistic universals as a bridge to universal mental processes, both the features held in common in all languages and the features that distinguish significantly among language systems are important. Those that do not vary provide an elemental base to understand the importance of those that do vary.

A listing of grammatical universals, as suggested by Hockett, may appear tautological because it would introduce elements that are basic in grammatical patterning and which are generally available to easy inspection. Nonetheless, a listing of common grammatical features opens the possibility of understanding human experience through the constituents of grammatical structure. Hockett includes in his, admittedly, tentative listing such observations about grammatical universals as the existence of deictic elements (e.g. personal pronouns, demonstrative pronouns), proper names, markers that do not denote anything but which influence denotation (e.g. and, but, in, on), major distinctions between "noun" and "verb" classes, and so on. These elements may be considered as features of psychological significance, particularly in terms of how the experience of communicating among people is channeled by the means of referring to the speaker, the hearer, and the referent. Carroll (1964a) says,

Although linguists have justifiably avoided any appeal to psychological considerations, it is possible that the grammatical phenomena formally described by the linguist can be even more parsimoniously described in terms of what may be called their "psychological motivation" or "dynamic logic." That is to say, given a certain linguistic construction, we may be able to find a psychological motivation for its existence and to show its relationship to other constructions in a way that cannot be done by formal analysis (p. 29).

It would be naive to impute psychological significance to grammatical structures and features on a one-to-one level. The main problem with Whorf's analysis of the relation of language to thought is his assumption that what is represented on the surface linguistic level is likewise represented on the personal, experiential level. However, it is apparent that a "dynamic logic" does operate in language use and it is likely to be pervasive on levels beyond the superficial.

There may be several valid and productive ways to examine the logic behind surface forms in language. I think of two that seem to be the most powerful. One way is to look at the structural characteristics that provide for the surface forms; that is, we can ask what it is that satisfies the necessary conditions for the incidence of observable forms. The second way would be based upon the first. We could attempt to describe the means by which the hidden structures become realized in observable structures; this would be a process-oriented approach and, hopefully, would illuminate the psychological dynamics involved in relating the structures.

The linguistic field that opens up both of these ways of understanding the psychological processes in speech production is called transformational grammar. Developments in the past two decades suggest some useable connections for psycholinguistics. They also reveal the problems involved in making those connections. For the rest of this appendix I will be pursuing the transformational grammar approach to linguistic universals and human experiencing.

Linguistic Universals from a Transformational Grammar Perspective

With the publication of Syntactic Structures, Noam Chomsky (1957) introduced a system for generating a grammatical description of language. In his theory he suggested that a structural description, if sufficiently set forth, would account for the fact that an infinite number of sentences may be generated from a finite number of words. It also would provide a description of the construction of sentences that would coincide with a native speaker's intuitions about the grammaticality of sentences. By seeking to account for the generative quality of language, which the native speaker somehow learns to apply, Chomsky was led to propose a tripartite grammatical theory composed of phrase structure rules, transformational rules, and morphophonemic rules.

Phrase Structure Rules

Phrase structure rules in Syntactic Structures indicate how words are combined in grammatical sequences. Starting with the sentence as the unit of consideration we can break it into its immediate constituent parts, the noun phrase and the verb phrase. Each of these can be differentiated further into the elements that may constitute its basic structure. Thus, for example, a verb phrase may be composed of a verb and a noun phrase; a noun phrase may be composed of an article (a, an, the) and a noun. These are very simple phrase structure descriptions. When they are written as rules we obtain:

S (sentence	→	NP (noun phrase) + VP (verb phrase)
VP	→	V (verb) + NP
NP	→	art. + N (noun)
where	→	means "rewrite as."

These few examples do not begin to describe the possible combinations of (fairly simple) phrases that can be analyzed. Linguists have been able to write complex series of rules that will generate almost all of the grammatical sentences in English without generating ungrammatical sentences. However, writing a sequence of rules, which provide a hierarchical analysis of sentences by dividing them into successive constituent elements, becomes a formidable enterprise. Although there are limited numbers of phrase structure rules that formalize the whole of language, attempts to categorize all the possible sentences lead to complicated concoctions on the linguist's part. In addition, such hierarchical analyses of sentence structures, while providing a sort of description of language, cannot account for the psychological dimension of language. That is, they do not represent the native speaker's ability to recognize and generate grammatical utterances.

Transformational Rules

Since phrase structure rules by themselves are unwieldy and incapable of bridging formal description and human experience, Chomsky postulated transformational rules that could do both. Where phrase structure rules provide for the combination of individual symbols into grammatical patterns, transformational rules indicate the ways in which the phrases themselves may be recombined. With transformational rules at his disposal, the linguist can simplify his descriptions of sentences by specifying how simple sentences may be reconstituted through holistic structural changes. An example may help here.

If we have the sentence the dog bites the boy and change it to a passive construction, the boy is being bitten by the dog, the writing of rules to make this transformation has to be based upon the total structure of the sentence. Were we only able to make changes in phrase structure rules we would have to change one word at a time. But since grammatical changes occur on a systemic level, phrase structure rules cannot adequately be formulated. Judith Greene in Psycholinguistics (1972) points out the difficulty in having phrase structure rules which operate only one at a time.

This sort of interlocking of contexts is very difficult to handle within a system in which individual symbols are rewritten independently of how other rewriting rules have been applied. Specification of context sensitive restrictions would be cumbersome to say the least (p. 41).

The advantage of considering transformational rules is that transformations, operating on strings of symbols instead of individual symbols, provide for the reordering of the whole sentence at one time.

Transformational rules as an organizational principle have psychological validity in that the mind organizes impressions in holistic patterns, not merely in one step at a time sequences. Chomsky's inclusion of transformational rules, then suggests a bridge between formal descriptions of grammar and individual usage. If the individual has available to him a knowledge of the basic grammatical constructions of his language (phrase structure rules) and also a set of transformational rules that may be applied to the basic constructions, as Syntactic Structures suggest, then we could conclude that the formal characteristics of language duplicate, at least in significant part, the mental processes of the individual in language use.

Admittedly, transformational rules are an outsider's conception of the internal process of language generation, but, even if the individual does not use such rules consciously, the description of the linguistic process in these terms does account systematically for the complex knowledge of grammatical construction that must be part of the individual's basic knowledge. A phenomenological description of the process takes into consideration the individual's personal meanings in a situation and his reasons for saying or doing something. A transformational grammar approach, however, merely indicates what he would have to know about language in order to produce sentences at all.

Morphophonemic rules

Phrase structure rules and transformational rules are not in themselves actual utterances. To be brought to the level of sound production they require a component that assigns particular sounds to the words that are to be expressed. Phonemes are the smallest units of distinctive sound features; phonemic differences in the words time and dime distinguish one from the other according to the difference in sound between t and d. Thus, phonemes are important in differentiating what is actually heard; they do not have meaning in themselves. Morphemes are minimal units of speech with recurring and meaningful dimensions. Some morphemes, such as un-, pre-, -s, -er, cannot be used by themselves, but affect the meaning of whatever words they are conjoined to. They can be said to have a meaning, either lexically as defined by a dictionary (such as sing, be, tree), or semantically as defined by their recurrent usage (such as s which "means" plural when attached to nouns).

The morphophonemic level, as Chomsky calls it, is important in the actual production of speech. They produce the surface level utterance, joining the more abstract levels of transformations and phrase structures with the concrete. The precise relation of morphophonemic rules is not necessary in this discussion, except to understand that at this level the rules can be carefully linked with linguistic practice, which is the ultimate goal of psycholinguistic investigation on all levels.

Caveat

In the preceeding discussion of transformational grammar I have been describing only the basic formulation represented in Syntactic Structures, and even that at a general level. In 1965, Chomsky published Aspects of a Theory of Syntax in which he enlarged upon some of the points made in Syntactic Structures and modified others. Psycholinguistic research based upon Syntactic Structures has had some intriguing results, but it does not represent the state of transformational theory since Aspects was published. In addition, in recent years transformational theory has expanded and diversified so rapidly that many of the assumptions about the relationships among linguistic structures have been brought into severe questioning.

Linguistic theory attempts to devise a formal description of language that is fully developed and internally consistent. In pursuit of this goal, linguistics appears to be moving in the direction of mathematical theory and formal logical theory. As it does so the connections with psychological dimensions may become negligible. Although Chomsky and other transformational linguists have suggested in the past that there

is a meeting place where linguistics, psychology, and philosophy merge, we have not reached that place yet.

Still, whatever the state of current linguistic issues, there remain two significant areas in which transformational grammar can contribute to the psychological area. One, in the psycholinguistic research based upon Syntactic Structures there are specific lines of investigation that have important implications. Even if the merging of linguistic theory and psycholinguistic theory is merely a historical accident in the development of the disciplines, there remain important contributions derived from that synthesis. Two, later developments and refinements in linguistic theory, while altering some major conceptions, still maintain an essential agreement on the nature of the syntactic structures and the process of relating the different structures. With these two points in mind, we can turn to each and witness the contributions to an understanding of language and personality.

Competence

In linguistic theory a careful distinction is drawn between linguistic competence and linguistic performance. Competence as an explanatory concept has been proposed by Chomsky (1957) as a means of accounting for the abstract system of knowledge that enables the individual to produce and understand verbal expressions that he has never heard before. Competence has elsewhere been described as a representation of the idealized native speaker's intuitive grasp of the grammar of his language. He does not have to "think out" any but the most complex utterances that he may hear. He knows marvelously a vast amount about the language system he is immersed in. Chomsky (1972) says:

I think that if we contemplate the classical problem of psychology, that of accounting for human knowledge, we cannot avoid being struck by the enormous disparity between knowledge and experience--in the case of language, between the generative grammar that expresses the linguistic competence of the native speaker and the meager and degenerate data on the basis of which he has constructed this grammar for himself. . . . The problem cannot even be formulated in any sensible way until we develop the concept of competence, alongside the concepts of learning and behavior, and apply this concept in some domain. The fact is that this concept has so far been extensively developed and applied only in the study of human language (p. 78).

When we begin to seek out the elements that make personal knowledge possible, that is, the cognitive abilities involved in an internal representation of the world, we have to account for the differences between a person's representation and what exists "in reality."

In perceptual psychology terms we do understand that what a person perceives is a product of what he has learned to perceive through his past experiences. Thus, personal knowledge of the world is a function of experience. A child tests properties of his environment and modifies or clarifies his understanding of his environment in terms of the effects of his manipulations. As he does so, his perceptions become more adequate. Inadequate perceptions become self-correcting as the individual acts upon understanding of linguistic competence in the individual.

In one way, competence sounds like Wertheimer's (1959) description of knowledge of structural features in an intellectual problem. Seeking to account for the "aha!" experience, the moment of understanding, Wertheimer claims that true knowing involves knowledge of the structural characteristics of the problem being investigated. In his classic discussion of finding the area of a parallelogram, he notes that what makes it

possible for the child to draw a perpendicular and appropriately find the area is a recognition of the formal properties of the geometric figure. Adherence to simple rules or following a formula blindly are not sufficient procedures, for the introduction of differently drawn figures makes blind rule-following inadequate.

The children in Wertheimer's study (1959) had to be able to perform some kind of operations on the parallelogram that not only preserved their sensorial knowledge of it but also enriched their total perceptions of the structure. In a similar way, Chomsky suggests that the child devises an enriched conception of his native language. His exposure to his language is sporadic, haphazard, and limited, yet he learns the essential grammatical structures very early from this halting, insufficiently expressed exposure.

Linguistic competence may be intimately tied together with mental processes. If competence represents an abstract ordering of external impressions into an organized internal system, then competence, as an explanatory concept, extends the Gestalt psychology description of learning into the generation of mental structures. Understanding linguistic structures could mean understanding mental structures. Chomsky (1972) points out,

it seems that most complex organisms have highly specific forms of sensory and perceptual organization that are associated with the Umwelt and the manner of life of the organism. There is little reason to doubt that what is true of lower organisms is true of humans as well. Particularly in the case of language, it is natural to expect a close relation between innate properties of the mind and features of linguistic structure; for language, after all, has no existence apart from its mental representation. Whatever properties it has must be those that are given to it by the innate mental processes of the organism that has invented it and that

invents it anew with each succeeding generation, along with whatever properties are associated with the conditions of its use. Once again, it seems that language should be, for this reason, a most illuminating probe with which to explore the organization of mental processes (pp. 94-95).

Ways of knowing the world and ways of organizing that knowledge of the world correspond with the ways people have of organizing knowledge about themselves. Mental processes organize a person's perceptual field. His experience at any moment is his whole perceptual field and the mental processes by which he discovers or creates the meaning of that moment is part of his experience, although he may not be conscious of the mental constructions he is employing.

Linguistic competence relates to the interplay of mental processes in that it suggests an innate organizing ability that bridges external phenomena (what Chomsky calls experience) and personal meanings. Language is not the only external phenomenon that the individual encounters and learns to manipulate. However, it is pervasive, in that it is encountered everywhere. As a widespread phenomenon, having both external and internal realizations, it cannot but be linked with a person's perceptual field. In addition, it is integral, in that language links human experiences together in a representational system that merges internal and external experiences. An advantage of Chomsky's notion of competence is that it allows us to consider people as having innate organizing abilities while providing for the effects of environment upon the resultant mental structures.

Thus, competence is both a process and a product in the individual. By developing an organized concept of grammar the individual creates a product; by using that product to construct and understand utterances he

engages in a process. As in psychological theory that proposes that the individual's phenomenal self is both a process and a product in his experience; competence recognizes the dual nature of the individual's relations to his world.

Piaget (1971a), in attempting to describe the constructive dimensions of cognition, says that the biological organism develops structures for regulating exchanges with the environment, and that these structures are regularly being recreated in ways that extend the range of the organism. This suggests that linguistic competence is a means of extension of the individual, allowing him greater and greater mastery over the external world.

I believe that this is a valid way of approaching the internal processes of the individual, although it may be wrenching Chomsky's conception somewhat out of its original form to apply it directly to cognitive dimensions. Chomsky is saying that beyond the actual linguistic performance of the individual there is an abstract representation of the whole of language structure that he must have in order to generate utterances. Other factors such as memory, situational factors, degree of personal threat, etc. affect what is actually said and how grammatical the utterance may be. However, the abstract representation of language is also a force in the production of concrete sentences.

Developmental Psycholinguistics

The most promising attempt to link the acquisition of language in children with the syntactic structures posited by Chomsky has been the work of David McNeill at Michigan. Basing his formulations upon transformational grammar and longitudinal studies in language acquisition,

McNeill (1966) attempts to explain how actual speech performance derives from linguistic competence. To do this, he says, we must keep in mind the distinction between performance and competence.

We are interested in eventually accounting for a child's linguistic performance, and this. . . requires that we rigorously maintain the performance-competence distinction. It is possible to describe performance without explaining it, but if we wish to explain performance, we must show how it derives from competence; that is, how the regularities in a child's grammatical knowledge produce regularities in his overt linguistic behavior. Nothing short of this will suffice (p. 17).

The first step in explaining how competence gives rise to performance is to account for the development of linguistic competence. Without going into the highly detailed, and sometimes contradictory, empirical data in regard to acquisition, we can observe an overall progression from simple one- and two-word utterances to complex grammatical constructions. The pattern of differentiation suggests a continuing elaboration of specific knowledge of grammatical classes and constructions and an internalization of abstract rules that order speech production.

Early sentence production involves the use of two classes of words: pivot and open. Pivot words in general describe relationships and actions, denote characteristics, etc. They are usually not fixed to any particular referents, but can be applied to a variety of specific, contextual referents. Open-class words, most often denoting specific referents, are more plentiful in the child's vocabulary. These seem to be added easily to his repertoire, possibly because of the relatively fixed meanings. At any rate, by choosing a pivot word and an open word a child constructs elementary sentences such as "boy (open) all gone (pivot)," "my plane," "Hi Mommy," "that Daddy," and so on.

The early formed pivot and open class grammars become differentiated into more formal classes as the child adds to his vocabulary and to his grammatical knowledge. McNeill claims that this process leads to the individual's sophisticated knowledge of the native language, that the child builds a hierarchy of categories by distinguishing the words that comprise his pivot class further and further. From an early use of pivot words and open words, pivot words are separated into classes of articles (a, an, the), adjectives, demonstrative pronouns, possessive pronouns, etc.

In each case, new classes appeared through subdivision of one of the pivot classes. . . and so we can say that the process of development here was differentiation of the pivot class. There is no evidence of independent discovery of the adult grammatical classes; they are merely removed from the pivot class like a banana peel (p. 28).

Progressive differentiation of grammatical classes in this fashion suggests that the child is learning categories for classifying words. He has at his disposal the ability to formulate hierarchies of grammaticality which reflect his knowledge of grammatical patterns irrespective of particular words placed in the pattern, and the capacity to generate particular rules for sentences construction that allow for certain words used in a certain context.

For example, recognition of the grammaticality of the sentence, "colorless green ideas sleep furiously" (to use Chomsky's famous linguistic example), comes from a knowledge of the appropriate patterns and positions of certain classes of words. We can utter the above sentence with an intonation pattern that fits with how sentences normally sound. Thus,

although the sentence is essentially meaningless, it is semi-grammatical. Knowing that it is somehow grammatical means knowing grammatical structures of one's language. In addition, knowing that it is not completely grammatical means knowing a series of rules that do not allow for abstract nouns (ideas) to be modified by concrete adjectives (green), etc.

There exist substantive and formal universals according to Chomsky (1972). The child learns both as he acquires his native language, thereby becoming proficient at recognizing the grammaticality of sentences such as the above. McNeill (1966) calls this process of deriving a grammatical theory of his language a Language Acquisition Device (LAD).

Equipped with both formal and substantive universals, LAD [Language Acquisition Device] operates something like a scientist constructing a theory. LAD observes a certain amount of empirical data, the primary linguistic data, and formulates hypotheses that will account for them from its knowledge of the formal and substantive universals. Further observation may lead to changes in LAD's hypotheses, but all new hypotheses will also be phrased in terms of the formal and substantive universals. Thus, the universals guide and limit acquisition. . . . The advantage to a child of having universals such as the hierarchy of categories is that he can progress toward the grammatical classes of adult English step-by-step. He does not have to notice, hypothesize, and test all distinctions at once. A simple dichotomy or trichotomy will serve at first. The rest of the distinctions are taken up in an order determined by the hierarchical arrangement of categories. If the same hierarchy underlies both adult grammar and a child's development, the child would be able to progress rapidly and surely to full linguistic competence (p. 39).

Innate Capacities

Linguists, particularly transformational linguists, often are led to propose innate structures or capacities in humans, in order to account for the rapid and systematic acquisition of language. Although I believe

that it is unnecessary to assume that children are born with the general, universal knowledge of grammatical relations that Chomsky has proposed, it is convenient to credit the child with some sort of innate ability that allows him to develop linguistically. The ability, however, as Piaget (1971a, p. 47) points out, must be developmental; that is, it must be acquired and elaborated as the brain functions mature and as the child develops more powerful representations of his world. H. Sinclair-de-Zwart (1964) states that the sensori-motor schemes as they are transformed into mental operations upon the environment "would determine the manner in which the linguistic structures are acquired (p. 371)."

J. H. Greenberg (1966) observes that there are grammatical relations that exist universally in language, or as near to universal as we are able to specify currently. McNeill uses this as evidence for the existence of basic grammatical relations in each child's linguistic endowment. Such an assumption assigns to the child the role of knowing entity who "discovers" what linguistic community he has been born into by sorting out the specific features of his native language from what he knows to be true universally. Stated this way, such beliefs about innate abilities sound naive and hyperbolic. However, an important consideration in regard to this is that the linguistic universals may represent an innate capacity to structure cognition in particular ways and an inability to structure them in different ways. That is, what is commonly available as an organizational force in all languages may reflect what is commonly, or even necessarily, available in the mental processes of humans. As the child

sorts through the linguistic evidence and constructs a grammar for himself, he may be choosing from a limited set of possibilities as ordered by linguistic universals. McNeill (1966) says:

LAD must be equipped with knowledge of just those specific aspects of linguistic competence that cannot be extracted from overt speech, namely, appropriate generic grammatical classes and hierarchical structures. . . . We might turn this assertion around and say that languages have deep features, unmarked in overt speech, precisely because children (like LAD) have the specific linguistic capacities that correspond to them. A language with different features would be unlearnable by LAD and, presumable, by children. The evolution of language so as to include particular universal features, therefore, is necessarily tied to the linguistic capacities of language learners (p. 50).

If we take the transformational grammar position seriously, we begin to see the role of language development in light of basic cognitive capacities. What becomes more important is to understand the structure of linguistic competence and performance. Evidence concerning the particular order of learned linguistic rules conflict, and notions about the place where meaning is attached to utterances conflict, but the basic structure of language capacity is generally agreed upon.

Deep Structures and Personal Meaning

Deep structures in transformational terms consist of the underlying strings of abstract rules that indicate the way a sentence will be realized in surface structure. That is, in deep structure, a concept which Chomsky introduced in 1965 to replace the notion of kernel sentences, the native speaker's understanding of ambiguity and disambiguity in language comes into play. This underlying structure still accounts for the speaker's ability to understand novel utterances and to interpret sentences that initially may be ambiguous.

A major formal argument currently rages among transformational linguists over the placement of semantic markers in the structural scheme. In 1965, Chomsky claimed that the deep structures contain all the essential information for semantic interpretation, thereby formalizing the linguists' intuitions about where linguistic meaning enters in sentence construction. However, Chomsky (1971) lately has altered that position to suggest that semantic markers occur at the surface level of sentence production, which waters down the assertion of deep structure as containing all the significant information about sentences. A host of transformational linguists, however, hold to the earlier viewpoint about the placement of semantic markers.

It makes more psychological sense to view semantic interpretations of words or complete utterances as existing on a deep level. Osgood's semantic differential, for example, suggests an internal constellation of dimensions around which a person orders concepts and symbols. These symbols which gather further "meaning" for individuals with experience would come into play in speech production from the onset. Deep level in these terms, then, would be the "preconscious," inner speech level of language production.

A distinction needs to be made here between the formal dictionary (lexical) meanings of words and the personal meanings they acquire. While a person's basic knowledge of a concept comes from its lexical meaning (Sullivan, 1953), that is, the agreed upon meaning of words or concepts in social interaction, his personal meanings are altered by his experience. Transformational grammar includes as part of the lexical meaning a semantic

component which indicates the ways in which the various meanings of the word may be related to other words. Katz and Fodor (1963), for example, propose that a semantic theory have "projection rules" which would match the native speaker's ability to sort the meaning of a sentence from all the possible meanings that might exist because of words that can be used in a variety of ways. That would be the beginning, it seems, of a link between the formal characteristic of words and their operational characteristics.

Describing each word in terms of its semantic features, so as to make available in some formal way what is available to the individual operationally, becomes a massive task. Judith Greene (1972) cites an example of how various meanings of a word could be written in transformational grammar notation.

Entries for the verb hit might be as follows:
hit (sense 1):+V, + (collide with, + (physical
 object. . .physical object)
hit (sense 2):+V, +(strike), +(higher animal
 . . .physical object) (p. 71).

In this fashion semantic markers would be indicated in the lexical item itself. However, this still does not account for the native speaker's understanding the particular meaning of the word in a certain context.

At this point we have to appeal to the individual's knowledge of the word, his own experience. Languages do not indicate all the probable occurrences and all of the actual experiences someone may have. Accounting for experience may be out of the province of linguistics, but it is definitely in the province of psychology, and theoretical stalemates may be overcome by making bridges to sister disciplines. Katz and Fodor (1963)

limit their analysis to features of language that may reasonably be supposed to be part of each person's repertoire regardless of individual experience.

Judith Greene (1972) says,

At first sight this seems a perfectly reasonable distinction. The semantic component can be thought of as describing the language user's ability to understand all possible semantic readings of a sentence in the same way as the syntactic component gives the rules for producing all possible grammatical sentences. Which particular sentence is uttered or which interpretation is accepted on any one occasion is a matter beyond the scope of a purely linguistic theory.

The real difficulty arises because it can plausibly be argued that semantic markers are themselves based on knowledge of the world; for instance, the knowledge that cats and dogs are animals but not human (except perhaps in their owners' eyes). Moreover, some markers seem to depend merely on current conventions. A nice example is the allocation of the marker (male) to the word priest, which would mean that the sentence The landlord knocked up the priest could be given only the interpretation "The landlord awakened the priest by knocking on his door." Clearly, the possibility of women being ordained would allow another interpretation. At present there appears to be no generally satisfactory solution to this problem of making a distinction between knowledge of a language and knowledge of the world (p. 73).

Drawing a distinction between knowledge of language and knowledge of the world is essential to formalization of language. It is presumed that language can be described fully and systematically in terms of its own structure, apart from daily experiences. Hence the emphasis upon competence rather than performance. The methodological problems of linguistic theory, such as where to assign semantic components a place in the structure, may have little to do at the present time with the problems of psychology.

From a perceptual point of view all the knowledge a person possesses is a result of his past and present experiences. The knowledge he possesses in regards to words, then, would incorporate the lexical meanings, the semantic markers, personal history with that word, prevailing cultural contexts, etc. I suggest that it becomes productive to consider all of the linguistic knowledge a person possesses as a function of daily experience, for then we can approach the question of the organization of that knowledge with a firm ground in personal experience.

Personal Experience

The total experience of the individual linguistically is organized around his symbolizing capacity, his experiences through the act of communication, and his abstract knowledge of his language. However much we may be able to describe the external, overt incidence of speech, we are left with only a partial understanding of the relationship between language and self. Areas of linguistic experience have external, social representations, but they also must have an internal, individual representation.

Internalization of external phenomena, as indicated above, is an organizational process. That is, as the child is learning to manipulate symbols, as he takes on the attitudes of others, and as he constructs an abstract representation of the grammar of his language, he is not merely absorbing features like a sponge. His capacity for abstraction and generalization allows him to find a way of organizing the incoming information. It is not that external impressions or phenomena are assimilated and then organized, but that the assimilation, or internalization process, if you will, is organizational in itself. This is the phenomenal field of the individual.

The individual is constantly organizing the world for himself (Kelly, 1963). His perceptions of physical reality, of the relationship of others to himself, of his own adequacy are organized into a total system. In perceptual terms the individual can be described as striving for the maintenance of a unified organization. This means that the individual must possess a means for anticipating and choosing from a range of possibilities those that will help him maintain his particular organization. As Prescott Lecky (1945) points out,

the ability to foresee and predict environmental happenings, to understand the world one lives in and thus to be able to anticipate events and prevent the necessity for sudden readjustments, is an absolute prerequisite for the maintenance of unity (p. 50).

Unity in personality structure means an internal unity. We cannot see it from outside. At best we can infer from the patterns of a person's behavior a particular internal organization that represents his perceptual field. Likewise, in attempting to deal in an organized way with the internal structure of language, we can infer an organization that accounts for the external representations. Kelly (1963) in the elaboration of his psychology of personal constructs states that in his seeking to anticipate events the individual evolves hierarchically arranged constructs, having systematic relationships among themselves.

Each person attunes his ear to the replicative themes he hears and each attunes his ear in a somewhat different way. But it is not mere certainty that man seeks; if that were so, he might take great delight in the repetitive ticking of the clock. More and more he seeks to anticipate all impending events of whatsoever nature. This means that he must develop a system in which the most unusual future can be anticipated in terms of a replicated aspect of the familiar past (p. 58).

Looking at the individual's ability to anticipate linguistic events in terms of their familiarity with already known aspects of language, we see that the individual must be relating novel utterances, either heard or produced by him, to an abstract organization of features. Chomsky's suggestion of deep structures and transformations fits in with the necessity of having an organized language system capable of anticipating produced speech.

I am suggesting that a structural description of language, insofar as it represents an internally systematized structure, can help us in understanding the structure of personality. I do not mean that personality is precisely structured like a transformational grammar, but I do mean that, given the organized nature of personality, perception, and behavior, the structural description put forth in transformational grammar provides a means for understanding the constructions a person makes. As McNeill (1966) points out:

If the capacity for language is a special case of a more general cognitive capacity, it would follow that the latter must have all the universal properties of the former. In short, the appropriate theory of mind may be a transformational system in which a vast range of complex ideas is converted into a much smaller range of abstract cognitive structures, just as a true grammar converts an infinite range of sentences into a limited number of abstract deep structures. (p. 37).

McNeill's conception of mind, as a transformational system that relates an individual's cognitions about the world in an economic fashion, can be expanded to the perceptual realm. Perception, we recall, involves differentiation of a figure in relation to a background. Certain figures emerge from an undifferentiated background and recede as they are not longer needed in conscious awareness. For example, in learning the conjugation

of verbs in Latin, a person initially is quite aware of the conjugation classes and makes his decision about what verb form to use on the basis of its fitting in the pattern that he is being taught. As proficiency increases, he has to consult the memorized conjugations less and less. Those features of the language are becoming internalized. He is less conscious of the application of rules in constructing sentences; they become the background from which other figures emerge (Combs, 1959).

As learned constructions are replaced in perception by other phenomena, the learned features recede from prominence but they still affect future perception. As part of the ground, they participate in the formation of other relationships. That is why it is important to understand the internalized structures in attempting to understand personality. Internalized features may become the unchallenged and unconscious assumptions from which a person bases his daily actions particularly in the case of language and mental processes.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

John Jeffrey Gorrell, who has never identified with his first name, was born to Wilfred and Jessie Gorrell, December 26, 1945, the second of four sons. In his early years he was a bookish kind of child who preferred to read than to play outdoor games. He still is bookish and tends to be sedentary, but he goes outside to ride his bike and water his plants.


Jeff entered Vanderbilt University in 1964 where he majored in English, learned to appreciate country music and amassed an undistinguished academic record. In January 1969 he entered the University of Florida as a graduate student in English. During the next 4½ years he received an M.A. in English literature, married, took every available course in Medieval poetry, divorced, developed two close friendships, taught freshman English, and learned the rudiments of cartooning. He still maintains his friendships, reads Medieval texts and draws cartoons. Sometimes he misses teaching poetry.

Jeff's interest in psychology, which stretches back to his undergraduate days, and in Humanistic Education led him to the Foundations department in September, 1972. There he found his intellectual home. During the past three years he has served as Editor for New Voices in Education, been a co-leader in various Gestalt therapy workshops, hired himself out as a ghost-writer, learned how to juggle, become a minor authority on old comic books, counseled teen-agers for Project CREST, fallen in love, and read an unimaginable number of books. He is proud of all these accomplishments.

His plans for the future include getting married, moving to Louisiana, learning to play the piano, teaching Educational Psychology, reading many


more books, and writing. Jeff finds it difficult to predict where his profession and his interests will carry him. He becomes most excited by the works of Arthur W. Combs, Alfred Korzybski, Walt Whitman, Fritz Perls, Leo Tolstoy, Carl Barks, E. E. Cummings, Abraham Maslow, Walt Kelly, Claude Levi-Strauss, Geoffrey Chaucer, Jorge Luis Borges, Gregory Bateson, Hank Williams, Johannes Brahms, Jean Piaget and Paul Valéry. He believes in the power of ideas, serendipity, excellence in every form, and in himself.

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
Arthur W. Combs, Chairman
Professor of Education

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
Walter A. Busby
Associate Professor of Education

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


Vernon Van De Riet
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

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Assistant Professor of Education

This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the College of Education and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

August, 1975.


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